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THE NATURALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION BY JOHN DEWEY

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Before investigating the naturalistic interpretation of religion by John Dewey it is necessary that we deal briefly with certain introductory matters, -- Dewey's life and achievements, the problems with which the dissertation is concerned, the meaning of the terms used, the organization of the study, previous investigations of the subject, the sources of this investigation, and a consideration of the early period of Dewey's development, when he held religious views other than those which now characterize him. Chapter I is devoted to these tasks.

A. JOHN DEWEY

John Dewey, whose interpretation of religion we are to investigate, was born in Burlington, Vermont, October 20, 1859.[1] He received his early education in the same city and matriculated at the University of Vermont. It was a theologically liberal college under the dominance of the Scottish school.[2] In his senior year there Dewey made his first acquaintance with philosophy under the guidance of Professor H. A. P. Torrey, an

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[1] WWA, XVIII, 713

[2] J. Dewey, Art. 85, 14. Hereafter articles whose authorship is not designated will be those of Dewey himself.

exponent of intuitionalism.[3] After his graduation in 1879 he spent a year at public-school teaching and private study, during which he decided to make philosophy his life-work.[4]

The following year he enrolled at Johns Hopkins University "to enter upon that new thing, 'graduate work.'"[5] There Dewey fell under the influence of Hegelianism for the first time. The professor of philosophy, George Sylvester Morris (on leave of absence from the University of Michigan), possessed a firm belief, Dewey tells us, in the "demonstrated" truth of the substance of German idealism.[6] Morris had had Trendelenburg as his teacher at Berlin, and hence his Hegelianism was tinged with Aristotelianism. But he conveyed to his student a lasting respect for Hegel.[7] The early eighties were a period, too, of reaction against atomic

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[3] Op. cit., 15. It is interesting to note, however, in the light of Dewey's later philosophical development, that he attributes the awakening of his interests in philosophy to a course in natural science. There was a course given in his junior year, he says in recollection of college days, "that had excited a taste that in retrospect may be called philosophical. That was a rather short course, without laboratory work, in Physiology, a book of Huxley's being the text. It is difficult to speak with exactitude about what happened to me intellectually so many years ago, but I have an impression that there was derived from that study a sense of interdependence and interrelated unity that gave form to intellectual stirrings that had been previously inchoate, and created a kind of type or model of a view of things to which material in any field ought to conform. Subconsciously, at least, I was led to desire a world and a life that would have the same properties as had the human organism in the picture of it derived from study of Huxley's treatment. At all events, I got great stimulation from the study, more than from anything I had had contact with before; and as no desire was awakened in me to continue that particular branch of learning, I date from this time the awakening of a distinctive philosophic interest." Ibid, 13.

[4] Ibid, 16; cf. S. Buchanan, Art. 1, 286.

[5] Loc. cit.

[6] Ibid, 18.

[7] Op. cit., 19.

individualism and sensationalistic empiricism, "the time of Thomas Hill Green, of the two Cairds, of Wallace, of the appearance of the Essays in Philosophic Criticism."[8] Dewey found himself swept along by the thought-current of the day and became an Hegelian. His first published writings fall within this period, published naturally enough by the Hegelian organ, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, though they do not deal with Hegelian philosophy.[9] Dewey lists W. T. Harris, editor of the Journal, as one of the decisive influences on his philosophical career.[10]

The young philosopher received his Ph.D. degree in 1884 and immediately went West in search of a teaching position.[11] The next ten years of his life were spent on the faculties of two mid-Western universities,--first at the University of Michigan, as instructor and assistant professor of philosophy (1884-88), then for a year at the University of Minnesota (1888-89), and finally at the University of Michigan, again, as full professor (1889-94).[12] During this decade Dewey's first books appeared, a psychology text-book (1887), and a study of Leibniz's New Essays (1888), together with several short monographs on ethics. These years were marked by a gradual drift away from Hegelianism and the increasingly perceptible influence of William James.[13]

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[8] Op. cit., 18.

[9] See Bibliography for his early writings.

[10] Op. cit., 16.

[11] His dissertation, which was not published, was entitled, "The Psychology of Kant". M. H. Thomas and H. W. Schneider, BJD, 3.

[12] WWA, XVIII, 713.

[13] Op. cit., 20-21, 23, 24. Though Dewey left the Hegelian camp altogether and in time became one of the most determined foes of the Absolute, he confesses that his acquaintance with Hegel left a permanent deposit in his thinking. Ibid, 21.

In 1894 Dewey was called to the newly-founded University of Chicago to become the head of the department of philosophy.[14] There he began his pioneer work in the fields of philosophy and education. He established an experimental school for the purpose of testing educational theories, a school which soon caught the attention of schoolmasters far and wide and gained for its founder recognition the world over. The publishing of his School and Society (1889), which unfolded the thesis that the purpose of the school is to train society, marked the beginning of a new era in American education. At the same time Dewey's logical and epistemological studies won followers for him in the world of philosophy; within a few years he and his colleagues and disciples were referred to as the "Chicago School."[15]

In 1904 Dewey left the University of Chicago to become professor of philosophy at Columbia University. While here he wrote the books on philosophy which have made him famous, -- Ethics (1908; in collaboration with J. H. Tufts), The Influence of Darwin and Other Essays (1910), How We Think (1910), Democracy and Education (1916), Essays in Experimental Logic (1916), Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), The Public and Its Problems (1927), and The Quest for Certainty (1929). In the more than twenty-five years which Dewey spent at Columbia his instrumentalistic pragmatism came to be the dominant American philosophy.

Since his retirement in 1930 as professor emeritus Dewey has

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[14] WWA, XVIII, 713.

[15] William James in 1903: "Chicago has a School of Thought! It deserves the title of a new system of philosophy." CER, 445, 446.

continued to lecture and write. Five significant books have come from his pen, -- *Individualism, Old and New* (1930), *Philosophy and Civilization* (1931), *Art as Experience* (1934), *A Common Faith* (1934), and *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935).

John Dewey's life, long and productive, has been rich in honors. He possesses honorary degrees from universities here and abroad. Professionally he has been accorded the highest honors in the power of his colleagues to bestow. He is a past president of the American Psychological Association (1899-1900), of the American Philosophical Association (1905-6), a member of the National Academy of Science, and a corresponding member of L'Institut de France.[16] He is holder of the most distinguished lectureships in this country and abroad, -- at the Imperial University of Japan (1920), the first series on the Paul Carus Foundation (1925) (to which he was chosen by a committee of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the American Philosophical Association), the Gifford Lectures at the Scottish Universities (1929) (James and Royce being the only other Americans to be so honored), the William James Lecture at Harvard (1931), and the Terry Lectures on Religion at Yale (1934).

Naturally, Dewey has wielded great influence upon the thought and practice of our time. The professional honors just mentioned which have come to him testify to his philosophical influence. In education the experimental methods first enunciated by him at the University of Chicago have revolutionized the school system of America.[17] His fame as a

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[16] WWA, XVIII, 713.

[17] For the best accounts of Dewey's influence upon education see the papers prepared for his seventieth-birthday-celebration by J. H. Newlon, Art. 1, 691-700 and E. C. Moore, Art. 1, 37-47. For the best account of his general influence, see Holmes and others, JDMP.

leader in educational reconstruction has brought him official invitations from China to lecture to teachers on educational reform (1919-20), from the Turkish government to report on the reorganization of the national schools (1924), and from the Russian government to appraise the new regime (1928).[18] He has been an acknowledged leader of social thought in this country,[19] was for some years associated with Jane Addams,[20] and through his disciples has been one of the liberalizing forces in American life.[21] His influence in the arena of practical politics has been felt in his sponsorship of the People's Lobby, the League for Independent Political Action, of which he is national chairman, and his chairmanship of the international commission investigating the Moscow trials of Leon Trotzky.[22] In the field of religion the humanistic movement,[23] which has shown considerable strength in certain quarters,

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18. Cf. Han, MOE, 3

19. Cf. Robinson, ILP, 246.

20. Cf. J. W. Linn, JA, 386, 375.

21. "Croly, Kallen, Lippmann, Robinson, van Loon, LaFollette, Eastman, Baker, Howe, John Haynes Holmes, Rabbi Wise, Clarence Darrow, -- such, with scores of others, are the men who have colored the very action of our world with the thought of this man." Quoted, Wagner, SR, 729 (source not given).

22. Cf. N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1937, 1.

23. Cf. "A Humanist Manifesto", published in May, 1933, setting forth the tenets of humanist belief. See Potter, HR, 6-15.

is built on Dewey's naturalistic philosophy.[24] Professor Wagner is within the truth when he says, "Although Dewey is still relatively unknown to most citizens, it is very likely that he has had more to do with molding their careers than any other living American."[25]

We are to investigate, then, in this dissertation the religious views of the most distinguished American philosopher of our day, -- one who has swung the full orbit of philosophical thinking,[26] whose interests are as wide as experience, and whose influence has been felt, not only in the classroom, but in the world of practical affairs.

B. THE PROBLEM

The problem of the dissertation is to answer two questions: (1) What is John Dewey's interpretation of religion? (2) Is his interpretation valid? Upon analysis, (1) resolves itself into the following subordinate

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[24] R. G. Hall: "The humanistic drive of the present day goes back to Dewey more than to any other individual." Art. 1, 339.
O. A. Petty: Dewey's Naturalism is "the suppressed major premise of American Humanism." CSG, 10.
E. W. Lyman: "Dewey's naturalism underlies the interpretations of religion by A. E. Haydon, cf. The Quest of the Ages; by M. C. Otto, cf. Things and Ideals; and by H. N. Wieman." MTR, 233 note.
D. C. Macintosh: "Of contemporary American antitheistical humanism in general, however, the true father -- or should we say the grandfather? -- is John Dewey." "Contemporary Humanism", HABL, 44.

[25] SR, 729.

[26] Dewey was reared and educated in "a conventionally evangelical atmosphere of the more 'liberal' sort" (Art. 85, 15), learned his first philosophy from an intuitionalist, became in his graduate days an Hegelian, developed into a pragmatist with naturalistic leanings in the later years, and yet confesses that it is Plato who still provides his favorite philosophical reading. (Ibid, 21)

problems:

(a) What is Dewey's position with reference to the historic religious tradition of the Western world?

(b) What is his theory of the nature of "the religious"?[27]

(c) What does he conceive to be the true object of faith?

(d) What does he affirm about man, "the human abode of the religious function"?[28]

(e) How does he interpret the basic problems of religion (i.e., the phenomena of personal and institutional religion, the problems of evil, of immortality, and of the goal of human history)?

An analysis of (2) involves the following more specific questions:

(a) Is Dewey's interpretation of religion internally consistent?

(b) Has it taken into consideration all the facts?

(c) Is it philosophically fruitful (i.e., does it contain insights or raise problems which contribute to the development of philosophical thought about religion)?

The purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, both systematic and critical, -- to expound Dewey's theory of religion and to evaluate it.

C. THE MEANING OF "NATURALISTIC"

The subject for investigation, as already stated, is "The Naturalistic Interpretation of Religion by John Dewey." The question arises at once with regard to the meaning of the term "naturalistic" in connection with Dewey's interpretation of religion.

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27. Cf., CF, 3.

28. Cf., ibid, 59.

Dewey often uses the term to characterize his thought. As early as 1905 he called himself a "natural realist."[29] In 1907 in a letter to William James he described his views as naturalistic as contrasted with those of humanistic pragmatism:[30]

> The antecedents of humanism, via personal idealism, were distinctly an idealistic metaphysics. My own views are much more naturalistic, and a reaction against not merely intellectualistic and monistic idealism but against all idealism, except, of course, in the sense of ethical ideals.

In his spirited defense of his right to the title of "naturalist" in controversy with Santayana, he designated his philosophy "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism."[31] Experience and Nature says that his doctrine, as there set forth, is "either empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism, or, taking 'experience' in its usual signification, naturalistic humanism."[32] What is the meaning of "naturalistic" as Dewey uses it, particularly in connection with his interpretation of religion?

In a sense it is the task of the dissertation as a whole to define the meaning of "naturalistic" as Dewey employs the term with reference to his theory of religion. At this stage, however, we may say, summarily, that Dewey's interpretation of religion is "naturalistic" in three respects:

1. He rejects supernaturalism. The supernatural and the things that have grown up about it Dewey characterizes as "encumbrances" in the

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[29] Art. 30, 324-7.

[30] Letter to William James, November 28, 1907; Perry, TCJ, II, 528.

[31] Cf. Art. 76, 57.

[32] EAN^2, 1a.

opening paragraphs of his Common Faith and says that "what is genuinely religious will undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from them."[33] As we shall see in Chapter II of this study, he inveighs against the evils of supernaturalism in all of his major works of the past fifteen years.

2. He regards man, individual and social, "the human abode of the religious function", as a part of nature.[34]

3. He conceives of religion as "naturalistic" in its "foundations and bearings."[35] True religious faith, he asserts, attaches itself to the "possibilities of nature."[36]God, for him, is not a transcendent being but the unity, imaginatively grasped, of the ideal possibilities of existence.[37] Nature is the matrix "within which our ideal aspirations are born and bred."[38] Not only are the foundations of religion "naturalistic", but the ultimate bearing of religious faith is upon nature. Religion eventuates in "an idealism of action" for the re-shaping of nature, a "reorganization of the existent" so that "approved meanings are attained."[39]Nature "ceases to be something which must be accepted and submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It is now something to be modified, to be intentionally controlled."[40]

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[33] CF, 2.

[34] "It is quite true that in my whole philosophy I regard man as part of nature." Art. 91, 1552.

[35] CF, 57.

[36] QFC, 306.

[37] CF, 50.

[38] CF, 85.

[39] QFC, 304, 306.

[40] Ibid, 100.

It is to be noted that Dewey's philosophy is not naturalistic in the nineteenth-century sense of the term, -- mechanistic materialism. Dewey regards such materialism as contrary to fact.[41] The Newtonian philosophy of nature, wherein "dead matter moved under the impulse of insensate forces," he says, is "now discredited", the principle of indeterminacy of the newer physics being the final step of its dislodgement.[42] Nature is not a mechanism in the older mathematically-predetermined sense, but "something problematic, undecided, still going-on and as yet unfinished and indeterminate."[43] It is amenable to intelligent human control.[44]

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

The purpose of the dissertation, as we have said, is to expound and evaluate Dewey's interpretation of religion. The study proper begins with Chapter II, which seeks to relate Dewey's point of view to the historic, Graeco-Christian religious tradition of the Western world that forms the background of our religious life. He is exceedingly critical of this tradition, and the chapter mentioned seeks to expound his critique of the particular object of offense in it, -- the belief in the supernatural.

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[41] "Historically speaking, materialism and mechanistic metaphysics -- as distinct from mechanistic science -- designate the doctrine that matter is the efficient cause of life and mind, and that 'cause' occupies a position superior in reality to that of 'effect.' Both parts of this statement are contrary to fact." EAN, 262. Matter is not a metaphysical cause but a character of natural events. Cf. EAN, 73, 74, 262.

[42] QFC, 110, 98, 204.

[43] EAN, 348-9.

[44] QFC, 106.

Having disposed of historic supernaturalism, Dewey essays to give a "normative" definition of religion. Chapter III of the dissertation, "A Common Faith", sets forth what Dewey believes religion to be. The burden of the chapter is to expound his theory of "the religious", his conception of God, his view of the human abode of religion, and his solution for the perennial problems of religion.

An analysis of Dewey's critique of historic religion, as well as his own interpretation, will reveal, we believe, two presuppositions: (1) that scientific method is the only certain method of arriving at the truth; and, hence, the existence of supernatural objects of faith can never be established; and (2) that man by the use of scientific resources is capable of indefinite progress; his needs can be satisfied without reference to more-than-natural powers. Chapter IV of the dissertation is devoted to the examination of (1), while Chapter V will seek critically to evaluate (2).

The last brief section contains a summary of the dissertation and a statement of conclusions. A bibliography of works cited and consulted completes the study.

E. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

The literature on the problem of the dissertation is surprisingly meager. While much has been written on the several phases of Dewey's thought, only comparatively few authors have undertaken an exposition or appraisal of his religious views. In this section we shall mention the more significant of these.[45]

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[45] The authentic bibliography of works by and about Dewey is Thomas and Schneider, BJD.

There have been no books written upon Dewey's interpretation of religion, although there are several that deal with broader subjects and treat his views in the course of their argument. Edgar Sheffield Brightman has given a succinct account of Dewey's treatment of religious values, together with a criticism of it, in his Religious Values (1925), as well as in The Problem of God (1930).[46] Charles Hartshorne has devoted a chapter to criticism of Dewey's naturalistic interpretation of religion in his Beyond Humanism (1937). William E. Hocking's little book of Thoughts on Death and Life (1937) has some sharp observations on Dewey's Common Faith, though only passing reference is paid to it. Orville A. Petty, in a critique of religious humanism, devotes some caustic pages to Dewey's thought as supplying the philosophical foundation for the doctrines of the school (1936).[47] Hugh Vernon White appends a review of A Common Faith as a sort of after-thought to his Theology for Christian Missions (1937). American Philosophies of Religion by H. N. Wieman and B. E. Meland gives a part of one chapter to Dewey, interpreting him incorrectly, we believe, as a theist (1936).[48] While containing material relevant to the problem of this study, none of these books can be called thoroughgoing investigations of Dewey's philosophy of religion as a whole.

Besides single-page reviews of Dewey books, a few scattering articles have appeared on his religious theory. The Christian Century has published a short symposium on the question, "Is John Dewey a Theist?",

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[46] RV, 140-52; PG, 52-58.

[47] CSG, Chapters II, III, et passim.

[48] None of these works are cited by Thomas and Schneider, op. cit.

H. N. Wieman arguing pro and E. E. Aubrey and Dewey himself arguing con.[49] J. W. Buckham gives a brief exposition and critique of A Common Faith in the Journal of Religion.[50] An article by R. G. Hall in Open Court on "The Significance of John Dewey for Religious Interpretation" sets forth the factors in Dewey's general philosophy which make themselves manifest in his interpretation of religion.[51] Its value is conditioned by the fact, however, that it was written before Dewey's most explicit works on religion appeared. A. E. Haydon, the humanist, gives us a short, naturalistic interpretation of Dewey's God.[52] H. H. Horne has written a monograph, brief and not too accurate, on "John Dewey's Philosophy, Especially The Quest for Certainty,"which states the religious implications of his philosophy.[53]Professor Otto has written a short appraisal of Dewey's religious views from the standpoint of a humanist.[54] H. P. Van Dusen's ten-page exposition of "The Faith of John Dewey" in Religion and Life is excellent, but, of course, too brief.[55] H. N. Wieman has written several articles on Dewey for the Journal of Religion and The Christian Century, but their interpretation of Dewey's God is repudiated by Dewey himself.[56]

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[49] 51(1934), 1550-53.

[50] Buckham, Art. 1.

[51] Hall, Art. 1.

[52] Haydon, Art. 1.

[53] Horne, Art. 1.

[54] Otto, Art. 2.

[55] Van Dusen, Art. 1

[56] Cf. Art. 91, 1552-3. For Wieman's articles on Dewey, see Bibliography, Section B.

The citation of these few sources indicates the meager work that has been done in the field of this dissertation. To our knowledge there has been nothing written which exceeds twenty-five consecutive pages in length. Much of that which has been produced is open to question touching its interpretation of Dewey's views. This investigation, therefore, deals with an aspect of Dewey's thinking which has not yet had adequate treatment by students of the philosophy of religion.[57]

F. THE SOURCES

We turn from a survey of writings about Dewey to his own works. The development of his religious views, as garnered from his writings, may be divided, roughly, into four periods:

I. 1882-90. During these years Dewey's point of view was theistic. Since, however, we are interested in his early viewpoint only in a passing way, it will not be necessary to cite his early writings.

II. 1890-1920. This period of thirty years was, broadly speaking, a period of indifference on Dewey's part to religion. His early

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57. Two reasons, at least, may be offered for the sparsity of material on Dewey's interpretation of religion. In the first place, Dewey's interest throughout the years has not been primarily religious but educational and social. He confesses in his spiritual autobiography, "Social interests and problems from an early period had to me the intellectual appeal and provided an intellectual sustenance that many seem to have found primarily in religious questions."(Art. 85, 20). Hence,until recently (since 1928) he had written very little specifically about religion. Secondly, judged by traditional supernaturalistic standards there is little in Dewey that is religious. Religion for him is the monopoly of no special institution but the spiritual import of our common life together; economics, education, and science being as truly "religious" as corporate worship. (Cf. Hall, Art. 1, 338.) Hence, because he was not interested in religion in its traditional meaning and because religion in Dewey's sense does not seem religious to many, there was very little primary material about which a literature could grow.

friendliness to theism cooled off. His attention was occupied with experimental ventures in education and with the development of his instrumentalistic philosophy. Only incidental writings pertain to religion. Within this period, however, Dewey produced works which are significant as laying the ground principles for his later philosophy of religion. Of these the following are the most noteworthy:

A. In the development of his theory of knowledge:

1. "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?", one of the essays in the volume in honor of William James (1908).[58]
2. How We Think (1910).
3. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought. (1910).
4. Essays in Experimental Logic (1916).

B. In the development of his notion of human progress:

1. "Progress." (1916).[59]
2. Democracy and Education. (1916).[60]
3. "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" (1917).[61]

III. 1920-1929. During these years the implications of his instrumentalistic philosophy worked themselves out in a sharp critique of the classic religious tradition, set forth especially in his three great

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[58] Art. 37.

[59] Art. 53.

[60] Dewey says, "Although a book called Democracy and Education was for many years that in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully expounded, I do not know that philosophic critics, as distinct from teachers, have ever had recourse to it." Art. 85, 22-23.

[61] CI, 3-69.

books of the period:

1. Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), which characterizes classic philosophy as "compensatory", dialectically formal, and concerned with a supernatural Reality and calls for reconstruction in the name of a philosophy that will enlighten "the moral forces which move mankind" and contribute "to the aspirations of men to attain to a more ordered and intelligent happiness;"[62]
2. Experience and Nature (1925), which indicts the classic tradition for its dualisms, which the book seeks to replace by its concept of continuity;[63]
3. The Quest for Certainty (1929), which attacks the specious claims of the Aristotelian tradition to certainty, pointing out that the only certainty worthy of the name is that arising from experimentally-verified control.[64]

The subject-matter of Chapter II of the dissertation, "The Attack on the Supernatural", is drawn mostly from these sources.

IV. 1929 to the present. Having disposed of the classic religious tradition (though he never really relinquishes the attack), Dewey entered upon a period of more positive thought concerning religion which finds most complete expression in A Common Faith (1934), his conception of what religion ought to be. Besides this book there are several articles that

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[62] Cf. RPH, 18, 20, 22, 27.

[63] Cf. EAN^2, III.

[64] Cf. QFC, Chapters I, IV.

help to define his theory of religion:

1. "What I Believe" in the Forum (1930), [65] which is probably the best-expressed exposition of Dewey's philosophy within brief compass;
2. "A God or The God" in the Christian Century (1933),[66] a discussion of the meaning of "God";
3. " Humanist Manifesto" (1933), a statement of the tenets of religious humanism, of which Dewey is a signer;[67]
4. "The Liberation of Religion" (1934),[68] an abstract of A Common Faith;
5. "Is John Dewey a Theist?" (1934),[69] which makes more explicit his conception of God.

These writings form the basis for the discussion in Chapter III of the dissertation.

G. DEWEY'S EARLY RELIGIOUS VIEWS

It is the avowed purpose of this study to treat Dewey's interpretation of religion as it appears in the mature years of his development. Before

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[65] Art. 86.

[66] Art. 89.

[67] This "Manifesto" was prepared under the auspices of the New Humanist and released to the press, May 1, 1933. The original draft was written by Professor Roy Wood Sellars and then revised by C. W. Reese, A. E. Haydon, R. B. Bragg, E. H. Wilson, and Robert Morss Lovett. It was submitted to Dewey, who signed it, without reservation or comment, according to a personal letter from E. H. Wilson to the writer.

[68] Art. 93.

[69] Art. 91.

proceeding to the task, however, a word may be in order concerning his early religious views.

As Dewey tells us, he was reared in " a conventionally evangelical atmosphere of the more 'liberal' sort."[70] As we may expect, his early writings show a distinct friendliness to religion of the traditional kind. Their tone is one not of revolt but of respect for religion. He contributed to the Andover Review and Bibliotheca Sacra, religious publications.[71] Such expressions as "the ever-valid religious ideas",[72] "our theology",[73] "those sublime words of the Apostle's Creed, 'I believe in the resurrection of the body,'"[74] and the statement that the notion of democracy "in grandeur has but one equal in history, and that its fellow, namely, that every man is a priest of God"[75] reflect an attitude that is never felt again in Dewey's writings. Anti-religious philosophies such as materialism, with "its reversed logic, which attempts to get the higher from the lower, instead of accounting for the

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[70] Art. 85, 15.

[71] See Bibliography.

[72] Art. 13, 684.

[73] This passage reflects his friendliness to religion: He says, in reviewing Sterrett's Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, "I cannot but think it a happy omen in the present juncture of our theology, when the attempt to find God immanent in the world and in history is becoming so manifest, that Dr. Sterrett should give us a book whose whole trend is so forcibly and consciously in that direction." Ibid, 685.

[74] A student of Dewey's later naturalism would find it difficult to believe that he ever wrote these words: "There is the body, the natural body, first. Spirit indwells within the body, and manifesting itself, realizing its own nature, it makes that body its own organ and servant. It makes it the spiritual. . . . . It is by no accident or meaningless chance that we read in the Apostles' Creed those sublime words: 'I believe in the Resurrection of the Body.'" Art. 5, 263.

[75] ETHD, 14.

lower on the ground of the higher",[76] agnosticism, which is but "a transitory resting-place",[77] and Darwinism, with its anti-theistical implications,[78] receive short shrift from him in these early articles. He insists that theology is essential to ethics, and whatever discounts

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76. Art. 5, 247.

77. "Agnosticism is by nature a compromise. It is a treaty of partition which would divide the kingdom of reality into halves, and proclaim one supernatural and unknowable, the other natural and the realm of knowledge." Art. 7, 574.

78. Dewey says that the argument which seeks to explain purposiveness in nature by appeal to "variations", "survival of the fittest", "selection", and the like "is suicidal. It only changes the special case into a general law. It gets rid of the primitive purposiveness of, say, a given reflex act, only by importing purposiveness, and thus intelligence, into the very structure of nature. It simply says that nature is such that, by the observance of its own law as ascertained by science, it gives rise to action for and by ends..... Darwinism, far from overthrowing this principle, merely establishes it as a general law of the universe, of the structure of things. Nature is made theological all the way through." (Art. 5, 250) This is essentially the same point that Bowne makes in his argument that the "survival of the fittest" is not the problem for naturalism to solve but "the arrival of the fit." (See B. P. Bowne, MET, 280.) Dewey has to say of Spencer: "There is indeed an anthropomorphism which is degrading, but it is anthropomorphism which sets up the feeblest element of its own thinking, pure being, as Mr. Spencer does, or the poorest element of its own feeling, a sensation, and reverences that as its own and the universe's cause. That is the anthropomorphism of the enslaved thought which has not yet awakened to the consciousness of its own totality and spiritual freedom." Art. 6, 169.

the former destroys the latter.[79] Dewey's first articles, as we have seen, are unmistakably friendly to traditional "supernaturalistic" (to use Dewey's later term of reproach) Christianity.

When we examine Dewey's conception of the nature of religion more closely, it appears, from the scant evidence we have, to be closely allied with morals. True religious feeling arises out of moral experience; the gulf between the actual and the ideal which occurs in the moral life can be overcome only through identification of the self in religion with an ideal which is actual, God. "Religious experience is the sphere in which this identification of one's self with the completely realized personality, or God, occurs."[80] The heart of religion, then, is surrender,[81] which, like all life, involves faith.[82]

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[79] "We believe that the cause of theology and morals is one, and that whatever banishes God from the heart of things, with the same edict excludes the ideal, the ethical, from the life of man. Whatever exiles theology makes ethics an expatriate. And we believe these things not from obstinacy, nor from traditional prejudice, as it seems to us, nor yet alone from a mere conviction that supernatural restraint and sanction are needed for the practical moralizing of humanity; but we are convinced that the physical interpretation of the universe is one which necessarily shuts out those ideas and principles which are fundamental to ethics; we are sure that an interpretation of reality which confines it to the coexistences of space, the sequences of time, and the reign of mechanical law, is fatal at once to the categories of morals and to the attitude of the practical life or morality." Art. 7, 577.

[80] PS^3, 338.

[81] Ibid, 339.

[82] "Since the entire intellectual, aesthetic, and moral life is one of idealization, it is evident that the feeling of faith, which religion insists upon and induces, is the feeling which is implicitly involved in all experience whatever." (PS^3, 340) Borden Parker Bowne could have written this sentence!

God is conceived of as "the organic unity of the self and the world, of the ideal and the real", -- "the true self-related." [83] He is the Absolute.[84] He is not conceived pantheistically,[85] however, but in a personalistic fashion, -- as "the perfect and universal personality."[86]

Though Dewey's views on religion in this period must be drawn from fleeting, scattered remarks on the subject, it is clear that Hegel's philosophy, in which he had been immersed in the early years, had influenced to some extent his own thought about religion.[87] (1) As we have suggested, he identified God with the Absolute. (2) He conceived of the essence of religion the identification of the finite self with the ideal self.[88] Hegel had insisted before him that true religion is manifested in the reconciliation of man and God through return of the isolated finite mind into identity with God.[89] (3) Dewey's belief that the philosophy of religion is the true apologetic for religion is in keeping with Hegel's view that philosophy gives us the exact and adequate concepts or notions

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83. Op. cit., 244.

84. Cf. Art. 6, 157.

85. Pantheism, particularly of the Spinozistic variety, he holds to be logically untenable. Art. 2, 257.

86. PS^3, 340.

87. He says of Hegel's contribution to theology: "Both in this higher work (of showing the authority of the absolute idea of Religion) and in the translating of the ever-valid religious ideas out of outworn and inadequate forms and language into more adequate and convincing modern forms theology has much to learn from Hegel." Art. 13, 684.

88. Cf., Supra, 21.

89. Cf. EPW, III Teil, #566.

of reality.[90]

From the early nineties on this friendliness of Dewey for religion gradually disappears. Dewey never returns to the friendly, theistic view of religion that he sponsored in the first decade of his professional life.

The question will be raised as to why Dewey departed from the faith he held in his younger years. A categorical answer probably cannot be given, but several explanations of it have merit in them. In the first place, his professional duties were non-religious in the technical sense of the term. He was a professor of psychology, philosophy, and education. He became absorbed in developing and defending new practices and theories in education. By that law which prescribes that functions not exercised shall atrophy, his very successes in philosophy and pedagogy militated against the retention of interest in religion.

Secondly, it is likely that Dewey himself consciously kept aloof from religion that the objectivity of the philosopher might not be impaired. He says in one place,[91]

> I have not been able to attach much importance to religion as a philosophic problem; for the effect of that attachment seems to be in the end a subornation of candid philosophic thinking to the alleged but factitious needs of some special set of convictions.

Further, it is possible that his indifference to religion grew out of unfortunate experiences with religion or religious people. Dewey's own

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[90] Dewey says that he is "in heartiest sympathy" with the view that "a Philosophy of Religion is the only final Apologetic for Christianity." (Art. 13, 684, 685) As for Hegel it may be said that the whole course of his metaphysics "is, indeed, an argument for the existence of God." Calkins, PPP, 392.

[91] Art. 85, 20.

testimony is contradictory at this point. In his intellectual autobiography, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism", he says,[92]

> I was brought up in a conventionally evangelical atmosphere of the more 'liberal' sort; and the struggles that later arose between acceptance of that faith and the discarding of traditional and institutional creeds came from personal experiences and not from the effects of philosophical teaching.

Three years afterward, however, when Professor Macintosh suggested that unfortunate experiences had perhaps colored his views of religion he was quick to deny it, maintaining that his attitude toward religion was the outcome of his philosophical development.[93]

> I will state that nothing untoward has happened, and that my present attitude toward theology, various creeds and various philosophies of religion developed slowly and pari- passu with the general maturing of my philosophic ideas.

It seems to us that this is the fundamental reason for Dewey's apostasy from his early faith. As we shall see in Chapters IV and V, an instrumentalistic, humanistic philosophy leaves no place for religion in the traditional sense. Dewey probably did not realize it when his thought first began to move in these directions. But as he began to draw out the implications of his philosophy its irreconcilability with historic religions must have become ever more plain. It seems to us more than historical coincidence that in the same decade (1890-1900) in which instrumentalistic trends began to assert themselves sympathy with traditional theism faded out and that toward the close of Dewey's career,

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[92] Loc. cit.

[93] Art. 90, 394.

as he proceeded to tie up the loose ends of his thought, he should take a position diametrically opposed to those beliefs he had once cherished.

We turn now to a consideration of the attack upon historic supernaturalism which characterizes his later thinking.

CHAPTER II

THE ATTACK ON THE SUPERNATURAL

We begin the discussion of Dewey's philosophy of religion by an endeavor to relate it to the religious tradition which has prevailed in the Western world for some two thousand years, -- the historic Graeco-Christian tradition. Before we can understand the significance of his theory of religion we must establish his position with reference to that general conception of religion which still occupies the central place in Occidental thought, and against which he is in revolt. The distinguishing characteristic of this tradition, Dewey affirms, is its faith in "the supernatural."[1] The task of this chapter will be to expound Dewey's view concerning "the supernatural."

A. THE MEANING OF "THE SUPERNATURAL"

"The supernatural", against which a great deal of Dewey's philosophical writing is directed, is defined by him as "that which lies beyond experience."[2] Our attention is turned at once to the meaning of "experience" in his thought.

1. _The Meaning of "Experience" in Dewey's Thought_. There are two general conceptions of "experience" represented in Dewey's mature

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[1] Art. 86, 177.

[2] Loc. cit. This, to our knowledge, is Dewey's only definition of "the supernatural."

thought.[3] In the first place, he conceives of "experience" as "the interaction of the organism with its environment."[4] It is

> the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment, natural and social....Experiencing is just certain modes of interaction, of correlation of natural objects among which the organism happens, so to say, to be one. It follows with equal force that experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and suffering.[5]

> Consciousness is only a very small and shifting portion of experience. In the experience.....are all the physical features of the environment, extending out in space....and....time, and the habits and interests.... of the organism....[6]

According to this definition the "supernatural" would be that which lies beyond interaction with the organism. A transcendent God would plainly be supernatural on this view. But this definition is too broad for Dewey's purposes, because he is an opponent of theism as well as deism.[7] For, if we assume, as personal idealism does, that nature is throughout the experience, and in part at least, the activity of the divine Will the organism is (metaphysically conceived) in constant interaction with God. To be sure, Dewey does not think of God on this wise, but his definition of "experience", literally taken, does not exclude such a position. Any immanental view of God holds to the fact of interaction between the human person (organism) and God.

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3. The writer is indebted here to two Ph.D. dissertations dealing with Dewey's notion of "experience", -- Y. S. Han's "Meaning of Experience in the Thought of John Dewey" (Boston University, 1929) and W. T. Feldman's The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Analysis (Johns Hopkins University, 1934).
4. This, we take it, is what Han means when he describes "experience" in Dewey's thought as "the whole of life process." Op. cit., 148
5. CI, 36, 37.
6. EEL, 6, 7.
7. See Humanist Manifesto, #6. Potter, HR, 6-15.

In the second place, Dewey regards "experience" in some of his writings as "the bare occurrence of qualitative immediacy," -- a view called "immediate empiricism."[8]

> Immediate empiricism postulates that things -- anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing' -- are what they are experienced as.[9]
>
> I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise is fearsome; it really is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively so. That is what it is experienced as being. But, when I experience the noise as a known thing, I find it to be innocent of harm. It is the tapping of a shade against the window, owing to movements of the wind. The experience has changed; that is, the thing experienced has changed -- not that an unreality has given place to a reality, not that some transcendental (unexperienced) Reality has changed, not that truth has changed, but just and only the concrete reality experienced has changed.[10]
>
> Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf...... These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level as colors, sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell.[11]
>
> In itself, the object is just what it is experienced as being, hard, heavy, sweet, sonorous, agreeable or tedious and so on. But in being 'there' these traits are effects, not causes.[12]
>
> We experience things as they really are apart from knowing, and...... knowledge is a mode of experiencing things which facilitates control of objects for purposes of non-cognitive experience.[13]

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[8] Cf. Feldman, op. cit., 20.

[9] IDP, 227.

[10] Ibid, 230.

[11] EAN, 96.

[12] QFC, 131.

[13] Ibid, 98.

> From this derogation of the things we experience by way of love, desire, hope, fear, purpose and the traits characteristic of human individuality, we are saved by the realization of the purposefully instrumental and abstract character of objects of reflective knowledge. One mode of experience is as real as any other.[14]

According to this view of "experience" the supernatural would be that which lies beyond immediate awareness. But in this sense everything, other than the experience itself, would be "supernatural", since the causes of the experience are not contained in it.[15] Further, since experience is non-cognitive and "one mode of experience is as real as another," mystical experiences, to which Dewey denies ontological validity in some of his writings, would, so far as the experience per se is concerned, have as much claim to acceptance as any other.[16] Strictly speaking, this view of experience does not rule out God and those objects usually called supernatural, unless one be prepared to go the whole way and rule out everything else, except the fact of awareness which is the experience.

But even if a consistent view of experience were worked out, the fact that a given object "transcends experience" would not connote all that Dewey means by "the supernatural." The contradictory notion of a square circle, subsisting in some critical realist's realm of essence, may be said to transcend experience, and yet it is not against such objects that Dewey's polemic is raised. There is about the term "supernatural" a certain "eulogistic" flavor (to use a Dewey expression). It has certain axiological connotations. It seems to us, therefore, that we shall best

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[14] Op. cit., 219.

[15] See fourth quotation above.

[16] See an article by H. N. Wieman which seeks to derive support for mysticism in Dewey's doctrine of immediate, non-cognitive experience. (Art. 1).

understand Dewey's meaning of the term if we sketch briefly the broader features of the classic tradition, the supernaturalism of which is so repugnant to him.

2. The Classic Tradition. The classic tradition in philosophy is that which has its source in Greek thought and life, particularly in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. This philosophic tradition was met by another stream of tradition of a religious sort, the Christian, and their intermingling and mutual influence upon one another provides the matrix from which all of the religious philosophies of the Western world have come.

When we examine that tradition, with Dewey's help, there are several broad features of it which are evident at once. Epistemologically, this tradition is characterized by an exaltation of the theoretical over the practical. Greek thought made a distinction between two kinds of knowing, that which is scientific or theoretical and that which is practical. Reviewing the various orders of human knowledge in one place Aristotle remarks that the experienced man is wiser than he whose knowledge is restricted to perceptions and recollections; but the man of theoretic knowledge is wiser than the merely experienced; the director of an undertaking involving art of skill than the manual laborer; while the man whose life is devoted to science (which deals with being) is wiser than he who seeks knowledge only in view of its application to practical uses; and in the sphere of scientific knowledge that is highest which respects the highest of ultimate reasons and causes of things, -- wisdom in the strict and absolute sense of the word.[17] Theology which has to do with the

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[17] Cf. Met., I, cc. 1, 2.

ultimate objects of knowledge is higher than those sciences that have to do with practical affairs, -- ethics, economics, and politics.[18] The objects of science are the objects of reason, -- universal and necessary, while opinion alone is concerned with whatever is subject to variation.[19] Experience was deemed by the Greek thinkers as unable to deliver necessary truths. Its conclusions were particular, not universal. Reason alone could give cognitive certainty. Reason, as we have suggested, was purely theoretical, and pure contemplation was regarded as the highest virtue.[20] Epistemologically there was a fundamental dualism between knowing and doing, theoretical and practical knowledge, in Greek philosophy.

The counterpart of this epistemological dualism was a metaphysical dualism, corresponding to the two types of knowing, two diverse types or levels of reality or being. The objects of theoretical knowing were the ideal essences of individual substances.[21] Pure theoretical knowledge grasped the forms of things. It was concerned with the static properties of existents and not with their changeable occurrence. "The Ideas of Plato and the Forms of Aristotle," says Dewey, following Bergson,

> may be compared in their relation to particular things to the horses of the Parthenon frieze in relation to the casual movements of horses. The essential movement which gives and defines the character of the horse is summed up in the eternal moment of a static position and form. To see, to grasp, that culminating and defining form and by grasping to possess and enjoy it, is to know.[22]

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[18] Met.XI, 7; Eth. Eudem., I, 8.

[19] Anal. Poet., I, 33; II, 19.

[20] According to Greek philosophy, Being "can be apprehended through the medium of the apprehension and demonstrations of thought, or by some other organ of mind, which does nothing to the real, except just to know it." QFC, 21.

[21] Met., VII, 4, 1030b. 5.

[22] QFC, 91.

In contradistinction, practical knowledge was concerned with the changeable, the variable aspects of things, that which is contingent. Thus, two types of reality were implied in the distinction between the two types of knowing: Superior reality which is fixed, changeless, to be apprehended by reason alone, and an inferior order of reality corresponding to practical knowing, -- temporal, changeable, alogical, contingent. To the objects of reason were joined certain axiological predicates. The Ideas were held to be primary, eternal, and self-sufficient. They were clothed with perfection. The highest place in the scale of being in Aristotles's philosophy was God, who was pure form, "eternal, unchangeable, immovable, wholly independent, separated from all else, incorporeal, and yet at the same time the cause of all generation and change,"[23] the perfect Being, uncorrupted by any element of movement (the distinguishing characteristic of the lower realm), -- the unmoved mover.[24] The objects, thus, of the highest and most necessary knowledge, true Being, were endowed in Greek philosophy with "the values which correspond to our best aspirations, admirations, and approvals."[25] These objects of reason were norms for the world of Becoming. "The ends and laws which should regulate human affection, desire, and intent" were derived "from the properties possessed by ultimate Being."[26] Thus, in Greek philosophy an axiological dualism was added to the dualisms of epistemology and metaphysics.

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[23] Windelband, HPH, 145.

[24] Met., XII.

[25] QFC, 34.

[26] Ibid, 57.

The Christian religion made its appearance in a world dominated by the dualistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. At first it had little to do with philosophy, for it claimed the definite authority of revelation from God and appealed primarily to the emotions and consciences of men. But as soon as it moved out of its narrow Judaistic environment and sought converts in the Graeco-Roman world it had to learn to speak the intellectual language of its day. The consequence was that Christian apologetics gradually appropriated the philosophical scaffolding of the age. The Logos of Greek philosophy was identified with Jesus of Nazareth. The hierarchy of Forms was molded to fit the needs of the Church. The fundamental dualisms running through Greek philosophy were transformed into a basic religious dualism between natural and supernatural, terrestrial and celestial, Diesseits and Jenseits, the realm of nature and the realm of grace.[27] This world was inferior and preparatory to the next or higher world. By the middle of the thirteenth century Aristotelianism had been enthroned as the official philosophy of the Church.

The fundamental dualism between the two orders of reality has persisted, Dewey points out, since the period of Aristotelian dominance, even in those thinkers who rejected scholasticism. Kant held to the basic distinction between phenomena and noumena. Fichte distinguished sharply between moral and existential.[28] Hegel's system, though "a triumph in material content of the modern secular and positivistic spirit," distinguished between the "Absolute" and its manifestations.[29] The basic

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[27] "Religion stated in one language precisely what the great philosophic tradition stated in another." QFC, 293.

[28] Ibid, 62.

[29] Ibid, 62, 63.

characteristic of the classic tradition as seen in modern as well as ancient philosophies is dualism. Dewey sums it up thus: [30]

> All philosophies of the classic type have made a fixed and fundamental distinction between two realms of existence. One of these corresponds to the religious and supernatural world of popular tradition, which in its metaphysical rendering became the world of highest and ultimate reality. Since the final source and sanction of all important truths and rules of conduct in community life had been found in superior and unquestioned religious beliefs, so the absolute and supreme reality of philosophy afforded the only sure guaranty of truth about empirical matters, and the sole rational guide to proper social institutions and individual behavior. Over against this absolute and noumenal reality which could be apprehended only by the systematic discipline of philosophy itself stood the ordinary empirical, relatively real, phenomenal world of everyday experience. It was with this world that the practical affairs and utilities of men were connected. It was to this imperfect and perishing world that matter-of-fact, positivistic science referred.

The dualism running through the classic tradition may be shown thus:

ORDERS OF BEING

A.	B.
1. Being (Ultimate Reality)	Non-Being (Phenomenal Reality)
2. Known only *theoretically*. (Reason, philosophy, religious insight)	Known *practically* through overt doing (Opinion, natural sciences, arts)
3. Eternal, unchanging	Temporal, changing
4. Perfection (Realm of Value)	Imperfection (Order of Existence)
5. God, divine beings, values, immortality	Physical Nature

Dualism ⟷ Discontinuity ⟷

Man was a citizen of both worlds. (Kant)

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30. RPH, 22-23

3. The Supernatural. Now Dewey means by "the supernatural" that which is designated above as A.[31] If we were to define it formally we would say that in his thought "the supernatural" is

> that which (1) is regarded as of normative worth and superior reality, but which (2) lies beyond scientific verification.[32]

It includes God, objective values, immortality, at least, and other entities.[33]

It may seem from this definition that Dewey's quarrel with the supernatural is really with a transcendental religious philosophy. It is customary in liberal circles to distinguish between two views of the supernatural, one of which conceives the supernatural as transcendent and intervening

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[31] The supernatural is the metaphysical. (CF, 21-22.) It is that which, in contrast with instruments and acts, is uncontrollable. (QFC, 13). It is "the home of assured appropriation and profession," as contrasted with the natural, the realm of "striving, transiency, and frustration." (EAN^2, 55). It is "the eternal and infinite" in contrast with the "temporal, finite, and human." Ibid. It is the ideal in contrast with the actual. (CF, 21-22). It includes the unseen power or powers "controlling human destiny to which obedience, reverence, and worship are due," (CF, 7) though it is not identical with God. (CF, 51). Immortality is a part of the supernatural, as well as the realm of values. (CF, 1; cf. QFC, 305).

[32] We have not contrasted the supernatural with the natural, though they do properly stand in contrast, because Dewey approaches it from the epistemological side, the contrast between theoretical and practical.

[33] The Bible insofar as it is made a standard of conduct, conceived of as the Word of God, -- neither of which can be established scientifically, -- is a supernatural book in Dewey's sense of the term. Prayer regarded as an instrument of divine guidance, its results not being open to scientific verification, would be supernatural. Etc.

in nature in lawless fashion, contrary to the teachings of science. This is the supernaturalism of a deistic "fundamentalism", so-called. According to the other view, the supernatural is regarded as immanent in the natural world, as its sustaining ground.

> It is a Supernatural not in that it interferes with nature but in that it includes and transcends nature. The upholders of this view usually deny miracle, and at any rate, no miracle is necessary to it. The regularity of the causal law is regarded as being merely the way God acts. It sees God in order rather than in disorder, in the dependable working of law rather than in incalculable interference with law. Thus there is no possible quarrel between it and science.[34]

It may seem that Dewey's view of the supernatural is that of the first type, and his polemic against the supernatural, which we shall develop in succeeding pages, is not directed against the second. Insofar, however, as immanental philosophy makes distinctions between different grades or levels of reality it affirms a belief in the supernatural, and almost all modern religious philosophies do, with the exception of the naturalistic.[35] Further, very few religious philosophies are willing to pin their sole faith on scientific method and hence are to be classed with traditional supernaturalists in that respect.[36]

The fact is that Dewey does not have high regard for modernism. It

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[34] Pratt, TRC, 39.

[35] Absolutists such as Royce ("World of description" vs. "world of appreciation," SMP, 389-97) and Hocking (whole vs. parts, MGHE, 411), mystics such as Jones (cf. RF, 7) and Bennett, ("the unseen order shining through," DRK, 7), and personalism (metaphysical vs. phenomenal reality, Knudson, POP, 232), -- all of which are immanental philosophies, recognize levels or orders of reality.

[36] Cf. CF, 32.

seems to him essentially "transitional, mediating in character."

> Its psychological value to many persons in easing the strain cannot be doubted; no one can deny that there is a social value in movements which modulate from one position to another in a way which avoids the crises and breakdowns incident to abrupt changes.[37]

But if it follows out the logic of its immanence it will arrive at a purely naturalistic conception of religion. When God becomes only a name for the way natural processes behave, the ultimate result will be nature without the name![38]

The supernatural is the object of relentless attack in all Dewey's writings. In the present chapter we shall seek to expound and evaluate his many objections to the supernatural under four headings: (1) genetic, (2) epistemological, (3) logical, and (4) practical. The first two types of objections are set forth at greatest length in the Quest for Certainty. The logical objection is chiefly met in Experience and Nature, while the practical objections to the supernatural are elaborated in A Common Faith.

B. THE GENETIC OBJECTION

Why do men philosophize? What is the origin of a supernaturalistic philosophy? Men readily persuade themselves that it is a desire for intellectual certainty. They want to know for knowledge's sake. But this,

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[37] Art. 72; CHE, I, 83. Far from being inferior intellectually, Dewey affirms that the traditional transcendental religious philosophy has some intellectual advantages over modernism. QFC, 70.

[38] Cf., CF, 72-73.

Dewey tells us, is not true. "The ultimate ground of the quest for cognitive certainty is the need for security in the results of action."[39] The world of experience as we find it is an uncertain world; "the values men prize are at the mercy of acts the results of which are never sure."[40] Failure, frustration, difficulties, insecurity are constant visitors of natural man. He does not have the means at hand to make daily life secure. So "in the absence of actual certainty in the midst of a precarious and hazardous world, men cultivated all sorts of things that would give them the feeling of certainty," an "emotional substitute" for real certainty.[41] They began to spin out philosophies that would demonstrate that those things they most prized and were unable to secure were securely fixed in the very heart of things.

> If one looks at the foundations of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as an anthropologist looks at his material, that is, as cultural subject-matter, it is clear that these philosophies were systematizations in rational form of the content of Greek philosophy.[42]

The exaltation of theoretical knowing above the practical, which we have noted in the previous section as characteristic of Greek philosophy, was purely compensatory for the fact that practical doing gave no certainty.[43] Philosophy turns supernaturalistic when it "loses its nerve,"[44] and Greek philosophy is the supreme example of it.

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39. QFC, 39.

40. Ibid, 33.

41. Ibid, 33-34.

42. Ibid, 16.

43. RPH, 117.

44. EAN, 127.

Such devices as a compensatory philosophy to keep up one's courage are no longer necessary, however. Modern science, by experimental methods of control, can give that practical certainty as a compensation for which metaphysical speculation was indulged in.[45]

The origin of supernatural religion is, like the corresponding philosophy, a product of men's need of security. "Man who lives in a world of hazards," run the opening lines of the Quest for Certainty,

> is compelled to seek for security. He has sought to attain it in two ways. One of them began with an attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his destiny. It expressed itself in supplication, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and magical cult.... If man could not conquer destiny he could willingly ally himself with it; putting his will, even in sore affliction, on the side of the powers which dispense fortune, he could escape defeat and might triumph in the midst of destruction.
>
> The other course is to invent arts and by their means turn the powers of nature to account; man constructs a fortress out of the very conditions and forces which threaten him. He builds shelters, weaves garments, makes flame his friend instead of his enemy, and grows into the complicated arts of associated living. This is the method of changing the world through action, as the other is the method of changing the self in emotion and idea.[46]

But primitive man was ill-equipped to appropriate the second means of security. He had none of the elaborate arts of protection we enjoy and no confidence in his own powers when they were reinforced by appliances of art.[47] Hence, he turned to the first source of help, giving himself to all those rites and rituals by which the support of the powers that made his destiny might be secured. "In such an atmosphere primitive

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45. Art. 86, 177-78.

46. QFC, 2.

47. QFC, 9.

religion was born and fostered. Rather this atmosphere was the religious disposition."[48]

While modern man has left far behind the trappings of primitive faith, religion is still largely a compensatory device for human lacks.

> When an individual finds a conflict in himself which is offensive and with which he cannot successfully cope directly, he 'projects' it into or upon another personality, and then finds rest. Uneasy and tortured egoism, finding no rest for itself in itself, creates a huge Ego which....is....huge enough to be our King, Leader, and Helper.[49]

Or, modern man, still feeling himself and his values insecure in an uncertain world does what Mr. Britling did in Mr. Wells's famous novel, -- "invented a God to keep him company and to give him assurance of the return of the dawn."[50] A study of the genesis of supernatural religion, in short, shows it to be an illusion, a compensatory device, an escape mechanism.[51]

While the view that religion is an expression of man's inescapable desire for security predominates in Dewey's writings, there is another view of the origin of religion that he offers also. According to this second theory religion grew out of the emotional enjoyments attendant upon mythmaking. Until agriculture and the higher industrial arts were

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[48] Op.-cit., 10.

[49] Art. 58; CHE, I, 82.

[50] Ibid, 78.

[51] This is the view of the origin of religion made familiar by Freud and by Feuerbach before him. "Religious ideas," says Freud, "have sprung from the same need as all the other achievements of culture: from the necessity for defending itself against the crushing supremacy of nature." (FIL, 36-37.) Dewey's view of the illusory nature of religion, needless to say, while resembling Freud's in the main points, does not regard religion as, fundamentally, an expression of the sex instinct.

developed by primitive man there were long periods of empty leisure, Dewey tells us, in which men had nothing to do but to remember and to embellish the tales of their own exploits, in the hunt or the battle.[52] Legends and myths slowly grew up in response to the irrepressible human tendency toward story-telling. As culture advanced these stories were consolidated. Theogonies and cosmogonies were formed, as with the Babylonians, Egyptians, Hebrews, and Greeks. In time these legends came under the guardianship of a special body, the priesthood, and out of them both philosophies and religions sprang.[53] Primitive religion did not grow out of, nor was it sustained by any urge of conscience, but out of the enjoyment of myth and rite.[54]

These two views of the origin of religion are not easy to reconcile. The first represents religion as growing out of man's deepest need, -- the need for life itself, security. According to the second, religion is an embellishment of life, an emotional enjoyment realized after the chase was over and the hunt was done. According to the first, religion is an outgrowth of the impulse to self-preservation; in the second it is derived from the play-instinct. Further, the positions of man relative to the objects of religion are different in the two views. In the first man is subordinate to the objects of his thought, while in the second man is the conscious creator of them. In the first, religion arises out of a pessimistic outlook on things; the second reflects an optimistic

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52. RPH, 4.

53. Cf., CF, 59.

54. EAN, 79-80.

view. These two divergent theories cannot represent two different stages of Dewey's thought, for the first appears both before and after the second.[55]

Perhaps Feldman in his remark on Dewey's Darwinism in general drops a hint for the solution of the difficulty. He says that the genetic point of view is one of limited application with Dewey, used mainly for negative purposes, "as a weapon against what he considered fruitless metaphysical and epistemological speculation."[56] It is possible that Dewey is more interested in discrediting religion than in offering a serious account of its origin. In fact, Dewey confesses himself that his genetic approach is made "with malice prepense." "It seems to me," he says, "that this genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining this type of philosophic theorizing (of the supernaturalistic sort) than any attempt at logical refutation could be."[57]

Assuming, however, that Dewey's two views of the origin of religion are capable of reconciliation, what is to be said of his attempt to discount supernatural religion by appeal to its unworthy origin in desire or myth? (1) In the first place, either of these theories of the origin of religion is, at best, an oversimplification. In view of the many diverse theories set forth by scholars concerning the origin of

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[55] The first view appears in RPH (1920), EAN (1925). The second predominates in QFC (1929). In the latter year, however, in EAN^2, the first view is repeated and again in CF (1934).

[56] PJD, 43.

[57] RPH, 24.

religion something more than a summary statement of one's own theory is necessary to establish it.[58] (2) Further, Dewey is not thoroughgoing in his genetic or evolutionary point of view. He assumes that science and morals have developed; he does not attempt to explain science in terms of astrology from which it developed nor validate morals by primitive customs or tabus. But in the case of religion the assumption is that it is essentially at the same primitive level at which it began, -- a compensatory device. The fact that religion might have developed along with man's other interests is nowhere recognized. (3) Again, we must remember that the genesis, either historical or psychological, of any belief does not determine its validity. The fact that mathematics began, possibly, by a primitive's counting of his toes does not invalidate any of our mathematical theorems. Nor does a primitive beginning of religion invalidate the beliefs it may hold. It is possible that religion originated in a primitive desire for security and yet God exists, nevertheless. (4) Once more, it must not be forgotten that science, upon

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58. Malinowski makes religion the outgrowth of primitive scientific inquiry. (See Adrian, and others, FDHB, 161-62.) Otto finds the essence of religion in an *a priori* category, the holy. (ITH, 140). James thought it grows out of the desire for spiritual redemption. (VRE, 508). Even Frazer, who taught that religion was the outgrowth of a magic that would not work, admits that the gods are not solely a means to man's ends but were enjoyed in many cases for their own sakes. (MAEK, I, 31). Before insisting on the validity of his own view, Dewey at least owes these theories of the genesis of religion serious consideration. But such consideration is nowhere given.

which Dewey places so much reliance, is a product of desire as truly as religion.[59] Yet, would Dewey dismiss it on that account? (5) Again, there is a fundamental disharmony between a genetic argument and pragmatism.[60] For pragmatism makes consequences the test of an idea or belief, not antecedents. In fact, we shall see in the next section Dewey's strictures against supernaturalism for its emphasis on antecedent realities. On a pragmatic basis religion cannot be denied because of humble origins. (6) Finally, it seems strange that Dewey should object to religion as "mythmaking" when, as we shall see in the next chapter, the object of faith as he conceives it is not a metaphysical reality but ideals created by the imagination for the purpose of integrating life!

The best to be said for the genetic objection to the supernatural is that it is superficially plausible.

C. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTION

When we turn to Dewey's epistemological objection to the supernatural we enter a province in which he is more at home, for his philosophy is largely epistemological in character. Very briefly, the objection Dewey makes to the supernatural from an epistemological basis is this: Supernaturalism rests on two assumptions that are not valid in the light of

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59/ "The distinctively intellectual attitude which marks scientific inquiry was generated in efforts at controlling persons and things so that consequences, issues, outcomes would be more stable and assured." EAN, 128.

60. Dewey seems to recognize this in his later writing. He says in the article, "Social as a Category," (Art. 81, 163.) that the proper method of philosophy is not one which lays the major emphasis upon "ultimate and unattached simples" but upon "taking things in the widest and most complex scale of observation open to observation." Ibid, 162.

modern scientific techniques.

(1) The first assumption is that knowledge is concerned "with the disclosure of the characteristics of antecedent existences and essences."[61] It assumes that knowledge has to do with "antecedent reality." By "antecedent" Dewey means simply "prior to and independent of the operations of knowing."[62] An antecedent reality is one regarded as 'given' "prior to .....experimental verification and redisposition."[63] It is held to be "in sufficient existence before the act of knowing," instead of being "the outcome of directed experimental operations."[64] That is, the existence of the supernatural is "demonstrated" by reason or established by contemplation. God, or immortality, are set up first and then "proved." Supernatural objects are not consequent to verification but antecedent.

(2) The other assumption of supernaturalism is that cases of knowledge must correspond with these antecedent objects.[65] "The objects of knowledge form the standards of measures of the reality of all other objects of experience."[66] In other words, supernaturalism appeals to a correspondence criterion of truth.[67]

Scientific techniques as they are employed in the physical sciences

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[61] QFC, 71.

[62] Ibid, 196.

[63] Ibid, 258.

[64] Ibid, 171.

[65] Ibid, 21.

[66] Loc. cit.

[67] Cf. ibid, 109-10.

show the false character of these two assumptions. (1) Truth for science does not reside in antecedent reality; for science the true is the verified.[68] Knowledge is the consequence of experimental operations.[69] "Verification and truth are two names for the same thing."[70] To say that a thing is true before it is verified is like a by-stander's remark after a person has been saved from drowning that he was saved all the time, even while in the uncertain process of being rescued.[71] This does not mean that Dewey is a solipsist. There is existence antecedent to the process of verification. Things are simply data or problems before verification is undertaken; they become *objects* as a result of the process.[72] There are three characteristics of scientific knowing which set it off sharply from that employed by supernaturalistic types of philosophy:[73]

> a) The first is the obvious one that all experimentation involves *overt* doing, the making of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it.
>
> b) The second is that experiment is not a random activity but is directed by ideas which have to meet the conditions set by the need of the problem inducing the active inquiry.
>
> c) The third and concluding feature, in which the other two receive their full measure of meaning, is that the outcome of the directed activity is the construction of a new empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such that the *consequences* of directed operations form the objects that have the property of being *known*.

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68. RPH, 160.
69. Cf, QFC, 196.
70. IDP, 138.
71. Ibid, 143.
72. QFC, 137.
73. Ibid, 86-7.

(2) For science, ideas are not that which must correspond to antecedent reality or with themselves. They are hypotheses for verification. The final value of ideas is not determined "by their internal elaboration and consistency, but by the consequences they effect in existence as that is perceptibly experienced." [74] Scientific men accept "the consequences of their experimental operations as constituting the known object, rather than feeling under obligation to 'prove' them by identification with what was said to be antecedently known."[75] Conceptions are "instrumentalities which direct operations of experimental observations;" the "knowledge-property resides in conclusions."[76] "The criterion of knowledge lies in the method used to secure consequences and not in metaphysical conceptions of the nature of the real."[77]

The epistemological objection to the supernatural boils down to this: The premises upon which belief in the existence of the supernatural rests are not in harmony with those of the sciences. This precipitates a crisis in religion, because "for the educated man today" the methods of experimental inquiry are "the final arbiter of all questions of fact, existence, and intellectual assent."[78] Because supernaturalism cannot meet the challenge of scientific method it is on the way out.

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[74] Op. cit., 165.

[75] QFC, 185.

[76] Ibid, 192.

[77] Ibid, 221.

[78] CF, 31.

This epistemological objection to supernaturalism, -- and the *ad hominem* gesture about the educated man of today and his beliefs, -- rests on the presupposition that the "educated man" is right when he assumes (if he does) that science is the final arbiter. This presupposition will be examined in Chapter IV.

In conclusion, it is to be noted that Dewey's attack upon "antecedent reality" is in keeping with a tendency we shall see throughout his thought to depreciate the past.

D. THE LOGICAL OBJECTION

The genetic objection to the supernatural is that religion arises out of unworthy desires. The epistemological objection was that the premises of supernaturalism are not in harmony with the scientific way of knowing. The logical objection to supernaturalism as a doctrine is that it is (1) self-refuting and (2) abstract.

(1) Supernaturalism, Dewey tells us, logically destroys itself. Supposedly it derives its validity from a consideration of experience. But once it has been established, it depreciates, assigns an inferior status, to the very experience upon which it is based. That is particularly the case with Absolutism.[79]

> The contents as well as the form of ultimate Absolute Experience are derived from and based upon the features of actual experience, the very experience which is then relegated to unreality by the supreme reality derived from its unreality.....If we start from the standpoint of the Absolute Experience thus reached, the contradiction is repeated from its side. Although absolute, eternal, all-comprehensive, and pervasively integrated into a whole so logically perfect that no separate

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[79] EAN^2, 61.

patterns, to say nothing of seams and holes, can exist in it, it proceeds to play a tragic joke upon itself -- for there is nothing else to be fooled -- by appearing in a queer combination of rags and glittering things, mental as well as physical, of ordinary experience.

The same sort of inconsistency is apparent in the exaltation of theoretical knowing over doing in the classic tradition. After elevating knowledge of immutable objects and degrading practical affairs to the realm of inferior reality, "the chief task of knowledge seems to be to demonstrate the absolutely assured and permanent reality of the values with which practical activity is concerned."[80] The supernatural, in short, is established by an inconsistent procedure; it either appeals to experience for its establishment and then demeans experience or demeans empirical modes of knowing only to secure by theoretical procedure those ends toward which empirical methods are directed.

(2) Not only is the doctrine of the supernatural inconsistent, but it is guilty of abstraction. It commits the fallacy of "selective emphasis" or hypostatization.[81] We find ourselves in a world that is "uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, hazardous."[82] There are, however, stable elements in the midst of the unstable, which is the occasion of philosophizing. The fallacy of classic thought has been that though the world contains both stable and unstable elements, and one is quite as much a part of existence as the other, traditional philosophy and religion have "relegated the uncertain and unfinished to an invidious state of unreal being, while they have systematically exalted the assured and complete to

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80. QFC, 35.

81. EAN^2, 29.

82. Ibid, 42.

the rank of true Being."[83] They have been guilty of the "erection of objects of selective preference into exclusive realities."[84] Men prefer certainty to uncertainty; therefore, those objects that are certainly known (i.e. theoretically known) are assigned primary reality.[85] They prefer the simple to the complex; therefore, "elements" have greater reality conferred upon them.[86] They prefer the permanent to the changing; therefore, whatever is "eternal" is elevated to the rank of primary reality.[87] What are "these Forms and Essences," Dewey asks,[88]

> which so profoundly influenced for centuries the course of science and theology, save the objects of ordinary experience with their blemishes removed, their imperfections eliminated, their lacks rounded out, their suggestions and hints fulfilled? What are they in short but the objects of familiar life divinized, because re-shaped by the idealizing imagination to meet the demands of desire in just those respects in which actual experience is disappointing?

"The values prized in those religions that have ideal elements are idealizations of things characteristic of natural association, which have been projected into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction."[89] God, like mathematical subsistences, esthetic essences, or the purely physical order of nature, is an illustration of the fallacy of "selective emphasis", which converts "eventual functions" into "antecedent

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[83] EAN^2, 52.

[84] Ibid, 26.

[85] Ibid, 25-6.

[86] Ibid, 26-7.

[87] Ibid, 27.

[88] RPH, 105-6.

[89] CF, 73.

realities."[90] They are abstractions.

This objection to the supernatural has the greatest merit of any Dewey brings against the supernatural. It is a form of the ancient problem of the one and the many, the permanent and the changing. To assert the superior reality of either the one or the many, or the permanent or the changing, is to do violence to the seamless fabric of existence. Dewey's objection is certainly valid against an impersonal idealism holding to the metaphysical objectivity of values (though it is likewise valid against his own temporalism when it asserts that change is everything).[91] Some account of reality must be given that will include both the one and the many, both permanence and change. Dewey believes that his conception of nature as inclusive of ideal and real, universals and particulars, is such an entity. But all he has done is to describe nature. He does not attempt to explain it. A possible explanation of nature would be a God who is the ground of nature and a concrete universal, a mind that maintains its identity while a participant in change.

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[90] EAN^2, 29. Dewey's objection to supernaturalism here is essentially the same one that Bowne used to employ with such effect against naturalism. Bowne called it "the fallacy of the universal;" -- "It consists in mistaking class terms for things, and in identifying the processes of our classifying thought with the processes of reality." (TTK, 244) He used it against such abstractions as "matter" and "force", "law", and "nature." (Cf. ibid, 245; MET, 248ff., 267.) Dewey also denominates "matter", "law", and "physical nature" as abstractions (Cf. EAN^2, 74, 29; RPH, 164), but applies the same to God. He is the hypostatization of the ideal qualities of existence. Bowne would be driven by his own logic to the same position had he not held to metaphysical causality as the criterion of reality. Dewey's concept of causality is positivistic.

[91] Cf, EAN, 71.

Dewey's logical objection does not hold against such a view.

D. THE PRACTICAL OBJECTION

> It is no longer enough for a principle to be elevated, noble, universal and hallowed by time. It must present its birth certificate, it must show under just what conditions of human experience it was generated, and it must justify itself by its works, present and potential.[92]

We have already given some account of Dewey's attempt to discredit the genesis of supernaturalism. In this section we shall set forth Dewey's views of the supernatural's attempts to justify itself by its works. Many are the reproaches brought by Dewey in his writings against the supernatural for its practical failures. We shall gather together the gist of his arguments against the supernatural in four propositions.

1. Subversive influence upon science. The first reproach of a practical sort to be levelled against the supernatural is: belief in it has retarded the growth and application of science to the needs of life. The obstructive role played by traditional supernaturalism is familiar to every student of the history of science. Not only did the intolerance of the Church impede the growth of science, but the very concepts of medieval supernaturalism, such as "final causes", for example, caused science to stagnate.[93] Not until men gave up the investigation of the antecedently real and began to experiment were the great achievements of science possible.[94]

Religion stands today as an essentially conservative force in the

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[92] RPH, 48.

[93] QFC, 102.

[94] HNC, 242-3.

path of science, an obstacle in the way of the application of intelligence (i.e. scientific method) to social relations.[95] Supernaturalism is the ally of vested interests who do not want the spotlight of critical intelligence turned upon them or their works.[96] It "stands in the way of an effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relations."[97] It is a barrier to "using the means that are in our power to make radical changes in those relations."[98] It is impossible to estimate, Dewey believes, the amelioration that would result if science and scientific method were given unrestricted opportunity for development.[99]

2. The practical futility of supernaturalism. In the second place the supernatural offers us no real solution for the specific problems that trouble us, and hence is a misapplication of human energy. After all, belief in the supernatural "does not change the existential situation in the least."[100] To classify the world into eternal and temporal, supernatural and natural, permanent and impermanent, does not make the world a whit less hazardous, for "trouble, struggle, conflict, and error still empirically exist."[101] Not only do these troublesome facts exist, but supernaturalism can give no hint as to how our specific problems are to be solved. Theology can supply us with no solution for diphtheria, insanity, governmental inefficiency, or poverty. Dewey does not believe

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[95] Cf, IDP, 2.
[96] CF, 78.
[97] CF, 80.
[98] Loc. cit.
[99] QFC, 305.
[100] QFC, 35.
[101] EAN^2, 54.

that "early Christianity has within itself even the germs of a ready-made solution for present problems."[102] We get no enlightenment at all from a contemplation of the supernatural or by reference to it; science offers the only way out of the problems that besiege us.[103]

Hence, devotion to the supernatural represents a waste of energies that could be better used.[104] "Mankind has hardly inquired what would happen if the possibilities of experience were seriously explored and exploited."[105]

3. Supernaturalism inimical to human endeavor. But not only does the supernatural offer us no solution for our practical problems, but it is really an enemy to their solution, because it dulls the edge of human endeavor.

> Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing. Dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor.[106]

The effect of traditional theology has been "to make the mind submissive and acquiescent;"[107] it leads to "intellectual somnambulism."[108] The business of "finding a wholesale transcendent remedy" for our ills, prevents men from looking facts in the face and going out to change the world.[109] Furthermore, the distinction between the ultimate and the

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[102] Art. 86, 180.

[103] RPH, 112-13; QFC, 264-65.

[104] QFC, 277.

[105] Art. 86, 177.

[106] CF, 46.

[107] RPH, 50.

[108] Ibid, 140.

[109] IDP, 16.

phenomenal has tended to depreciate the realm of existence and natural values. Ideals are thought to be but objects of meditation locked up safely in heaven; the world is turned over to the forces of evil. "While saints are engaged in introspection burly sinners run the world." 110 The hope of courage and an active re-shaping of the world in the interests of human betterment lies in a return to an active conception of knowledge and the belief that the environment is something to be changed.[111]

4. The supernatural an encumbrance to religion. Finally, the supernatural is inimical to religion itself. To begin with, the supernatural is not essential to religion. "Religious qualities and values if they are real at all are not bound up with any single item of intellectual assent, not even of that of the existence of the God of theism."[112] The feeling of dependence which Schleiermacher celebrated as the essence of religion can be a feeling of dependence on nature instead of on God.[113] Faith may be had in intelligence itself, without reference to supernatural powers.[114]

Not only is the supernatural not essential to religion but it is an encumbrance to it. The present depression in religion, as we have seen, is due to the conflict between the notion of the supernatural and the methods and teachings of science, which have led to the widespread discrediting of those forms of faith holding to the supernatural.[115] The

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110. RPH, 196.
111. Ibid, 115-16.
112. CF, 32.
113. CF, 25-6; QFC, 307.
114. CF, 26.
115. Ibid, 9.

esoteric character ascribed to experiences of the supernatural **has** discouraged those who seek a genuine experience of religion.[116] Traditional religion's division between sinners and saved has erected a barrier to true human brotherhood.[117] Besides, supernatural religion has fostered in many cases fanaticism and false pride.[118] All in all, the supernatural has been a blight upon the religious spirit, and its tie with religion and religious values must be dissolved.[119]

5. Criticism. With respect to this indictment of the supernatural from the standpoint of its works a number of things may be said.

The first objection, -- that belief in the supernatural is and has been an obstacle to the development of science, -- is unquestionably true. Dewey's argument assumes, however, that science should be allowed free play for its development, the implication being that science is the only means and criterion of progress. This assumption will be examined in Chapter V of the dissertation.

It is to be noted, however, that science owes something to historic naturalism. Professor Whitehead has pointed out that modern science got its start from the notion of the rationality of nature, which was a teaching of medieval theology.[120] Professor Hocking has shown, further, that Christianity was not entirely an enemy of the rise of modern science, for

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[116] Op. cit., 14-15.

[117] CF, 83-4.

[118] HNC, 227-28; QFC, 308.

[119] CF, 128.

[120] SMW, 19.

the spirit of scientific detachment had been instilled unwittingly through the cultivation of religious detachment.[121]

The second proposition stated above, -- that the supernatural has nothing to offer for our specific ills, -- rests upon the assumption that the worth of anything is to be gauged by the immediate contribution it makes to solving the problems at hand. It assumes, further, that the only needs men have are those amenable to solution by experimental method. This assumption will be examined in the last chapter of the dissertation.

After all, most of the higher interests of mankind are subject to the same objection Dewey has raised against the supernatural. How does friendship solve our biological needs? What solution does a Beethoven symphony offer for the inadequacies of our economic order? How does the reading of Shakespeare contribute to the solution of a problem of sanitation? Yet, we shall scarcely give up friendships, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare on that account. So long as men feel that these things, though having no immediate cash value, give more to the enrichment of life than they take away, they will be cherished and retained. The specific tasks of the hour are not the sole criterion for evaluating art, human association, or religion.

Dewey says, in the third place, that "dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor." "Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing." History, he avers, is

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[121] TDL, 181.

testimony to this fact.[122]

Without doubt there have been adherents of the supernatural who have passively waited for God to do for them what they could have done for themselves. But when Dewey makes the broad statement that dependence upon external powers is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor one can only marvel. If the statement is true then either the Puritan fathers did not believe in external powers or else they did not carve out a civilization in the New England wilderness. If it is true then either Paul, Augustine, Luther, the Franciscans and Jesuits, Wesley, and Shaftesbury were unbelievers, or else they did nothing. As one contemplates Christian history one thinks of the movements that have had their inspiration in the Church, -- toward education, care of the poor, the building of hospitals, abolition of the slave-trade, education for temperance, prison reform, -- and the known social consequences of the Franciscan movement, the Wesleyan Revival, and the Oxford Movement; and one is at a loss to explain such a palpably erroneous judgment as that recorded above. The most decisive refutation of Dewey's position is his own words. A few pages after the citation offered above Dewey is discussing another subject, the power of ideal ends in determining human conduct and enhancing social fruitfulness. As illustrations of the way ideals can determine conduct he mentions four persons, -- Florence Nightingale, Howard, Wilberforce, and Peabody.[123] And all four of

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[122] CF, 46.

[123] Cf., CF, 48.

these whom he selects as models of social fruitfulness are believers in a real God![124] In the light of these facts Professor VanDusen's judgment is not too strong when he says that Dewey's statement is "so perverse a distortion of the truth as to cast question upon the reliability of its author."[125] It is an illustration of the same flagrant disregard of the history of religion which we have noted before.

Finally, Dewey says that the supernatural is an encumbrance to religion. The assumption is, however, that the supernatural can be

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[124] Florence Nightingale; -- Sir Edward Cook, her biographer, cites the following passage from her diary in the year 1850: "I am thirty, the age at which Christ began his mission. Now, no more childish things, no more vain things, no more love, no more marriage. Now, Lord, let me think only of thy will." Cf., Martin, CSR, 121.
John Howard; -- In a memorandum, containing an account of 42,033 miles travelled in behalf of prison reform we read these concluding words: "To God alone be all praise! I do not regret the loss of many conveniences of life, but bless God who inclined my mind to such a scheme." J. Howard, SP, XI.
William Wilberforce; -- See his correspondence edited by his sons. (CWW) Hardly a letter fails to express his fervent sense of gratitude and dependence on God. For particular letters, see ibid, I, 114, 172; II, 325.
George Peabody (presumably it is the British-American philanthropist who is meant); -- "It has been my constant prayer to God for upwards of twenty years, that I might be enabled to accumulate a large sum of money to bestow in charity on the poor." Quoted, Hanaford, LGP, 287.

[125] VanDusen, Art. 1, 129-30. Even Leuba, who shares with Dewey the belief that metaphysical religion is illusion, admits that the mystics, supposedly the most God-centered of men, have been servants of the common good. "Whatever the mystics may say that seems to subordinate unselfish activity to the passing enjoyment of God is belied by the general trend of their writings, and still more convincingly by their lives; all of them, so soon as unity was established in their consciousness, have spent themselves without stint in the service of their fellowmen." PRM, 128.

removed from religion and it still be religion. Historically, the supernatural has been an integral part of religion, as Dewey acknowledges himself. But with his customary disdain for historical facts, he denies that religion should be defined in historical terms. Nothing can be done about it except to note the departure from the historical usage. To say that traditional supernaturalism has been an encumbrance is to say that traditional religion has been an encumbrance, for they are part and parcel of each other.

It is to be noted, in conclusion, that the practical objection as a whole rests upon the pragmatic criterion of truth, an assumption that will be subjected to later scrutiny.

F. DEWEY AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The concluding portion of this chapter will be devoted to a brief discussion in the light of Dewey's thought of the arguments which have been advanced for the existence of a supernatural God. Traditionally there were three "proofs" of the divine existence, which were recognized by Kant, -- the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological (physico-theological).[126] The latter supplanted them by a fourth, which, with its developments by theology and philosophy, has been called the moral argument. To these arguments there is that of certain "religionists", who "rely upon a certain kind of experience to prove the existence of the object of religion, especially the supreme object, God."[127]

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[126] KRV, A 591-2.

[127] CF, 11.

This may be called the argument from religious experience. Having set forth Dewey's objections to belief in the supernatural, in the succeeding pages we shall indicate Dewey's attitude to those arguments offered in favor of supernaturalism by its proponents. While we do not have references in every case to specific arguments, his position with regard to them is clear.

1. *The Ontological Argument.* This is the famous argument of Anselm to the effect that the very concept of God implies his existence. Kant states it in the form it was held by its author:[128]

> dass es doch einen und zwar nur diesen einen Begriff gebe, da das Nichtsein oder das Aufheben seines Gegenstandes in sich selbst widersprechend sei und dieses ist der Begriff der allerrealsten Wesens. Es hat, sagt ihr, all Realität, und ihr seid berechtigt, ein solches Wesen als möglich anzunehmen.......Nun ist unter aller Realität auch das Dasein mit begriffen: also liegt das Dasein in dem Begriffe von einem möglichen. Wird dieses Ding nun aufgehoben, so wird die innere Möglichkeit des Dinges aufgehoben, welches widersprechend ist.

Dewey's objection to this argument is essentially the same as Kant's, namely, that existence cannot be deduced from a concept:[129]

> No amount of purely deductive manipulation of abstractions brings a resulting conclusion any nearer a concrete fact than were the two original premises. Deduction introduces in regular sequence new ideas, and thus complicates the universal content. But to suppose that by complicating the content of a universal we get nearer the individual of experience is the fallacy at once of medieval realism and of the ontological argument for the existence of God.

2. *The Cosmological Argument.* The second of the traditional arguments Kant phrased as follows:[130]

> Wenn etwas existiert, so muss auch ein schlechterdings notwendiges

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[128] KRV, A 596-7.

[129] LCS, 119.

[130] Kant, op. cit., A, 604, B, 632.

> Wesen existieren.....(weil) alles Zufällige seine Ursache habe, die, wenn sie wiederum zufällig ist, ebensowohl eine Ursache haben muss, bis die Reihe der einander untergeordneten Ursachen bei einer schlechthin notwendigen Ursache endigen muss, ohne welche sie keine Vollständigkeit haben würde.....Nun existiere zum mindesten ich selbst: also existiert ein absolut notwendiges Wesen.

There are four points, according to Professor Sorley, at which the cosmological argument is open to attack and defense:[131] (1) the validity of the causal concept in general; (2) the validity of applying it to the world as a whole; (3) the validity of calling a halt in the regress of causes, and saying that the First Cause had been reached; (4) and the validity of the identification of this First Cause with God. Kant defends the first with his teaching that every event must have a cause.[132] He attacks the argument on the basis of (3) and (4). Cause and effect stand in necessary relationship to each other; a cause stands in necessary relationship not only to its effect but to the cause of which it is an effect.[133] Hence, to postulate a beginning in the causal series would destroy the notion of causality.[134] Further, at most the argument establishes a first cause and does not teach "was nämlich ein absolut notwendiges Wesen überhaupt für Eigenschaften haben müsse."[135]

Dewey's attack on this argument, though the argument is not mentioned specifically anywhere, is along the first line indicated above. He opposes the causal concept in general. Mechanism, like teleology, in nature implies "a breach in the continuity of historic process; the gulf

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[131] MVIG, 314.

[132] Cf, op. cit., A, 196, B, 241, 234.

[133] Op. cit. A, 621; B, 649.

[134] Ibid, A, 445; B, 473.

[135] Kant, op. cit., A 606-7.

created has then to be bridged by an emission or transfer of force."[136] Causality presupposes that causes are "somehow superior in rank and excellence" to effects.[137] As a matter of fact they are members merely of a common series; one cannot be derived from the other.

> Both the earlier and the later are simply limits which define the process in question. They are framework which gives it outline; they are the terms which characterize the problem to be attacked.[138]

To select one event from a process and designate it as cause and another as effect is to abstract, to "isolate an event from the history in which it belongs and in which it has its character."[139] Dewey takes the empirical view of causality and calls it "another name for the sequential order itself."[140] Hence, from Dewey's point of view the cosmological argument is defective because it assumes metaphysical causality, a concept that is not empirically verifiable.

3. The Teleological Argument. The third of the historic arguments runs,

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[136] EAN, 273.

[137] Art. 24, 116.

[138] Ibid, 118-19.

[139] EAN, 100.

[140] Loc. cit. Though Dewey renounces efficient causality, he does seek to explain the origin of notions of causality, in short, the cause of causal theories! (Cf., EAN^2, 34-5, 58 ff.) Further, he says, in another place that "a 'cause' is not merely an antecedent; it is that antecedent which if manipulated regulates the occurrence of the consequent." (EAN, 109; the italics are the writer's) This is illustrative of the difficulties in which philosophers fall who try to eliminate the notion of efficient causality.

according to Kant, as follows:[141]

> 1. In der Welt finden sich allerwärts deutliche Zeichen einer Anordnung nach bestimmter Absicht, mit grosser Weisheit ausgeführt, und in einem Ganzen von unbeschreiblicher Mannigfaltigkeit des Inhaltes sowohl, als auch unbegrenzter Grösse des Umfangs. 2. Den Dingen der Welt ist diese zweckmässige Anordnung ganz fremd und hängt ihnen nur zufällig an, d. i. die Natur verschiedener Dinge konnte von selbst, durch so vielerlei sich vereinigende Mittel, zu bestimmten Endabsichten nicht zusammenstimmen, wären sie nicht durch ein anordnendes vernünftiges Prinzip, nach zugrunde liegenden Ideen, dazu ganz eigentlich gewählt und angelegt worden. 3. Es existiert also eine erhabene und weise Ursache (oder mehrere), die nicht bloss als blindwirkende allvermögende Natur durch Fruchtbarkeit, sondern als Intelligenz durch Freiheit die Ursache der Welt sein muss.

Dewey has a full quiver of arguments against teleology which may be summarily stated, since we have met some of them before. (1) Dewey says that there is no particular mystery about the alleged "teleological" character of the world; the fact of adaptation is no more difficult to explain than the mystery of existence itself.[142]

> A mystery has not seldom been made of the fact that objective nature lends itself to man's sense of fitness, order and beauty; or, in another region of discourse, that objective nature submits to mental operations sufficiently to be known.....But the wonder and mystery do not seem to be other than the wonder and mystery that there should be such a thing as nature, as existential events, at all, and that in being they should be what they are. The wonder should be transferred to the whole course of things.

This is true, of course, but the mystery of existence as a whole is more luminous on some hypotheses than others.[143] (2) Dewey affirms that the

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[141] Kant, op. cit., A 625.

[142] EAN, 276-7.

[143] Tennant acknowledges the truth of the point which is made by Dewey here. But he points out that thought has the task of explaining why "the world is more or less intelligible", why "it happens to be more or less a cosmos, when conceivably, it might have been a self-subsistent and determinate 'chaos' in which similar events never occurred, none recurred, universals had no place, relations no fixity, things no nexus of determination, and 'real' categories no foothold." PT, II, 82.

fact that certain events are termini does not make them "ends" of natural processes, any more than the fact that because a musical phrase has a certain close, the earlier portions, therefore, have existed for the sake of the close.[144] (3) Teleology is arbitrary, selective. It chooses to eulogize the good and explain away the bad, whereas nature is both good and bad.[145] (4) The notion of teleology is hypostatization of esthetical objects into realities.[146] (5) Natural teleology is not in accord with the deliverances nor the methods of science.[147] For the reasons mentioned above Dewey would reject the teleological argument.

4. The Moral Argument. Kant renounced the rational arguments for the existence of God but supplanted them with the argument that the divine existence is a postulate of the moral consciousness. Stated briefly, Kant argued that the highest good is possible only if happiness follows upon moral virtue. But no finite being can order events so as to secure happiness. Therefore, God must exist as a guarantee of the coexistence of virtue and happiness.[148]

Dewey makes no mention of Kant's argument as such, but the latter's fundamental assumption that the moral life requires the existence of God for its grounding is attacked more than once. Morality, Dewey argues, does not require a supernatural guarantee of its validity; the authority of ideals lies in their own intrinsic nature.

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[144] EAN, 99.

[145] Ibid, 103, 112; CF, 55-6. See Logical Objection above.

[146] Ibid, 88, 90.

[147] Ibid, 103, 131. This is the Practical Objection above.

[148] Kant, KRV, II, 2.

> All endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence to the actual. Nor does this faith depend for its moving power upon intellectual assurance or belief that the things worked for must surely prevail and come into embodied existence. For the authority of the object to determine our attitude and conduct, the right that is given it to claim our allegiance and devotion is based on the intrinsic nature of the ideal.[149]

Indeed, Dewey insists that not only is a supernatural guarantee not necessary for morality, but to attempt to support morality with metaphysical guarantees of ultimate success of the good marks a lack of moral faith.[150]

The argument for the existence of God from the objectivity of moral values (the later form of the moral argument) is open, of course, to the strictures noted in his logical objection to the supernatural. Values objectified are hypostatizations. Further, to argue for God from the alleged objectivity of moral values is to fall into contradiction.

> It is a 'contradiction' to make the moral ideal absolute and then insist upon the necessity of some existent Being in order to ensure its triumph. If the ideal be absolute, then it takes care of itself, existential triumph or not.[151]

On the whole, Dewey's demurrer against the moral argument is valid. Morality does not require supernatural guarantees. Yet, one wonders why metaphysical support for values is rejected. It seems strange, too, that one who is interested in consequences as Dewey is should not ponder the consequences to moral endeavor if the doctrine becomes universal that the universe will ultimately erase the results of all our moral strivings.

5. The Argument from Religious Experience. In recent times religious thinkers have seen the inadequacy of the traditional arguments for the

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[149] CF, 23.

[150] Ibid, 21-22.

[151] Art. 90, 395.

~~for the~~ divine existence, and, influenced by the empirical trend of modern thought, have sought an empirical basis for the older proofs. Often they have fastened upon religious experience and have argued that the existence of God is immediately given in religious experience. We are said to know God through our religious experience in the same direct way that we know the physical world through the senses.

This sort of argument comes in for rigorous scrutiny by Dewey. He finds several faults with it. (1) For one thing, he distinguishes between the experience itself and its interpretation and holds that the supernatural interpretation of religious experience is not inherent in it but is brought to it by the experient's doctrine or previous experience.

> Theexperience is a fact to be inquired into. The theory, like any theory, is an interpretation of the fact. The idea that by its very nature the experience is a veridical realization of the direct presence of God does not rest so much upon examination of the facts as it does upon importing into their interpretation a conception that is formed outside them.[152]

> As with every empirical phenomenon, the occurrence of the state....is simply an occasion for inquiry into its mode of causation. There is no more reason for converting the experience itself into an immediate knowledge of its cause than in the case of an experience of lightning or any other natural occurrence.[153]

> The particular interpretation given to this complex of conditions is not inherent in the experience itself. It is derived from the culture with which a particular person has been imbued. A fatalist will give one name to it; a Christian Scientist another, and the one who rejects all supernatural being still another. The determiñing factor in the interpretation of the experience is the particular doctrinal apparatus into which a person has been inducted.[154]

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152. CF, 35.

153. CF, 37-8.

154. CF, 13.

This objection to the argument from religious experience is valid. "What we call religious experience has no necessary ontological significance. It may be valid, but it may also be invalid."[155] (2) Dewey contends that religious experience, far from requiring belief in a supernatural God, can be had without belief in God. Men with all sorts of views of God, and those who reject belief in the supernatural have had religious experiences.[156] There is no a priori bond between the experience of religion and a supernatural object of reference. (3) Dewey urges, further, that any experience, the religious not excepted, is a complex thing, and may have many causes.[157] To ascribe it to God is an over-simplification. (4) Religious experience has the disadvantage of being private and limited; unlike science it is not open and public.[158] There is much greater play of subjectivity possible in experience of the religious sort. Finally, (5) the argument from religious experience is circular.

> When the experience in question does not yield consciousness of the presence of God, in the sense that is alleged to exist, the retort is always at hand that it is not a genuine religious experience. For by definition only that experience is religious which arrives at this particular result.[159]

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[155] Knudson, VRE, 71.

[156] CF, 12.

[157] CF, 14.

[158] CF, 39.

[159] Ibid, 40.

Thus, Dewey rejects the arguments most frequently offered in speculative circles for belief in the divine existence. His strictures upon these arguments are not essentially different from those which theists themselves pass upon them. Very few modern students of religion will admit the logical cogency of the so-called proofs for the divine existence. But most of them believe that they create a presumption in favor of the existence of a divine being and, on this basis, launch their faith. Dewey, on the other hand, chained to nature by the method of experiment, which he regards as sovereign, refuses either to speculate or to proceed in faith. His final word on the question is that the existence of a supernatural God is logically possible, but if the future of religion is bound up with the discovery of valid proofs of it, the future of religion is not bright.[160]

G. SUMMARY

In this chapter we have expounded Dewey's naturalistic critique of the notion that occupies the central place in historic religious philosophy, -- the supernatural. We have seen that he condemns belief in it on four general counts: (1) Genetically, religion arises out of desire or myth, a fact which discredits its claim to objective validity. (2) Epistemologically, the supernatural rests on premises belonging to the pre-scientific era. (3) Logically, it is self-refuting and guilty of hypostatizing eventual functions of experience into antecedent realities. (4) Practically, belief in the supernatural is inimical to the development of science, human amelioration, the exercise of human endeavor, and

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[160] Art. 90, 395.

the practice of religion undefiled.

Upon examination we have found that the first objection is irrelevant, even on a pragmatic basis; antecedents are not the criteria of truth. The second objection presupposes the exclusive validity of scientific method. The third has the greatest cogency, being decisive against impersonal idealism. The fourth is vitiated by unguarded generalizations and rests on the general pragmatic criterion of truth.

Dewey rejects the usual arguments for God upon essentially the same grounds as other critics.

Three things, in conclusion, are worthy of note: (1) Dewey's attack on supernaturalism has cogency only if his assumption concerning the exclusive validity of experimental method is tenable. This assumption will be investigated in Chapter IV. (2) Dewey manifests a strange, almost wilful, disregard of the facts of historic religion. (3) The underlying difference between Dewey and the supernatural religion he opposes is the difference between an existential and functional approach to reality. For supernatural religion the decisive issue is whether certain objects exist; for Dewey the question is, What practical difference, if any, do they make?

CHAPTER III
A COMMON FAITH

In the preceding chapter Dewey's critique of historical religion has been set forth. In the chapter which follows the endeavor will be to expound his own interpretation of religion. We proceed, thus, from a discussion of what religion is to what, in Dewey's judgment, it ought to be, moving from the negative to the positive, from the critically descriptive to the normative. Dewey believes that the essential point to grasp in formulating a common faith to which all truly religious men may adhere is the fact that religion is naturalistic in its "foundations and bearings."[1] The general plan of this chapter will be to set forth briefly the naturalistic foundations of religion, -- nature, man, and value, -- then to consider faith itself in its relations, together with its object, and finally to indicate the bearings of Dewey's view upon the perennial problems of religion. That the theory may be seen in its clearest outlines the chapter closes with a brief comparison of it with personalism.

A. NATURE

Although the foundations of religion are held to be "naturalistic", Dewey does not give us a formal definition of "nature". But what he means by the concept in general is apparent. Nature, for Dewey, is a

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1. CF, 57.

totality which includes, -- (1) the physical, (2) the psycho-physical, and (3) the mental.[2] It is not to be identified with physical nature, -- the sum of things and events in space and time and subject to a single system of causal laws. It includes physical nature, and also man,[3] mathematical and logical objects, and values.[4] In general, its boundaries may be said to be co-terminous with that which can be experimentally verified.[5]

Three statements may be made about nature as Dewey conceives it:

1. Nature is a temporal process. It is "a history which is a succession of histories."[6] "Every existence is an event."[7] The world is in process of transformation.[8] The permanent is merely those things which undergo change more slowly than others.[9]

2. Nature is continuous. Dewey is never clear or consistent in his view of continuity, although he regards it as axiomatic. Sometimes the term is used in the broad sense of "relational." He says, for example, in speaking of "the occurrence of problematic and unsettled situations" that they are due "to the characteristic union of the discrete or individual and the continuous or relational."[10] In this sense continuity means

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2. EAN, 261.
3. Cf., Art. 91, 1552.
4. QFC, 195.
5. Cf., ibid, 197.
6. EAN, 100. "'The natural'", says Han, "is whatever occurs." MOE, 63.
7. EAN, 71.
8. Art. 37, 56-7.
9. EAN, 71.
10. QFC, 234.

interaction, -- as, for example, when processes of nature interact or ideals regulate conduct.[11] Dewey always means this, at least, when he refers to nature as continuous, -- it is related, interactional. But sometimes the term is used to suggest qualitative identity. He says, for instance, that

> the intelligent activity of man is not something brought to bear upon nature from without; it is nature realizing its own potentialities in behalf of a fuller and richer issue of events.[12]

That is, man is not related to nature; he is a part of nature, identical with it. Or again, he says,

> A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event occurring *within* nature because of traits of the latter.[13]

The "is" of this quotation, we take it, means to affirm identity. While the former meaning of "continuity" is the one more frequently expressed, the latter is employed, too, particularly as the major premise of criticisms against the foes of naturalism.[14]

The implication of the fact of "continuity" is that nature is a system.[15]

3. Nature contains *real novelties*. Nature is indeterminate; if it

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[11] Art. 86, 176.

[12] QFC, 214-15.

[13] EAN, 68.

[14] For an excellent discussion of this use of "continuity" in Dewey's writing, together with its difficulties, see Feldman, op. cit., 86-90.

[15] "Everything that exists in as far as it is known and knowable is in interaction with other things. It is associated, as well as solitary, single." EAN, 12.

were not so, perception, knowledge, and experiment would be impossible.[16] There are emergents in nature, as we have suggested, -- three levels: (1) physical, (2) life, and (3) association, communication, participation, -- mind; mind is a real novelty.[17] It is a functional character of natural events at the state of widest and most complex interaction.[18] Each level has its own characteristics and categories, although each stands in relation to and in dependence on the others.[19]

Two observations may be made about this view of nature. First, it represents an attempt on Dewey's part to conceive of existence as a whole. As we shall unfold Dewey's religious philosophy we shall notice this moment, reminiscent of Hegel and Dewey's renounced idealism, again and again. Secondly, this broad view of nature is only a description; it is not a philosophical explanation. Physical things, man, values and all are described in their interaction; an explanation of why they are systematically related is not forthcoming. Pratt's strictures against the emergent evolutionists are applicable to Dewey:[20]

> What they present us with is merely a theoretical history, a chronological list of the order in which things have appeared. Their history and their list are probably correct, but if they stop with them they have thrown no light on the extraordinary things that they have described.

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16. Cf., EAN, 348-9, 75.

17. EAN, 272-3; CI, 66.

18. EAN, 75, vi.

19. Ibid, 272-3.

20. PR, 363.

B. MAN

When we approach Dewey's view of man we come to grips with his naturalism still better. There are three questions religion is interested in asking about man: (1) Does he possess a soul or self? That religion has been interested in the question needs no proof. (2) What is the relation of the soul or self to the body? Immortality is bound up with this query. (3) Is the individual of supreme worth? Christianity has always affirmed the intrinsic worth of the human soul. We organize Dewey's thought about men in relation to these questions.

1. Does Dewey affirm the existence of a soul or self? If by "soul" the soul of traditional Christianity is meant, -- the mental principle conceived as a substance separate from the body, and having personal individuality and identity, though the source of mental phenomena, -- Dewey denies the existence of a "soul". He is explicit about the matter. Such a soul is an hypostatization.[21] When such a soul is offered as strict science it is nothing more than a "superstitious encumbrance."[22]

Does he believe, however, in a self conceived not as a transcendental substance but as a conscious, immanent, nonspatial unity? Two views are present in his writings.

First, there are many behavioristic statements, of which the following are samples:

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[21] Art. 33, 40.

[22] EAN, 294.

> Instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; and meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification. Put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean any transcendent states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but that the operations of knowing are (or artfully derived from) natural responses of the organism.[23]

> Knowledge which is not projected against the black unknown lives in the muscles, not in consciousness.[24]

> The 'seat' or locus of mind -- its static phase -- is the qualities of organic action, as far as these qualities have been conditioned by language and its consequences.[25]

> Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects.[26]

> Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do; the distinctive purpose for which they are employed.[27]

It would be difficult to find a more outspoken formulation of behaviorism than these passages represent. We should be forced to classify Dewey with the Watsonians were it not for some other considerations which receive probably greater emphasis in his thought.

For one thing, Dewey explicitly rejects behaviorism of the extreme type. He says that that description is inadequate which "reduces speech to vocalization or making of sounds and thinking to a silent exercise of

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[23] EEL, 331-2.

[24] HNC, 177.

[25] EAN, 291-2.

[26] EAN, 179-80.

[27] EEL, 14.

the organs of vocalization and other structures."[28] He regards it as a grossly oversimplified "subcutaneous" theory of the mental processes.[29]

In addition to the explicit rejection of Watsonian behaviorism there are other considerations pointing quite as definitely away from it: (1) Dewey affirms the existence of consciousness, response to meaning. He defines intellect as "possession of and response to meanings",[30] "mental" as "aware of meanings",[31] and "thinking" as "response to the doubtful as such."[32] In this capacity to respond to meanings Dewey says that human beings function at a level above the psychophysical.[33] By no stretch of the imagination could the following passage on the "moral self" be interpreted behavioristically:[34]

> The self should be *wise* or prudent, looking to an inclusive satisfaction and hence subordinating the satisfaction of an immediately urgent single appetite; it should be *faithful* in acknowledgment of the claims involved in its relations with others; it should be solicitous, *thoughtful*, in the award of praise and blame, use of approbation and disapprobation, and, finally, should be *conscientious* and have the active will to discover new values and to revise former notions.

(2) Dewey affirms that men are not only conscious but "conscious of consciousness."[35] (3) Further, he speaks of the "integration of the

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[28] From "Body and Mind", an address delivered before the New York Academy of Medicine and reported in Ratner, POJD. This quotation is found on page 102.

[29] Art. 50, 509-11.

[30] EAN, 272.

[31] EAN, 258.

[32] QFC, 224.

[33] EAN, 177, 178.

[34] ETH, 315. The italics are Dewey's.

[35] Art. 37, 72, 73; Ratner, POJD, 85.

self"; indeed, he makes it the mark of genuine religious experience.[36] (4) Finally, as Lovejoy puts it, one of the "deepest-lying premises" of Dewey's philosophy is the notion that man is an "agent" and a "reflective agent, in a physical and social environment."[37] One of the never-ceasing refrains of Dewey's works is the teaching that a pragmatic intelligence is "creative intelligence."[38]

> The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends -- to free experience from routine and caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action is the pragmatic lesson.[39]

These considerations since they represent the general trend of Dewey's thought, seem decisive against behaviorism. Morris's judgment is probably correct when he suggests that Dewey's thought is "behavioristic in the larger non-Watsonian sense of stressing the central importance of behavior for philosophy."[40] Does Dewey hold, then, to the reality of a conscious self? We defer our answer until after investigation of the next question.

2. What is the relation of "mind" to body? It is not a dualistic one. Dewey explicitly rejects psychophysical dualism,[41] and the

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36. CF, 17.

37. Lovejoy, Art. 1, 177.

38. CI, 64.

39. Ibid, 63.

40. STM, 320.

41. EAN^2, ix.

double-aspect theory,[42] as well as epiphenomenalism.[43] All attempts to assign mind and body to different existential realms is repudiated.[44]

What is the relationship? Dewey contends that mind and body are different characters of natural events.[45] They represent different levels "of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events."[46] The approach to the body-mind problem must be genetic. It cannot be settled by taking a cross-section of the body-mind unity; rather this unity must be treated as a process of growth, one thing in a child, another in a youth, another in maturity.[47] There are several stages in the development of the body-mind unity: (1) There is that of the psycho-physical organism, which represents simply the organization of energies upon the lines of need-demand-satisfaction.[48] (2) Above it is the level of sensitivity, discriminatory response, -- the animal level as compared with the plant level of the first.[49] (3) Next is the level of feeling, marked by response to distant stimuli (distant in space and time), -- a characteristic of the higher animals.[50] (4) Finally, at the peak of development is mind, whose distinguishing characteristics are communication, language, response to meanings.[51]

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[42] EAN, 74.

[43] Ibid, 315.

[44] Ibid, 284.

[45] Ibid, 74.

[46] Ibid, 261.

[47] Cf., ibid, 275.

[48] EAN, 253-4.

[49] Ibid, 256.

[50] Ibid, 256-7.

[51] Ibid, 258.

Consciousness is present at all these levels; but at the level of psycho-physical organisms it is only "the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences", while at the level of mind it is the totality of "actualized apprehensions of meanings."[52] Consciousness is those meanings of which one is aware at the moment, while mind is "the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life."[53] Thus mind, or soul (as Dewey sometimes employs the term, though apprehensive of the misunderstandings it may evoke) represents an achievement of the psycho-physical organism. Not everyone possesses a soul or mind.[54] The relationship, thus, of consciousness to physiological organism is relative to the stage of development of consciousness. Mind represents the highest level of action of natural events of which the organism occupies a lower.

Though mind and body represent different levels of interaction, mind is bound to body, having an essential connection with it.

> Every 'mind' that we are empirically acquainted with is found in connection with some organized body. Every such body exists in a natural medium to which it sustains some adaptive connection: plants to air, water, sun, and animals to these things and also to plants. Without such connections, animals die; the 'purest' mind would not continue without them........
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> The only excuse for reciting such commonplaces is that traditional theories have separated life from nature, mind from organic life, and thereby created mysteries.[55]

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[52] EAN, 303.

[53] Loc. cit.

[54] "To say emphatically of a particular person that he has soul or a great soul is not to utter a platitude, applicable equally to all human beings. It expresses the conviction that the man or woman in question has in marked degree qualities of sensitive, rich and co-ordinated participation in all the situations of life." Ibid, 294.

[55] EAN, 277, 278.

Does Dewey hold to a conscious self? While explicitly rejecting the substantial or transcendental view of soul, he does affirm the existence of a conscious self, the quotations which point otherwise notwithstanding. It will be noted in reading Dewey that the greatest doubt is thrown upon the existence of a conscious self in Experience and Nature. In that book Dewey is attempting to establish continuity in nature, and the method, as we have seen and shall see again and again, is verbal. By expressing himself in behavioristic terms he gives the effect of bridging the body-mind dualism. To call "mind" "a genuine character of natural events when these attain the stage of widest and most complex interaction with one another" not only sounds behavioristic but seems to bring together two entities, -- mind and nature, -- that have often stood in opposition.[56] But when we discover that some of the distinguishing marks of this "character of natural events" are consciousness,[57] unity,[58] awareness and manipulation of meanings,[59] space and time transcendence,[60] and striving for known ends,[61] the behavioristic ring of the definition is not so fearsome; it is another way of saying that man, while closely related to the psychophysical, is nevertheless a conscious, thinking, feeling, willing being. It is to be noted that Dewey's ethical and religious writings do not

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[56] EAN^2, vi.

[57] EAN, 298.

[58] Cf., ETH, 336; CF, 33.

[59] EAN, 298, 308.

[60] Ibid, 256-7.

[61] ETH, 317.

hesitate to employ the term "self."[62]

3. Is the individual of supreme worth? To this question in its traditional form, like the others, Dewey would return a negative. The individual of traditional religion with

A never-dying soul to save
And fit it for the sky

is not the possessor of infinite worth.[63] Neither is the individual of the good old days of "rugged individualism" nor the individual in his solitariness of supreme worth.[64] Yet, while Dewey is chary about ascribing superior worth to the individual, because of the overtones of supernaturalism suggested by such expressions as the "infinite worth of the human soul", he accepts the practical meaning of this teaching. He acknowledges that the historic teaching of the infinite worth of the human soul, though not demonstrated by traditional religion, has had a salutary effect upon secular relationships.[65] He confesses that democracy, of which he has been a life-long exponent, assumes the worth of the individual.

> Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society.[66]

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[62] Cf., ETH, 315 ff.; CF, 33ff.

[63] Cf., ION, 74-75.

[64] Cf., ibid, 74-82.

[65] RPH, 47.

[66] Ibid, 186.

He looks forward to a time and a society when individuals may mutually enjoy the good things of life.[67] He says that "individuals will always be the center and the consummation of experience;"[68] there cannot be "a society really worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals of significant qualities."[69] He affirms the true purpose of "government, business, art, religion, all social institutions" to be "to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status."[70] Surely traditional religion never gave greater practical content to its doctrine of the worth of the individual soul than this.

A word of criticism must be raised here against Dewey's conception of nature and man, which we have set forth in the two preceding sections. Nature, as he conceives it, is a continuous system, inclusive of both mind and physical organism. Hence, there is no real problem of the relationship of body and mind; the problem is created by a tearing in twain of an original unity and an attempt to relate the parts again.[71]

Does, however, the teaching that a dualistic relationship exists between mind and body destroy "continuity", as Dewey believes? If by "continuity" is meant identity (the second meaning mentioned above),[72] a dualism of mind and body is not reconcilable with continuity. But a

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67. ION, 154.

68. Art. 86, 181.

69. DEE, 142.

70. RPH, 186.

71. Cf., EAN, vii, viii.

72. Supra, 73.

qualitative identity of mind and body makes all of Dewey's talk of "emergence" and "levels" meaningless. Plainly it would seem that Dewey does not mean they are identical but continuous in the other sense mentioned above, -- "related." [73]

But how, we ask, does "dualism" destroy continuity in the sense of relatedness? There is a continuity existing, for example, between father and son. They represent in a sense different stages of development in a family, different levels. Yet, that does not mean that father and son are not distinct nor that their relationships are not a problem which the simple affirmation of continuity does not solve.

Dewey has "solved" one of the knottiest problems of philosophy by a verbal expedient. He has stretched the concept of "nature" until it covers both mental and psycho-physical and then assumed that because both fall within the category of "nature" there is no basic problem of their relationship.

There are four fundamental differences between mental events and bodily events:[74] (1) Mental events observe themselves; bodily events do not. (2) Bodily events are in space; mental events are not. (3) Bodily events are in the present only; mental events are extended in time to the past and future. (4) Bodily events are facts; mental events are facts with meanings. No more elementary differences can be conceived in all existence than these. To enclose them both with the concept "nature" does nothing at all to their differences. Dewey is guilty here of the same fallacy

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[73] He acknowledges they are "different" levels of emergence. EAN, 272.

[74] Cf. Hocking, TOP, 98-100 for an illuminating discussion of these points.

with which he charged supernaturalism in the previous chapter. Supernaturalists, he claims, hypostatized certain aspects of experience, -- permanence, for example, -- into realities, allowing the hazardous elements of experience to sink into phenomenal reality or non-Being. But classification, he reminds us, does nothing to existence.[75] We agree, -- not even to the fundamental differences existent between mind and body!

C. VALUE

Before embarking upon a discussion of Dewey's concept of religion proper we sketch briefly his naturalistic theory of value which lies at the basis of it.

1. *Psychology of value.* Values arise in experience. Two interpretations of the psychology of valuation are offered us by Dewey. In his *Ethics* he makes value equivalent psychologically to the realization of desire.[76] While thought plays a part in the determination of value, "it is impotent unless it arouses desire."[77] In his *Quest for Certainty* he identifies value with liking or enjoyment. "To be enjoyed and to be a value are two names for one and the same fact."[78] There is, however, no fundamental significance for the philosophy of religion of these two psychological theories.

2. *Criterion of value.* The true worth of the goods presented by experience is not immediately given.[79] Both likings and desires conflict, which make discrimination between them necessary; there is a basic

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75. QFC, 35.
76. Cf. ETH, 228.
77. ETH, 201.
78. QFC, 258.
79. ETH, 318-19.

distinction ~~distinction~~ between desired and desirable.[80] The criterion of discrimination between competing desires or likings is their relationships to a whole. The office of reflection in value-experience is "the formulation of a judgment of value in which particular satisfactions are placed as integral parts of conduct as a consistent harmonious whole."[81] "The criterion is the whole situation in which the desire takes effect."[82] This does not mean, of course, that the true worth of competing desires is decided without appeal to consequences. "The moral quality of any impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing the sort of consequences to which it leads in actual practice."[83] Thought, coherence, is the criterion by which consequences are to be judged.

3. The organization of values. When we reach the matter of organizing values two characteristic doctrines of Dewey come forward. First of all, he insists that values cannot be arranged in a hierarchy of any sort.

> We cannot draw up a catalogue and say that such and such goods are intrinsically and always ideal, and such and such other ones inherently base because material. There are circumstances under which enjoyment of a value called spiritual because it is associated with religion is mere indulgence; when its good, in other words, becomes one of mere sensuous emotion. There are occasions when attention to the material environment constitutes the ideal good because that is the act which thoroughgoing inquiry would approve.......The business of reflection in determining the true good cannot be done once for all, as, for instance, making out a table of values arranged in a hierarchical order of higher and lower. It needs to be done, and done over and over and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as they arise.[84]

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[80] QFC, 260, 261.

[81] ETH, 228.

[82] Ibid, 385.

[83] Ibid, 250-51.

[84] Ibid, 230.

In the second place, Dewey maintains that no distinction must be made between instrumental and intrinsic goods. Several considerations inspire him to reject this usual ethical distinction:

(1) "Means-consequences" is "a single undivided situation."[85] Means and consequences bear an organic relation to each other.[86] (2) So-called ends or intrinsic values are not termini but turning-points.[87] Every value is both a means and an end.

> All experienced objects have a double status. They are individualized, consummatory, whether in the way of enjoyment or of suffering. They are also involved in a continuity of interactions and changes, and hence are causes and potential means of later experience.[88]

(3) Value-judgments are essentially judgments about the conditions and result of value.[89] (4) Finally, the practical results of divorce of means and ends has been the brutalizing of our economic and social life, because ideals are held to occupy a different status from the world of means and not associated with them.[90]

4. The relation of value and existence. "Ideals," a term which Dewey uses interchangeably with values, are continuous with natural events.[91] By that he means that ideals represent the "possibilities" of natural events.[92]

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85. EAN, 397.

86. Cf. Ibid, 367-68.

87. HNC, 223.

88. QFC, 236.

89. Ibid, 265.

90. Cf. RPH, 171-72. This is a theme Dewey often dwells upon. See also QFC, 280-81.

91. EEL, 336-7.

92. Loc. cit.

> The relation between objects as known and objects with respect to value is that between the actual and the possible. 'The actual' consists of given conditions; 'the possible' denotes ends or consequences not now existing but which the actual may through its use bring into existence. The possible in respect to any given actual situation is thus an ideal for that situation; from the standpoint of operational definition -- of thinking in terms of action -- the ideal and the possible are equivalent ideas......If we agree to leave out the eulogistic savor of 'ideal' and define it in contrast with the actual, the possibility denoted by an idea is the ideal phase of the existent.[93]

The "ought" is merely "the 'is' of action."[94] Consciousness of duty is no more than "consciousness of something to be done."[95] "The difference between saying 'This act is the one to be done, this act will meet the situation,' and saying, 'The act ought to be done,' is merely verbal."[96]

5. Are values objective?[97] Finally, we come to the question as to the objectivity of value, which is often cited as the test case for determining metaphysical position. Dewey is opposed to the objectivity of values in the sense of their being already actual in a realm of Being. His whole polemic against the supernatural set forth in the previous chapter is directed against such a conception. Further, if it be true, as Barrett, (following Urban) declares, that the decisive question is whether we find value in the world or we ourselves create all there is, Dewey must be counted among the subjectivists. "Nature," he says, "has intelligible

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[93] QFC, 299-300.

[94] Ratner, POJD, 374.

[95] Loc. cit.

[96] Ibid, 375.

[97] Dewey objects to this phrasing of the question, for it is reminiscent of an introspective psychology which "accepts a realm of purely private states of consciousness" in contrast with an objective order. EEL, 345.

order as its possession in the degree in which we by our own overt operations realize potentialities contained in it."[98]

But there are several respects in which Dewey may be said to hold to a sort of objectivity of value. (1) Values are more than mere personal likings; if they are not to be simply arbitrary, undiscussable preferences they must possess the objectivity of cognitive beliefs.[99] If a pragmatist can consistently hold to logical objectivity, values may be said to be logically objective for Dewey. (2) Further, they are socially objective. The projection and realization of ideals is a process extending through generations of continuous effort.[100] (3) Also, they are objective in the sense of having a determinative influence upon human conduct.[101] (4) Finally, they are objective in the sense that they are natural. They are rooted in natural conditions: "they are made out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience."[102] Men's labours in behalf of the ideal are "the doing of the universe", because man is a part of it.[103]

There are many criticisms which a theory of values such as that outlined call forth. At this point, however, we shall make but two observations.

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[98] QFC, 215.

[99] EAN, 424.

[100] "The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it." CF, 87.

[101] CF, 48.

[102] Ibid, 49.

[103] EAN, 420.

(I) We see here again the same fallacy noted in Dewey's discussion of man and nature, -- the merely verbal unifying of real and ideal by the concept of "continuity". Values may be included under the concept "nature", but that fact does not bridge the fundamental differences between existence and value:

(1) As mental events (and Dewey admits they are projections of the imagination)[104] there are the same differences between them and physical existents as we have noted previously.[105]

(2) Further, ideals involve an element of compulsion, necessity, obligation which other existents do not. Dewey says that an ideal is "a possibility of existence."[106] In that way he binds value and existence together. But that is not what we mean by an ideal. A genuine ideal is not only a possibility of existence but one which we acknowledge that we ought to realize. To say "wealth is a possibility of existence" is not the same as to say "I ought to seek wealth." Possibilities may be either good or bad. War and peace, for example, are both possibilities of existence. Kant pointed out long ago the distinction between existence and obligation.

> Das Sollen drückt eine Art von Notwendigkeit und Verknüpfung mit Gründen aus, die in der ganzen Natur sonst nich vorkommt.....Es ist unmöglich, dass etwas darin anders sein soll, als es in allen diesen Zeitverhältnissen in der Tat ist, ja das Sollen, wenn man bloss den Lauf der Natur vor Augen hat, hat ganz und gar keine Bedeutung. Wir können gar nicht fragen: was in der Natur geschehen soll, ebensowenig, als: was für Eigenschaften ein Zirkel haben soll....[107]

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[104] CF, 43.

[105] Supra, 84.

[106] Cf. EEL, 336-37.

[107] KRV, A, 547; B, 575.

(3) Still further, what "ought to be" stands frequently in opposition to what is.

To call both existents and values, then, "natural events" is only to classify and not to solve the problem of their status in the world. It is a verbal solution for the basic dichotomy existing between them.[108] It no more mediates their intrinsic differences than the classification of Japanese and Chinese as "Mongolians" settles their difficulties.

(II) We see in Dewey's discussion of values his basic assumption that nature is a whole, which includes man and his values. Since it is a whole and not anaggregate, it may be characterized as a whole. Man is, of course, characterized by this natural whole of which he is a part; but man to some extent characterizes it! "If man is natural," as Hartshorne puts it, then "nature is manlike."[109] The final implications of interpreting nature in terms of man is that conception of the world to which theism ultimately refers.[110] The doctrine that nature is a whole, inclusive of man and his ideals, is two-edged; its implications are quite as properly idealistic as naturalistic.

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[108] It is for this reason that Santayana calls Dewey's naturalism "half-hearted." For Dewey brings ends, aims, and values which men cherish into nature, imparting to it a teleological and anthropological character quite inconsistent with nature as usually conceived. Santayana holds that Dewey is incurably ethical, and his naturalism is really a thin veneer. He is unwilling to go the whole way and carry through the assumption of naturalism to materialistic conclusions. Cf. Santayana, Art. 1.

[109] BH, 40.

[110] Hartshorne contends that the ultimate implication of Dewey's view is panpsychism. Ibid, 40-41, 45.

D. "THE RELIGIOUS"

1. Religion versus "the religious." Dewey begins his exposition of his own views with the pronouncement that "there is a difference between religion, _a_ religion, and the religious."[111] Concretely, there is no such thing as religion in the singular.

> There is only a multitude of religions. 'Religion' is a strictly collective term and the collection it stands for is not even of the kind illustrated in textbooks of logic. It has not the unity of a regiment or assembly but that of any miscellaneous aggregate.[112]

All peoples have had _a_ religion, but "the differences among them are so great and so shocking that any common element that can be extracted is meaningless."[113] A survey of historical religions reveals a multitude of different gods, from the Kami of primitive Shintoism, or the fetish of the Africans, to the gods and semi-divine heroes of the Greek and Roman Pantheons, or the personal and loving Providence of Christianity. [114] "There is no greater similarity in the ways in which obedience and reverence have been expressed."[115] There is, further, "no discernible unity in the moral motivations appealed to and utilized" in historical religions.[116] Hence, Dewey comes to the conclusion that the search for a universal element,

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[111] CF, 3.

[112] Ibid, 7-8.

[113] Ibid, 8.

[114] CF, 4.

[115] Loc. cit.

[116] Ibid, 5.

religion, in the mass of divergent religions is profitless.

> What boots it to accept, in defense of the universality of religion, a definition that applies equally to the most savage and degraded beliefs and practices that have related to unseen powers and to noble ideals of religion having the greatest share of moral content?[117]

Since a universal element of any significance is missing, -- religion, -- and a religion always means "a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight,"[118] Dewey proposes to deal with what he designates "the religious", -- "attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal."[119]

2. Analysis of "the religious". Dewey gives us two specific statements of "the religious":

> (1) A sense of the possibilities of existence and .... devotion to the cause of these possibilities, as distinct from acceptance of what is given at the time.[120]

> (2) The unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices.[121]

An analysis of these two expressions of "the religious" reveals the following constituent elements:

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117. CF, 7.

118. Ibid, 9.

119. Ibid, 10.

120. QFC, 303.

121. CF, 33.

(1) A Wertschau, -- apprehension of value, "a sense of the possibilities of existence", imaginative projection of the ideal. This valuational sense is directed toward (1) whatever is truly significant, whether it be certain ideal possibilities or that upon which they depend, and (2) it apprehends what is significant in its wholeness. The object of faith is variously defined as "the active relation between real and actual" (which Dewey describes as "coherent"),[122] "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions," [123] the universe as a whole.[124] But whatever the objects of valuation may be, they are not apprehended religiously in their solitariness but in their unity or wholeness.

(2) Devotion to whatever is perceived to be truly significant, -- "devotion to the cause of these possibilities," "allegiance to inclusive ideal ends."

(3) The result of devotion to ideal ends is unification of the self. Dewey says that whenever this is effected "there is a definitely religious attitude."[125]

If we seek an illustration of the sort of naturalistic religion Dewey is expounding, communism comes to mind. It rejects the supernatural, as Dewey does, and involves a passionate allegiance to certain ideal ends which it holds to be possibilities of natural events. While Dewey is critical of communism he admits that it is truly "religious."[126]

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122. CF, 51.

123. Ibid, 42.

124. Ibid, 18, 19.

125. Ibid, 17.

126. Cf. Art. 83; CHE, I, 426; Art. 87, 31-32.

3. Comparison with the historic notion of "the religious." A comparison of Dewey's theory of "the religious" with that of historical religions suggests that elements (2) and (3) above are common. Devotion to the objects of faith and integration of self through such allegiance are frequent phenomena of historical religions, as Dewey would acknowledge.[127]

There are three respects, however, in which Dewey's view of "the religious" differs sharply from historical conceptions of the same. In the first place, historically the religious attitude has been inseparably bound to supernatural objects. The truly significant or worthful to which the religious attitude is directed in Dewey's theory is, of course, natural. Secondly, historical religions have regarded "the religious" as having a peculiar quality of its own, "something sui generis."[128] For Dewey the religious attitude may be associated with all sorts of experiences and activities.[129] Thirdly, historical religions, Dewey believes, have found their consummation in the act of worship; "dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor."[130] "The religious" in Dewey's sense, is not quietistic, but, because it is directed toward natural ends, eventuates in "an idealism of action."[131]

4. "The religious" and science. Historic religions have been bound to specific intellectual beliefs. But these supernatural beliefs of religion have been discredited in the modern world by the impact of the new

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127. Cf. CF, 4, 17.
128. Ibid, 13-14.
129. Ibid, 14.
130. Ibid, 146.
131. QFC, 304.

astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, and literary criticism.[132] Supernaturalistic faiths have been hard pressed by the approach of science. They have resorted to a number of different expedients. Attempts have been made to partition the territory between science and religion. But this method is open to the objection that " a positive conclusion is drawn from a negative fact." [133] That is, "existing ignorance or backwardness is employed to assert the existence of a division in the nature of the subject-matter dealt with." [134] But "the argument that because some province or aspect of experience has not been 'invaded' by scientific methods, it is not subject to them, is as old as it is dangerous." [135] Another device has been to save religion by holding its beliefs to be symbolic. While this view may be an advance upon those that hold to literal objective validity, such an attempt is riddled with ambiguities concerning the status of that symbolized.[136]

Because of the inability of supernatural religions to accommodate their doctrines to the methods and results of science a crisis exists in religion today. This crisis can be resolved by a conception of faith such as Dewey heralds. It is in harmony with the spirit and methods of science, and cannot be discredited but only furthered by any advances science will make.[137]

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132. CF, 31.

133. Ibid, 34.

134. Loc. cit.

135. Ibid, 35.

136. Ibid, 40-41.

137. Ibid, 33.

> Were we to admit that there is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth -- that conveyed by the word 'scientific' in its most general and generous sense -- no discovery in any branch of knowledge and inquiry could then disturb the faith that is religious.

What is the relation, then, of science to "the religious," as Dewey views it? First of all, as we have just suggested, "the religious" is, in spirit, in harmony with science. The ever-seeking, progressive, truth-loving attitude which characterizes science is its own. Secondly, science would uncover the possibilities of which, after criticism, are to become the ends of religious devotion.[138] Finally, the methods of scientific intelligence would be employed for the realization of those ends to which "the religious" gives its allegiance.[139]

5. "The religious" and philosophy. Philosophy, as Dewey conceives it, has a two-fold function with reference to experience. First, and negatively, it is critical. Its duty is to act as "liason officer between the conclusions of science and the modes of social and personal action through which attainable possibilities are projected and striven for."[140] It criticizes the values (possibilities) which the sciences bring to light with an eye to rendering them "more coherent, more secure, and more significant."[141] Further, it is critical in that it seeks to remove those obstacles which stand in the way of the realization of true values.[142]

Secondly, it has the positive function of projecting ideals, --

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[138] QFC, 304.

[139] Cf. CF, 81.

[140] QFC, 311.

[141] EAN, 408.

[142] QFC, 313.

possibilities of experience, -- that are truly worthy of personal and social action. Further, it would project methods for their realization.[143]

> [The positive function of philosophy is] the creative work of the imagination in pointing to the new possibilities which knowledge of the actual discloses and in projecting methods for their realization in the homely everyday experience of mankind.

The relation of philosophy to "the religious" is fairly clear. Philosophy, after criticism of the results of the sciences, would present religious men with those ideal ends which should be the ends of faith. Philosophy would supply "the religious" with its objects. At the same time, it would critically revise from time to time those objects as well as seek to destroy all spurious forms and conceptions of religion.

6. "The religious" and the moral. Dewey offers two respects in which "the religious" differs from the moral. First,

> The religious attitude signifies something that is bound through imagination to a general attitude. This comprehensive attitude, moreover, is much broader than anything indicated by 'moral' in its usual sense. The quality of attitude is displayed in art, science, and good citizenship.[144]

If "morals in the usual sense" means merely honesty, temperance, benevolence, chastity, and the like, of course, "the religious" represents something more comprehensive. But Dewey himself does not conceive of morals in such a fashion. "Moral science," he says, "is not something with a separate province. It is physical, biological, and historic knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men."[145] Morals includes love of knowledge, belief, and art.[146]

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143. QFC, 312.
144. CF, 23.

145. HNC, 296.

146. Cf. EAN, 52, 272; cf. Crissman, Art. 1, 598.

"Potentially, conduct is one hundred per cent of our acts."[147] Whenever choice enters, "a difference between better and worse arises."[148] Dewey conceives, thus, of morals as involving the conduct of life as a whole. We cannot see more than a verbal difference between what Dewey calls "religious" and what an orthodox moralist would call "devotion to the Good."

But Dewey suggests that there is a second difference between "the religious" and the moral.

> What has been said does not imply that all moral faith in ideal ends is by virtue of that fact religious in quality. The religious is 'morality touched by emotions' only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self. The inclusiveness of the end in relation to both self and the 'universe' to which an inclusive self is related is indispensable.[149]

But unification of the self has often been the result of allegiance to what are usually regarded as moral ends.

"The religious" is indistinguishable from the moral, if the latter (1) be conceived as devotion, not to particular, but inclusive ends, and (2) as resulting in integration of the self.

7. "The religious" and the esthetic. "The religious" is closely related to the esthetic. (1) The object of faith, in so far as it possesses unity, has esthetic quality. For Dewey says that "no experience of whatever sort is a unity unless it has esthetic quality."[150] Unity is the mark of the esthetic everywhere. Even

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147. HNC, 279.

148. Ibid, 278.

149. CF, 22-23.

150. AAE, 40.

> the most elaborate philosophic or scientific inquiry and the most ambitious industrial or political enterprise has, when its different ingredients constitute an integral experience, esthetic quality.[151]

In so far as the ends of religious devotion are conceived as a unity, as a whole, it has esthetic quality.

Further, (2) both "the religious" and the esthetic involve imagination. Dewey emphasizes the fact that the object of faith is imaginatively presented;[152] esthetic experience is likewise essentially imaginative.[153] (3) Again, both involve subjection of the resistant to an end, -- "dynamic organization."

> In every integral experience there is form because there is dynamic organization. I call the organization dynamic because it takes time to complete it, because it is a growth....... That which distinguishes an experience as esthetic is conversion of resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are temptations to diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close.[154]

The realization of the inclusive ends of faith in a world such as ours will require, also, time and conversion of "resistance and tensions" before consummation is reached.[155]

(4) Religious feeling may be invoked by esthetic perception.

> A work of art elicits and accentuates...... [the] quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live. This fact..... is the explanation of that feeling of exquisite intelligibility and clarity we have in the presence of an object that is experienced with esthetic intensity. It explains also the religious feeling that accompanies intense esthetic perception. We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences. We are carried out beyond ourselves to find ourselves.[156]

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151. AAE, 55.
152. CF, 33.
153. AAE, 272.
154. Ibid, 55-56.
155. Cf. CF, 81.
156. AAE, 195.

Wherein do "the religious" and the esthetic differ? Chiefly in different interests and purposes that initiate and control them.[157] "The religious" is interested in certain ideal ends and eventuates consciously in certain objective activities. The esthetic is interested in the wholeness of experience for its own sake without reference to further purposes.

> In a distinctively esthetic experience, characteristics that are subdued in other experiences are dominant; those that are subordinate are controlling -- namely, the characteristics in virtue of which the experience is an integrated complete experience on its own account.[158]

8. "The religious" and society. The relationship of "the religious" to society is clear and can be summarily stated.

To begin with, ideals, which form, in their unity, the object of faith are socially derived. Man himself is intrinsically social, and his ideals are shaped by his social relations and are the product of his discontent with the social conditions in which he lives.[159]

In the second place, the "religious" sense can be built up and sustained in society alone. The notion that "the religious" can be developed in solitary souls is fatuous.

> The very attempt to secure integration for the individual, and through him for society, by means of a deliberate and conscious cultivation of religion, is itself proof of how far the individual has become lost through detachment from acknowledged social values ..... The sense of wholeness which is urged as the essence of religion can be built up and sustained only through membership in a society which has attained a degree of unity. The attempt to cultivate it first in individuals and then extend it to form an organically unified society is fantasy.[160]

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[157] AAE, 55.

[158] Loc. cit.

[159] Cf. HNC, 60-63, 260.

[160] ION, 64.

Finally, the ideals which commend the truly religious man's loyalty are social ideals.[161]

9. Criticism. Though many criticisms are evoked by Dewey's theory of "the religious", we limit our comments to two observations.

(I) In the first place, the distinction between "religion" and "the religious" which he employs as a point of departure for projecting a theory of his own is not well made. It will be recalled that Dewey rejected the notion that there is in historical religions a universal element of sufficient significance to be called "religion". He denied that historical religions have any meaningful common element. Such a contention can scarcely be sustained for several reasons:

(1) Students of religion have found common, meaningful elements in historical religions.[162] While they may be in error, to discuss a theme such as this, as Dewey does, without acknowledging their labors does not commend itself to seekers of the truth about historical religions.

(2) It is difficult to understand why it is more difficult to arrive at the common elements in historical religions than at the common denominator of the sciences. Dewey frequently employs the term "scientific method." As a matter of fact there is a multitude of methods used by

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161. Cf. CF, 80ff.

162. For example, Schleiermacher, -- the feeling of dependence as the common element of religion (Der christliche Glaube, #4); Troeltsch who finds an a priori element in religion (cf. "Das religiöse Apriori", Gesammelte Schriften, II, 754-68); Otto, who discovers a common numinous element (cf. Das Heilige); J. Baillie, who defines religion after an historical survey, as "a moral trust in reality" (IOR, 318).

the sciences. Further, if we extend our survey backward into the history of the sciences we discover still more. Yet, Dewey believes that he has found their common denominator. Why is it impossible with religions? After all, the fact that religions have contradicted one another does not invalidate "religion" any more than the contradictions of science spread upon the pages of its history -- and there are many of them -- invalidate the claims of science.

(3) Dewey fails to recognize that evolution has taken place in religions. In any process of development the elements of meaning are to be sought for in the later and higher phases. Dewey, however, lumps together the varied expressions which religion has taken from the dawn of consciousness into what Van Dusen calls "an indiscriminate and heterogeneous bundle of equal significance," African fetish-worship, the divine Idea of Plato, the religion of the Sioux Indians, phallic worship, the religion of the Hebrew prophets, Christianity, and then fails to find a meaningful common element![163] It is worthy of note that when Dewey seeks the meaningful factors in science he does not bring in the primitive science of the Zulus or the ancient Babylonians together with modern science in order to seek the common significant element. He begins with the seventeenth century![164] Why should not religion be interpreted in terms of its highest phases?

(4) The decisive refutation of Dewey's contention that there is no

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[163] VanDusen, Art. 1, 127; cf. CF, 35-37, 47.

[164] Cf. RPH, 28.

common meaningful element in historical religions is to be found in his own testimony. After stating in the first chapter of A Common Faith that there is no significant universal element in historic religions he closes the last chapter of the book with these words:

> We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature...... Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.[165]

(II) It is to be noted that Dewey violates the principle of continuity, which he insists so strongly upon in his theory of nature, when he treats historical religion. He violates it in two respects. First of all, he tears faith and its object apart. Historically, religion has had two inseparable elements, -- (1) a subjective -- attitude of the worshipper, (2) an objective -- an actual supernatural object of worship. Dewey has cut these two factors apart and insisted that religion is to be identified with the first. If Dewey's strictures are valid against those who would divide experience into subject and object, or mind and body, or cause and effect, why is not a protest against the severance of faith and its object in the historical experience of religion legitimate?

Further, he has snapped the threads of continuity between his own religion and historical religions. He says plainly that he proposes in his Common Faith to "wipe the slate clean" of supernatural faiths and

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[165] CF, 87. (Italics ours.)

"start afresh."[166] He wants no misunderstanding. "The opposition between religious values as I conceive them," he says, "and religions is not to be bridged."[167] Such a position is clearly inconsistent with the principle of continuity which he affirms to the point of tediousness in his deliverances on nature.

After all, Dewey prides himself upon being a philosopher of experience. He insists that we take experience as we find it and proceed in our philosophizing from there. Now the only experience of religion that we have got to philosophize about is historically-experienced religion. Yet, Dewey expresses his intention of "wiping the slate clean" of it and formulating a theory of his own. Can anything be more unempirical?

E. THE OBJECT OF FAITH

In the previous section we have expounded Dewey's religious theory from the standpoint of attitude; in the present section we consider the object of the religious attitude.

1. "God." It will be recalled from the preceding chapter that Dewey censured supernaturalism because of the divorce of actual and ideal contained in it. The ideal was severed from existence. In his own constructive philosophy, as we have seen, he endeavors to connect the ideal with the actual. The connection, as he conceives it, is two-fold:

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[166] CF, 6.

[167] Ibid, 28.

(1) The ideal shapes the actual; the ideal is a determining influence upon conduct and physical nature. "The reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their undeniable powers of action."[168] (2) Yet, the actual is the matrix of the ideal. The ideal is a "possibility of existence," realized through the use of natural means by man, who is a part of nature.[169] The objective of faith, then, for Dewey is the active relationship between the ideal and the actual. The active union between the two he calls "God."

> We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God.'[170]

2. Analysis. How is this "active relation between ideal and actual" to be conceived? It will be noted that there are two factors contained in the union which constitutes "God", the object of religious devotion: (A) an ideal, and (B) an actual. A study of Dewey's notion of "God" will reveal that Dewey oscillates between emphasis on one and the other. The result is that there are two variant conceptions of God present in Dewey's thought corresponding to the two factors in the definition above.

(A) In the first place, God is represented as the imaginative synthesis of ideal ends, deriving their origin and support from nature, though having a determinative influence upon it. This conception of God

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[168] CF, 43.

[169] Cf. QFC, 299-300.

[170] CF, 50-51.

is evidenced by such passages as the following:

> [God] denotes the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action.[171]

> [God] means the ideal ends that at a given time and place one acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination take on unity.[172]

> 'God' represents a unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin when the imagination supervenes in conduct.[173]

> [The idea of God is] one of ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God, or of the divine, is also connected with all the natural forces and conditions -- including man and human association -- that promote the growth of the ideal and that further its realization.[174]

> [The faith that is "religious" is] the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices.[175]

> The idealizing imagination seizes upon the most precious things found in the climacteric moments of experience and projects them. We need no external criterion and guarantee for their goodness. They are had, they exist as good, and out of them we frame our ideal ends.[176]

The object of faith as portrayed in these passages is clear. "God" is an imaginative synthesis of ideals, possessing no actuality in themselves, yet arising out of nature and through human agency effective in

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171. CF, 42.

172. Loc. cit.

173. Ibid, 43.

174. Ibid, 50.

175. Ibid, 33.

176. Ibid, 48.

re-shaping nature.

B. On the other hand, "God" is represented in Dewey's thought in a fashion corresponding to the actual factor in the definition. In certain places in A Common Faith the object of faith is represented as "those factors in existence that generate and support our idea of good as an end to be striven for:"

> The meaning [of the idea of "God"] is selective. For it involves no miscellaneous worship of everything in general. It selects those factors in existence that generate and support our idea of good as an end to be striven for.[177]

> Matthew Arnold's conception of a 'power not ourselves' is too narrow in its reference to operative and sustaining conditions. While it is selective, it is too narrow in its basis of selection -- righteousness. The powers that generate and support the good as experienced work within as well as without...... And the powers work to enforce other values and ideals than righteousness.[178]

> A humanistic religion, if it excludes our relation to nature, is pale and thin, as it is presumptuous, when it takes humanity as an object of worship.[179]

In addition to these passages which suggest that the object of faith is not ideal but actual is a group of passages closely related which suggest that the end of religious devotion is not so much certain selected aspects of nature as nature as a whole:

> [In a passage in A Common Faith the object of religious devotion is set forth as] the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected).[180]

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177. CF, 53.

178. Ibid, 54.

179. Loc. cit. 54.

180. CF, 19.

> In a genuine sense every act is already possessed of infinite import. The little part of the scheme of affairs which is modifiable by our efforts is continuous with the rest of the world...... That small effort which we can put forth is in turn connected with an infinity of events that sustain and support it. The consciousness of this encompassing infinity of connections is ideal...... This ideal is not a goal to be attained. It is a significance to be felt, appreciated.[181]
>
> Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist. The ideal means, as we have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach..... Even in the midst of conflict, struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole.[182]
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> Every act may carry within itself a consoling and supporting consciousness of the whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it....... Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal.[183]
>
> A work of art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live...... It explains also the religious feeling that accompanies intense esthetic perception. We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences. .... Where egotism is not made the measure of reality and value, we are citizens of this vast world beyond ourselves, and any intense realization of its presence with and in us brings a peculiarly satisfying sense of unity in itself and with ourselves.[184]
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> [A passage suggesting the object of devotion as both nature as a whole and also selective aspects of it:] Fidelity to the nature to which we belong, as parts however weak, demands that we cherish our desires and ideals till we have converted them into intelligence, revised them in terms of the ways and means which nature makes possible. When we have used our thought to its utmost and have thrown into the moving unbalanced balance of things our puny strength, we know that though the universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence.[185]

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[181] HNC, 262-3.

[182] Ibid, 330.

[183] Ibid, 331-32.

[184] AAE, 195.

[185] EAN, 420-21.

We have quoted at some length to indicate the fact that there are two emphases in Dewey's thought about the object of faith, one an idealistic, another a realistic, which amount to two different conceptions of the divine. "Ideal possibilities of existence" (A above) and "factors in existence" (B above) are not the same. They represent the difference between what is possible and what is actual. One (A) is prospective; the other (B) is here and now. The object according to one view (A) is an ideal conception; the object of devotion according to the other (B) is those aspects of nature that support and condition our ideals. According to the one view (A) the object of religion might be, let us say, the idea of a "Beloved Community", -- it is a possibility of existence, -- in which all man's needs, biological, esthetic, cultural, would be met. The idea of a "Beloved Community" would occupy the focus of attention, though it would be recognized that such a Community is conditioned by natural forces and will be brought about by natural tools. In the other case (B) the object of "the religious" would be all those factors in existence that interact to make a "Beloved Community" possible, such as, let us say, the reliability or law-abiding character of physical nature, its productiveness, tools, scientific method, and the ideal-projecting faculty of man.

We see revealed here again the same difficulty noted elsewhere in Dewey's philosophy of reconciling the ideal and the real, the possible and the actual. We have seen that in nature as a whole, in the "Body-mind" problem, and the relation of values to existence Dewey bridges genuine differences by resort to verbal expedients. Here again the same "solution" is in evidence. "God" is the "active relation between ideal and actual." But when we inquire concerning the "relation" two

variant conceptions appear, one, ideals forming nature, the other, nature generating and supporting ideals. The fact that Dewey seems to lean more to the former does not negate the presence of the other in his thought.

3. Is Dewey a theist? The question has been raised as to whether Dewey is a theist.[186] Professor Wieman interprets him theistically, and Professor Meland classifies his religious views under "empirical theism" in his survey of American Philosophies of Religion.[187]

"Theism", in general, has meant one of three things:

(1) Belief in supernatural powers and agencies.

(2) Belief in the existence of one God, -- monotheism.

(3) More particularly, belief in the existence of a God who transcends created things by his personality and yet is immanent in them. In all these senses it is opposed to atheism. As (2) it is opposed to polytheism. (3) stands in opposition to deism and pantheism.[188]

Dewey's whole polemic against the supernatural would eliminate him as a theist in either the first or third senses. It is with difficulty that he is classified as a theist in the second sense. If we take the "ideal"

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186. Cf. the controversy "Is John Dewey a Theist?" (Art. 91; Aubrey and Wieman, Art. 1) Professor Wieman insists that Dewey is a theist; Professor Aubrey denies it; and Dr. Dewey himself sides with Aubrey. If one will peruse the passages which Wieman and Aubrey submit to establish their respective points of view one will discover that they correspond to the two interpretations of Dewey's thought which we have indicated above. Aubrey insists that "God" is only an ideal synthesis for Dewey; Wieman points to the fact that the center of focus is really those aspects of nature which generate and support ideals. While Dewey lends his sanction in the article cited above to the "idealistic" interpretation, Professor Wieman is well within the truth when he points to unmistakable realistic strands in Dewey's thought about the object of faith.

187. APR, 273.

188. Cf. Harris, NID, 2139; **Thormeyer**, PWB, 196; Baldwin, DPP, II, 688-91; Galloway, PHR, 466; Brightman, ITP, 392.

interpretation of the object of faith, it is not an existent and hence will not qualify Dewey as a theist. If we take Wieman's interpretation, Dewey is a theist, in the special sense of believing in one God, though the fact that this God is not conceived as a person excludes Dewey from theism in the generally-accepted use of the term. The fact that Dewey himself rejects the attempts to make him a theist seems decisive against theistic classification.[189]

4. Criticism. In concluding this section a few critical remarks are in order.

(I) We have already noted the ambiguity in Dewey's thought about the object of faith. The "active relation between the actual and the ideal" can be interpreted either ideally or actually. If we take the "ideal" interpretation of the object of faith we are confronted with an ambiguity in the notion of "idea", which we have pointed out in the discussion of Dewey's theory of value. An "ideal" for him is a "possibility of existence", and we have suggested that a "possibility" is capable of either good or evil connotations.[190] If we take the "actual" interpretation of Dewey's thought we are met with the problem of determining whether the object of religious aspiration is those elements of nature that support ideals, the view mentioned in A Common Faith, or nature as a whole, the view suggested in his other works.

(II) A study of Dewey's thought will reveal that the same general objections which he levelled against supernaturalism are also to be urged

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[189] Cf. Art. 91, 1551-52; Humanist Manifesto, #6.

[190] Cf. Supra, 90.

against his own conception of God, particularly if he holds that the object of faith is an imaginative synthesis of ideal ends. In the last chapter we have organized his objection to the supernatural under four categories:

(A) Genetic. We have seen that Dewey belabored supernatural religions because their objects of worship were projections of the desire for security. Yet, Dewey acknowledges that his own conception of God is an imaginative projection, which has to be made if the self is to achieve the very desirable state of integration![191] In what respect, we ask, is the desire for integration of self such that a faith based on it is valid while a faith based on desire for security is not?

(B) Epistemological. Dewey objected to the objects of supernaturalism, because they could not be established by scientific method. But, the object of faith, as he conceives it, cannot be established by scientific method, either! As Professor Hocking has pointed out, Dewey forsakes his instrumentalism when he formulates his conception of God.[192] We have seen in the discussion of value that he rejects the notion of a hierarchy of value, values which are good once and for all as ends of action. He maintains, instead, that we must proceed from situation to situation, and when conflict arises imagined ends must be devised as hypothetical ways

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[191] CF, 18-19. "It is pertinent to note that the unification of the self throughout the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers, and achieves, cannot be attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe." CF, 19.

[192] TDL, 169-71.

out of the situation. That way which resolves the conflict is good.[193] Dewey explicitly rejects the attempt to elevate principles as such to the central place in the moral life; a moral principle is merely "a tool for analyzing a special situation."[194]

But in his discussion of religion he reverses himself; he says that the needs of the self for integration can only be met by surrender to an ideal, which is not a hypothetical way out of a particular situation but a view of the Universe as a whole.[195] It is to be noted, further, that the unification of the ideal ends of existence which are to be made the objects of faith cannot be given to us by science; science can only suggest possibilities. It is philosophy, by its criticism of the sciences, that projects those ends which are to become the objects of devotion.[196] Thus, Dewey in his formulation of his idea of God turns his back upon those instrumentalistic premises which he had employed as the basis for

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193. Cf. ETH, 230; HNC, 223-27; Ratner, POJD, 374, 375.

194. ETH, 309.

195. CF, 19.

196. Cf. Supra, 97.

rejecting supernaturalism.[197]

(c) Logical. Dewey condemned supernaturalism because it erected certain selected aspects of experience into superior realities and the objects of religious devotion. But when we turn to Dewey's own thought we find him doing essentially the same. His object of religious aspiration is not everything; it is those aspects of experience which are selected because of their significance.

> Use of the words 'God' or 'divine' to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance.
>
> In any case, whatever the name, the meaning is selective. For it involves no miscellaneous worship of everything in general. It selects those factors in existence that generate and support our idea of good as an end to be striven for. It excludes a multitude of forces that at any given time are irrelevant to this function.[198]

If it is legitimate for Dewey to select the objects which seem to him significant as ends of devotion the choice in itself of certain objects by the classic tradition for allegiance is not to be condemned.

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[197] Professor Hocking says: "It is of great interest to note that Professor John Dewey comes to... the .... conclusion.... that the meaning of life is not to be reached through the sciences, but rather by way of the imagination -- a conclusion which seems to me in various ways a welcome departure from positions with which he has been supposedly identified.
The genius of the instrumental philosophy I take to be this: that ideas mean what they lead us to -- the general idea serves as an instrument to guide action to some particular experience in which it is verified. The general means the particular. But in the great little book of Dewey's on A Common Faith, meaning runs the other way; particular experiences appear as instrumental to ideas. The meaning of life is found in serving ideal ends, that is to say, in attempting to embody them in practice. To find one's life integrated, that is to say, whole-hearted and therefore significant, one must reach the point, says Dewey, where certain ideals present to imagination dominate conduct." TDL, 168-69.

[198] CF, 53.

The practical limitations of Dewey's point of view will be considered in Chapter V.

(III) Finally, it is to be noted that personal idealism offers an "active relation between ideal and actual." It conceives of God as an actual Being, active in the world, realizing ideals. At the same time it is not guilty of those ambiguities which inhere in Dewey's conception of faith and its object, and it provides an end, devotion to which can effect that unification of the self which Dewey prizes.

F. DEWEY AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION

In this section we shall indicate where Dewey's thought leads him with reference to the perennial problems of religion, -- personal religion, the problem of evil, immortality, the Church, and finally the goal of human history.

1. Personal religion: (a) Religious experience. Since we have already discussed religious experience in connection with arguments for the existence of God, a summary statement will suffice. (1) Dewey regards religious experience as genuine.[199] (2) It is not unique, sui generis.

> Those who hold to the notion that there is a definite kind of experience which is itself religious, by that very fact make out of it something specific, as a kind of experience that is marked off from experience as aesthetic, scientific, moral, political; from experience as companionship and friendship. But 'religious' as a quality of experience signifies something that may belong to all these experiences.[200]

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[199] CF, 37, 12.

[200] Ibid, 10.

(3) It is not self-verifying. There is no immediate apprehension of the divine in religious experience; the interpretation of the experience, the naming of the object contacted in it, it brought to the experience from without.[201] (4) The God-concept is not necessary for a genuine religious experience.

> Either.... the concept of God can be dropped out as far as genuinely religious experience is concerned, or it must be framed wholly in terms of natural and human relationships involved in our straightway human experience.[202]

(b) Prayer and worship. "In place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer," reads the Humanist Manifesto, of which Dewey is a signer,[203]

> the humanist finds his religious emotions expressed in a heightened sense of personal life and in a cooperative effort to promote social well being.

As we have seen in considering Dewey's objections to the supernatural, he regards worship as a waste of energy and socially unproductive. Prayer, though he has no specific deliverances on the subject, is easily identifiable with that dependence on the supernatural which is anathema to him.

(c) Revelation. Dewey has scant respect for revelation in the usual sense. With his accustomed low estimate of history he affirms that traditionalists in appealing to revelation are turning from the relative enlightenment of the present to the ignorance of ancient men.[204] Further, supposing that ancient revelation was infallible, where is the infallible

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[201] CF, 13.
[202] Art. 90, 394.

[203] Cf. Potter, HR, 10.

[204] Art. 66; CHE, II, 456.

interpreter?[205] Characteristically, Dewey regards appeal to the past as the sign that a society has found "growth painful and change disturbing."[206] We must, Dewey says, turn from the past to the future for the revelation of truth.

> Faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative human endeavor is more religious in quality than is any faith in a completed revelation..... [We must trust that] natural interaction between man and his environment will breed more intelligence and generate more knowledge provided the scientific methods that define intelligence in operation are pushed further into the mysteries of the world, being themselves promoted and improved in the operation.[207]

(d) Salvation. "Salvation" is another of the watchwords of traditional religion that comes under Dewey's fire. In the first place, the doctrine of sin, which salvation presupposes, is reprehensible. (1) It implies a pessimistic view of human nature which stultifies human effort.[208] (2) Further, to trace social evils to general moral causes such as "the sinfulness of man, the corruption of his heart, his self-love" and the like is an obstacle to the application of intelligence in dealing with them. It is on the same intellectual level as that primitive science which referred bodily diseases to the work of demons; modern science was unable to advance until such explanations were thrown aside, and the application of scientific intelligence to social problems awaits the disappearance of such abstractions.[209] (3) Further, the division of mankind

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[205] Loc. cit.

[206] RPH, 159.

[207] Cf., 26.

[208] CF, RPH, 115-16; HNC, 295.

[209] CF, 77-78.

into saved and sinners, as the notion of salvation supposes, is an enemy of human brotherhood.[210]

Salvation of man is not to be achieved along traditional lines, Dewey thinks. The historic Christian doctrine of self-denial logically leads to an inhuman asceticism, creates more problems of self-control than it solves, and narrows the conception of the good.[211] Dependence upon the supernatural for salvation represents a retreat, an escape from existence,[212] and is too easy a way withal out of difficulties to be practically worthful.[213]

Salvation for the modern man must come through science, which, by its method of testing beliefs, gives men the intellectual and emotional peace which once they found in religion,[214] as well as the courage for remaking the world;[215] and through devotion to ideal ends which result in unification of the self and the fructifying of society.[216]

2. The problem of evil. Dewey's teachings concerning the problem of evil are clear cut and consistent with his general point of view. (1) He regards the problem of evil as an unnecessary one. We have it on our hands because apologists "identified the existence of ideal goods with that of a Person supposed to originate and support them."[217]

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210. CF, 33-34.

211. ETH, 366, 367.

212. QFC, 275.

213. CF, 46-47.

214. Art. 66; CHE, II, 457.

215. EAN, iii.

216. Cf. CF, 17ff.

217. Ibid, 45.

Give up belief in God, Dewey says in effect, and you have no problem of reconciliation of evil in the world with divine love!

(2) The real problem of evil is not a theological or metaphysical one but "the practical problem of reducing, alleviating, as far as may be removing, the evils of life."[218]

(3) The optimistic view of things -- that this is the best possible world, that fundamentally all is well, etc., -- is an obstacle to the removal of evil, for it tends to make men satisfied with things as they are.[219]

3. Immortality. Dewey's view of the doctrine of immortality is well-summarized in his contribution to a New York Times symposium:[220]

> I have no beliefs on the subject of personal immortality. It seems to be a subject, being one of continued existence, for science rather than philosophy, or a matter of physical evidence. If it can be proved, it would have to be along the lines of the psychical researchers, and so far I have not been much impressed with their results.

4. The Church. Dewey is severely critical of the Church. He feels, for one thing, that it has lost itself in "cults, dogmas, and myths" and has obscured and distorted the genuine religious spirit.[221] It has been a reactionary force in society, -- a defender of the status quo, a devotee of the immutable.[222] As a consequence "the greatest revolution

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[218] RPH, 177-78.

[219] Ibid, 178-9.

[220] Art. 82, 1.

[221] HNC, 330-31.

[222] Art. 86, 178-80.

that has taken place in religions during the thousands of years that man has been upon the earth" has occurred.[223] The Church has been demoted from the central, all-embracing institution of an essentially religious community to "a special institution in a secular community."[224]

Yet, Dewey does not want to destroy the churches. Rather, he wants to help them recover their vitality by having them give up their devotion to the supernatural and claims to exclusive authority and devote themselves to social ends.[225]

5. The goal of human history. There is no reference to the Kingdom of God in Dewey's writings; he refers to "the Great Community" in one of his books, but investigation shows him to be speaking not of an all-

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[223] CF, 65.

[224] Ibid, 61. We allow Professor Van Dusen to answer this statement of Dewey's: "What an extraordinary reading of historic records! What, one might ask Professor Dewey, does he consider to have been the status of the religion of Socrates in fifth-century Athens, or of Amos in eighth-century Israel, or of Jesus in Judaea at the turn of the ages, or of the early Christians in second-century Rome, or of Savonarola in fifteenth-century Florence, or of John Wesley in eighteen-century England? However we describe its status within the community of its day, it was of such a character as to bring upon its adherents derision, persecution, and in most instances martyrdom. 'The essential point', Professor Dewey feels, 'is not just that secular organizations and actions are legally or externally severed from the control of the church, but that interests and values unrelated to the offices of any church now so largely sway the desires and aims of even believers.' [CF, 65] A thing utterly new in history! Could one imagine a more apt description of the actual situation in Ninevah and Tyre, Babylon and Assyria, Athens in her decline, imperial Rome, late Renaissance Italy, not to speak of revolutionary France and Georgian England? The clear testimony of history is that prophetic religion, living religion is almost always a special interest within a community which, whatever its lip service to formal religion, is, at the springs of its life, through and through secular. Is there reason to expect that the new 'common faith' to which we are summoned, if it is to embody living and socially potent aspiration, will suffer any kindlier fate?" "The Faith of John Dewey," op. cit., 130-31.

[225] CF, 82-83.

embracing ideal society but the local community, integrated, democratized, made secure.[226]

Dewey is very chary about predicting the future; such prediction he holds to be impossible.[227] We create "an unknown future."[228] He sets up as a goal toward which we should strive the end of "growth, itself."[229] The lines along which we should proceed are drawn with a broad brush. Probably the words with which the Humanist Manifesto closes represent Dewey's attitude toward the future as well as any:[230]

> We assert that humanism will: (a) affirm life rather than deny it; and (b) seek to elicit the possibilities of life, not flee from it; and (c) endeavor to establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, not merely for the few. By this positive morale and intention humanism will be guided, from this perspective and alignment the techniques and efforts of humanism will flow.
>
> So stand the theses of religious humanism. Though we consider the religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest for the good life is still the central task for mankind. Man at last is becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task.

The foregoing calls for no criticism in this place; it rests upon the common assumption of so much of Dewey's thinking, -- that experimental method is the only dependable one for arriving at truth and supplying our essential needs.

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[226] Cf. PUB, 211-19.

[227] ION, 169-70.

[228] Ibid, 171.

[229] RPH, 177. As we shall see later (infra,184), Dewey, despite his avowed unwillingness to set up a future goal, does in reality do so.

[230] CF. Potter, HR, 11-12.

G. DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND PERSONALISM

In order that Dewey's philosophy of religion may be defined as clearly as possible we shall summarize the main points of agreement and disagreement between it and personalism. By personalism we mean

> that philosophical system which holds that the universe is a society of selves, unified by the will and immanent causality of a Supreme Self, and which, therefore, defines matter and the whole system of physical nature in terms of the active, conscious will of that Supreme Self, while it regards human selves (and whatever other selves there may be) as enjoying an existence of their own, dependent, it is true, upon the will of the Supreme Self, yet no part of it. ....The Supreme Self of personalism may be identified with God, the object of religious worship.[231]

The points of agreement are fewer than those of disagreement, but there are several respects in which the two philosophies of religion harmonize.

1. Both are opposed to irrationalism in religion. Both deny the uncriticized claims of religious experience in itself to ontological validity. Both appeal to reason to substantiate their respective religious views, though reason is conceived somewhat differently by them.

2. Both Dewey and the personalists insist upon the superior worth of the human individual. With the latter the intrinsic worth of personality is a central principle; with Dewey it is not an implication of his metaphysics or method but appears rather as an independent insight.[232]

3. Both philosophies of religion are highly ethical; religion receives its confirmation in the sphere of conduct.

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[231] Brightman, Art. 3, 382.

[232] Cf. Lyman, MTR, 187.

4. Both Dewey and the personalists insist that religion has social implications.

While in these broad respects Dewey's theory of religion harmonizes with the teachings of Bowne and his disciples, the differences between them are so great as to place them at almost opposite poles.

1. Personalism's theory of religion is primarily existential, while Dewey's is functional. That is, personalism is interested in establishing the existence of a divine being. Dewey, on the other hand, is unconcerned as to whether there is such a being or not if those functions exercised by a divine being in historical religion (which he conceives to be guardianship of security) can be realized as well or better in other ways. Personalism is interested in establishing the status of values: Dewey does not care what their cosmic place may be so long as they function in human experience. Of course, personalism is interested in functions and Dewey has a place for existences, but their motives are primarily as stated.

2. Personalism is metaphysical; Dewey is positivistic (with occasional sallies into metaphysics). Personalism distinguishes between phenomenal and metaphysical reality. Dewey regards the phenomenal world as metaphysical and refrains from judgments about the supernatural.

God, for personalism, is a real, personal being; for Dewey he is an imaginative synthesis of ideal ends, having no objective reality (or is an impersonal concept, nature or certain aspects of nature).

4. Personalism takes "nature" to mean physical nature; mind, values, and universals are regarded as standing outside nature though interacting with it. Dewey, on the other hand, takes an inclusive view of nature, which takes in mind, values, and mathematical and logical objects, as well as physical existence. He does not, however, interpret the non-physical aspects of nature in physical terms, as traditional naturalism did.

5. According to personalistic teaching, religion contains unique elements, -- unique attitudes and experiences, if not certain unique qualities designated by the term "religious a priori."[233] With Dewey, however, religion is scarcely distinguishable from morality conceived as a pursuit of inclusive ideal ends and eventuating in self-integration.

6. Personalism is kindly disposed toward historical Christianity and seeks to preserve continuity with it. Dewey, as we have seen, has no high regard for historic faith, and maintains that the breach between it and his conception of religion cannot be bridged.[234]

7. Personalism holds to belief in immortality as one of the implications of belief in a personal God. Dewey is agnostic with reference to the possibility of a future life.

8. While both personalism and Dewey are melioristic, personalism believes that the future rests ultimately with God, with whom we may

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[233] Cf. Knudson, DG, 222-23.

[234] Dewey says that the beneficent effects of believing in "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" have been, "to put it mildly, much exaggerated." Art. 89, 194.

cooperate for the making of a better world. Dewey, on the other hand, pins his hopes for the future upon human effort.

If the question should be raised why there should be the sharp cleavage between personalism and Dewey's philosophy of religion, the answer seems to be found in their different conceptions of the method and criterion of truth. For Dewey experimental verification after the pattern of the physical sciences is both *the* method and criterion of truth. His allegiance to scientific method accounts for his functional interest (1 above), -- science has no need of the concept of substance but thinks in terms of functions or activities,-his positivism (2), and resulting disbelief in the existence of a supernatural being (3) and life beyond this life (7), as well as his belief that man (because of the method he possesses) is equipped to stand on his own and guarantee his own future (8). As we shall see later, Dewey's depreciation of history (6), is consistent with the inability of a purely experimental method to get knowledge of the past.[235]

While personalism entertains respect for scientific method, its criterion of truth is coherence, and its method is synoptic, which allows for other avenues of truth than those accessible to scientific research. It supplements the facts brought to light by the sciences with those derived from other sources.

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[235] Dewey's conception of nature as an all-inclusive whole (4), and his contention that "the religious" is not unique but a possible accompaniment of all experiences (5), seem to be inspired by non-scientific motives, probably by the organismic logic of his early idealism which breaks through his instrumentalism from time to time.

H. SUMMARY

In this chapter we have examined Dewey's naturalistic interpretation of religion. We have seen that nature for him is a totality, inclusive of physical things, mind, universals, and values. Man is a part of nature and his values are continuous with natural events. It was pointed out that the problem of the relation of ideal and real in nature (mind and matter), in man (mind and body), and in value (ideal and existence) is given only a verbal solution. Rejecting the notion of a universal content in historical religions, Dewey establishes his own conception of "the religious" as an apprehension of and devotion to such inclusive ends as result in the unification of the self. Such a view of "the religious" is in harmony with science, dependent on philosophy for its ends, closely related to the moral and esthetic, and eventuates in a social idealism. The object of faith, or God, is defined as the "active relation of the ideal and the actual;" analysis of Dewey's writings shows that the object of faith is interpreted now with the emphasis on the ideal element in the definition -- God is the imaginative synthesis of ideal ends -- now on the actual, -- God is certain aspects of nature which support ideals, or nature as a whole. While probably the first view represents Dewey's main intent, the second view is present and illustrates again the difficulty Dewey finds in his whole philosophy really to resolve the ideal-real relationship. It was seen, further, that Dewey's conception of the object of faith was not only ambiguous but open to some of the fundamental objections which he had raised himself to the supernatural. When the naturalistic view of religion is applied to the perennial interests of

religion it appears that Dewey is greatly suspicious of personal religion, as usually conceived, feels that the problem of evil is practical rather than speculative, questions immortality, summons men to a consecration of the Church to social ends, though offering himself no objective Kingdom of God as the goal of history. A closing comparison of Dewey's philosophy of religion with personalism revealed that their underlying differences were due to their varying views as to the significance of scientific method.

In conclusion, several items are worthy of note:

1. Dewey's philosophy of religion is thoroughly naturalistic: (a) It rejects the supernatural. (b) Man, the bearer of religion, is a part of nature. (c) The ends of faith are possibilities of nature (or nature itself as a whole or in certain aspects). (d) Religion eventuates in a re-making of the natural.

2. Despite the naturalistic coloring of his philosophy of religion, Dewey reveals several elements in his thought that are reminiscent of his early idealism: (a) The rationalistic axiom of continuity is the premise of his naturalism. (b) He appeals to the principle of the whole, -- as a criterion of values, in defining the object of religious devotion, -- and wholeness, unification, is made the mark of the "religious" self. (c) He affirms the reality of consciousness. (d) His object of religious devotion is an imaginative presentation. (e) He conceives of the present crisis in religion, which raises demand for a new interpretation of faith, as primarily a crisis in the world of thought. (f) His ultimate appeal for the re-making of the world is to intelligence.

3. It should be pointed out again that what Dewey regards as the

basic failure of supernaturalism -- its divorce of the real and the ideal -- receives only a verbal treatment from him.

4. In this chapter we have seen again the low estimate Dewey places upon historical religion; though claiming to be a philosopher of experience he evidences scant regard for the experience of religion as revealed in history.

5. We note as the premise of Dewey's rejection of the supernatural as well as of the formulation of his own theory the implicit faith in the complete adequacy of scientific experimental method: epistemologically, it is the only sure method of arriving at truth; practically, it is the one hope of human progress. We shall examine this premise in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER IV

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENT

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAPTER

One of the basic assumptions of Dewey's position with regard to religion is that scientific method is the only valid method and criterion of truth. He opposes historical supernaturalism, because it arose out of a desire for security that can now be satisfied with the cognitive certainty supplied by modern science.[1] He found supernaturalism epistemologically defective in that it assumed the existence of objects antecedent to experimental verification.[2] Practically he condemned historic faith, because it has stood in the way of the application of scientific methods to life.[3] He found it futile; prayer, worship, salvation, and revelation, -- these are concepts of an outmoded approach to getting what science can give us.[4] Further, one of the chief considerations recommending his own view of religion is that it, in contrast with the traditional faith, can be harmonized with the methods and results of science.[5]

Dewey does not allow this conviction that scientific method possesses exclusive validity to remain an unexpressed premise of his thought. He

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[1] Supra, 39.

[2] Supra, 45.

[3] Supra, 52.

[4] Supra, 117-19.

[5] Supra, 96-7.

openly affirms it. He tells us that the intellectual crisis in religion will never find its solution until we admit "that there is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth, -- that conveyed by the word 'scientific' in its most general and generous sense."[6] He reminds us that doctrines to be convincing for the modern men must be "brought to agree with the deliverances of science;"[7] for scientific procedure is "actual knowing" as contrasted with other and inferior types.[8] "Effective and integral thinking is possible only where the experimental method in some form is used."[9] Knowledge does not eventuate "until some overt experimental act takes place by means of which an existential incorporation and organization is brought about."[10] Scientific method is the only method that has proveda"fruitful" method of thinking,[11] and it provides us with "the sole dependable means of disclosing the realities of existence."[12] "Both logically and educationally, science is the perfecting of knowing, its last stage."[13]

It is plain that if what Dewey says in praise of scientific method is correct, his case is made. If scientific method is the sole valid approach and criterion to truth, the tenets of historical religion must, as he says, be given up, and if any human interest is to do business under

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[6] CF, 33.

[7] EAN, 137.

[8] QFC, 85-6.

[9] HWT, 99.

[10] QFC, 189.

[11] Art. 42; CHE, II, 774.

[12] Art. 86, 178.

[13] DEE, 256.

the name of "religion" it must be along the naturalistic lines which he indicates.

It shall be the purpose of this chapter to investigate these claims that are made by Dewey in behalf of the exclusive validity of scientific method. In the introduction to the dissertation we have suggested that in evaluating any doctrine we would ask, first, is it self-consistent? and, secondly, is it consistent with our system of judgments as a whole? Following out this line of inquiry, we shall first investigate scientific method, as Dewey conceives it, with a view to discovering whether the doctrine of the exclusive validity of scientific method can be established by scientific method itself. If it cannot be, then the notion of its exclusive validity is no more than an assumption. Then we shall ask whether those entities that occupy the central place in Dewey's thought about religion themselves can be established by scientific method, or must be assumed. We have chosen four:

(1) The existence of other selves. The notion of society occupies a central place in Dewey's thought. He regards man as fundamentally a social being. His religious ideals are developed and sustained in society, and according to Dewey's view, must be social in content.[14]

(2) The past. Dewey's approach is usually genetic, and his attacks upon the past of historical religion play a great part in his rejection of it.[15]

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[14] Supra, 101.

[15] Supra, 37-42.

(3) Values. It will be remembered that God is defined as the "active relation between ideal and actual."[16] The notion of value occupies a central place in Dewey's philosophy of religion.

(4) The whole. It is the idea of the whole which Dewey tells us is essential to effecting that unification of self, which is the mark of "the religious."[17]

Dewey's method and criterion of truth should be inclusive enough to take in these entities, which occupy a central place in his thought; if not, it is plain that the basic teachings of his philosophy of religion are gained by assumption rather than established logically.

The problem, then, of this chapter is to discover whether the notion of the exclusive validity of scientific method can be established by scientific method, and whether the existence of other selves, the past, values, and the whole can be verified in the same way. The immediate task, before undertaking these matters, is to discover what Dewey means by scientific method.

B. THE MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC (EXPERIMENTAL) METHOD

1. Scientific method as experimental. "Scientific method" means experimental method for Dewey. He defines scientific method as the method in which

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[16] CF, 51.

[17] Cf. CF, 18-19.

> observation is determined by experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain guiding conceptions; .... reflection is directed and checked at every point by the use of experimental data, and by the necessity of finding such a form for itself as will enable it to serve in a deduction leading to evolution of new meanings, and ultimately to experimental inquiry which brings to light new facts.[18]

It is the method of "making hypotheses which are then tried out in actual experimental change of physical conditions."[19] The fundamental distinction between ancient and modern science is to be found in that the latter is experimental.

> Ancient science accepted the *material* of sense-material on its face, and then organized it, as it *naturally* and originally stood, by operations of logical definition, classification into species and syllogistic subsumption. Men either had no instruments and appliances for modifying the ordinary objects of observation, for analyzing them into their elements and giving them new forms and arrangements, or they failed to use those which they had.[20]
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> The striking difference in modern science is, of course, the dependence placed upon doing, doing of a physical and overt sort. Ancient science, that is, what passed as science, would have thought it a kind of treason to reason as the organ of knowing to subordinate it to bodily activity on material things, helped out with tools which are also material.[21]

Modern science is "a recognition that no idea is entitled to be termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers."[22] For Dewey "scientific method" is equivalent to "experimental method."[23]

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[18] EEL, 89-90.

[19] EAN, 155.

[20] QFC, 89.

[21] Ibid, 88.

[22] Art. 37; 62.

[23] QFC, 24.

2. The nature of experimental method. What is the meaning of "experimental method?" Dewey does not definė it formally, but he gives many illustrations of it. His view of it is that usually understood by the term. Logically, he tells us, it involves five distinct steps:[24]

(1) The occurrence of a difficulty. "Thinking takes its departure from specific conflicts in experience that occasion perplexity and trouble."[25] The difficulty may be one which the organism comes upon in its environment; it may be an intellectual problem.[26]

(2) Definition of the difficulty. This involves observation with a view to

> defining the problem, of locating the trouble, of forcing home a definite, instead of a merely vague emotional sense of what the difficulty is and where it lies.[27]

(3) Suggestion of possible solution.

> Given data which locate the nature of the problem, there is evoked a thought of an operation which if put into execution may eventuate in a situation in which the trouble or doubt which evoked inquiry will be resolved.[28]

These ideas of suggested solutions have a two-fold character: (1) They are instrumental to resolving the specific problem which called them forth.[29] (2) They are hypothetical, to be held tentatively until tested in action.[30]

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[24] Cf. HWT, 68-78.

[25] RPH, 138.

[26] Cf. EEL, 10-11; QFC, 228. Dewey is opposed to a purely biological interpretation of pragmatism. He scores one critic for treating his doctrine as one that "regards intelligence as a lubricating oil facilitating the workings of the body." CI, 62.

[27] RPH, 141.

[28] QFC, 123.

[29] LCS, 124.

[30] RPH, 145.

(4) Development of the bearings of the idea. "Action is at the heart of ideas."[31] "In general," says Dewey, following Bridgman, "we mean by a concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations."[32] It is necessary by deduction to draw out the implications or operational bearings of the idea offered as a solution to the problem in hand.[33]

(5) Experimental verification. Having arrived at a hypothetical solution for a problem and drawn forth its implications, its consequences, the final step is to discover whether the consequences required are present. This involves overt manipulation or experimentation.[34] The test of an idea's truth is to be found in its consequences.[35] Experimental method is, thus, both a method of discovering truth and a criterion by which alleged truths are verified. It is essential to note that the process of verification is objective, -- public and capable of verification by anyone meeting the conditions of the experiment.

> A public and manifest series of definite operations, all capable of public notice and report, distinguishes scientific knowing from the knowing carried on by inner 'mental' processes accessible only to introspection, or inferred by dialectic from assumed premises.[36]

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31. QFC, 167.

32. P. W. Bridgman, LMP, 5; quoted in QFC, 111.

33. HWT, 79-80.

34. LCS, 123.

35. QFC, 128-9.

36. Ibid, 289.

3. The dual meaning of verification. The meaning of experimental method, turns, of course, on the meaning of verification. How does Dewey conceive of verification? What particular quality of consequences constitutes it? A study of Dewey's teachings about verification brings to light the fact that there are two theories concerning it in his writings. According to the first (which we shall designate as A), an idea is true if it works successfully in resolving the difficulty or problem which called it forth. Take a problem P. Several hypothetical solutions are offered, X, Y, Z. If by testing X, Y, and Z it is shown that X resolves the difficulty (while Y and Z do not), X is held to be the true idea; it worked successfully. A physician who tries several cures for a disease until one is discovered which works successfully -- the true one -- illustrates this mode of verification.

According to the second theory of verification (B), an idea is true if accurate predictions can be made from it. Take three ideas, X, Y, and Z, which are hypothetical solutions of a problem, P. Suppose that by assuming the truth of X a prediction that M will occur is made, and it has been discovered experimentally that M does occur (while predictions cannot be made by Y and Z). Then X is true; it led to a verified prediction, to results which were as predicted. An illustration of this type of verification is Einstein's prediction on the hypothesis of relativity that there would be a certain shift in the observed position of certain stars during an eclipse of the sun, a shift which did occur (though there are some who question the data) according to the photographs of the stars made during the eclipse of 1919.[37]

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[37] Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, IPA, 140.

Both types of verification are found in Dewey's thought. Passages illustrating A are as follows:

> Thinking ends in experiment and experiment is an actual alteration of a physically antecedent situation in those details or respects which called for thought in order to do away with some evil.[38]

> The measure of its success, the standard of its validity, is precisely the degree in which the thinking actually disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed with more direct modes of experiencing, that are forthwith possessed of more assured and deepened value.[39]

> Ideas are not ..... genuine ideas unless they are tools in a reflective examination which tends to solve a problem.[40]

> If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon, then they are false. Confirmation, corroboration, verification lie in works, consequences. Handsome is that handsome does. By their fruits shall ye know them.[41]

> The test of validity of an idea is its functional or instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one ..... The 'meaning' or idea as such, having been selected and made-up with reference to performing a certain office in the evolution of a unified experience, can be tested in no other way than by discovering whether it does what it was intended to do and what it purports to do.[42]

Passages illustrating B are as follows:

> Experimental science is a recognition that no idea is entitled to be termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers.[43]

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38. EEL, 31.

39. Ibid, 77.

40. HWT, 109.

41. RPH, 156.

42. SLT, 75, 76.

43. Art. 37, 62.

> To run against a hard and painful stone is not of itself, I should say, an act of knowing; but if running into a hard and painful thing is an outcome predicted after inspection of data and elaboration of a hypothesis, then the hardness and the painful bruise which define the thing as a stone also constitute it emphatically as an object of knowledge.[44]

> According to experimental inquiry, the validity of the object of thought depends upon the consequences of the operations which define the object of thought. For example, colors are conceived in terms of certain numbers. The conceptions are valid in the degree in which, by means of these numbers, we can predict future events, and can regulate the interactions of colored bodies as signs of changes that take place. The numbers are signs or clues of intensity and direction of changes going on. The only things relevant to the question of their validity is whether they are dependable signs.[45]

> Final certitude can never be reached except experimentally -- except by performing the operations indicated and discovering whether or not the intended meaning is fulfilled in propria persona.[46]

> In the case of knowledge of a star the visible light is a necessary part of the evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence, place and structure of the astronomical star, and some other perception is the verifying check on the value of the inference.[47]

> An experience is a knowledge if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort: One means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke fellow is to be fulfilled through an operation it sets up.[48]

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[44] EEL, 15.

[45] QFC, 128-29.

[46] IDP, 103n.

[47] EEL, 260.

[48] Art. 35, 301.

There is no inherent contradiction or incompatibility between these two notions of verification. Yet, there are some significant differences between them:

(1) In A the basic reference of the corroborating evidence is to a situation which it clears up; in B the basic reference is to an idea whose predictions it fulfills.

(2) In A the decisive element in determining the truth of an idea is a value-element (it works successfully); in B the decisive factor in determining the truth of an idea is intellectual (the agreement of two ideas). B is, thus, more precise than A.[49]

(3) B is the method of verification employed in the abstract or physical sciences, where mathematically verifiable predictions are possible. A is the method employed in the everyday conduct of life and to considerable degree in the more concrete sciences, where prediction is difficult or impossible. A past event, strictly speaking, can never be verified according to method B, for prediction (which involves future verification) cannot be made with regard to the past. Historical sciences employ method A; they declare those hypotheses true which work successfully, which harmonize best with the facts as a whole.

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[49] It may be said that the most significant difference between James's and Dewey's pragmatism is the difference between these two modes of verification. Both philosophers, of course, expound both types of verification. But a study of their writings will reveal that James was interested in the broader, more evaluational type of verification (A) while Dewey's primary interest was in the narrower (B). In Dewey's review of James's Pragmatism he points out, in effect, this difference. (Cf. EEL, 303-34) He says that James's formula telling us to look "towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts," (PR, 55) may be used to determine either (1) our proper conception of objects, (2) the meaning of ideas, or (3) the value of beliefs. (EEL, 308-11) Dewey says that in distinction from James his primary interest is in (1) and (2), -- in determination of the meaning of objects and ideas, -- while James was more deeply concerned with (3), -- the value of beliefs. (Cf. EEL, 316.)

4. Experimental method as the method of the physical sciences. When Dewey speaks of "scientific method", which of these modes of verification is he thinking of? He employs both, but B seems to be his real intent. While both appear in Dewey's writings, in his later works, Experience and Nature and the Quest for Certainty, he thinks of "scientific method" in terms of the experimental method of the physical sciences, which employ the method designated above as B.

In Experience and Nature Dewey makes an analysis of the object of "science", which he says "in effect is the object of physics."[50] He finds four characteristics of it:

(1) It is a constant, capable of mathematical formulation.[51]

> Immediate things come and go; events in the way of direct seeing, hearing, touching, liking, enjoying and the rest of them are in rapid change; the subject-matter of each has a certain uniqueness, unrepeatedness. Spatial-temporal orders, capable of mathematical formulation are, by contrast constant. They present stability, recurrence at its maximum, raised to the highest degree. Qualitative affairs like red and blue, although in themselves unlike, are subject to comparison in terms of objects of physics; on the basis of connection with orders of sequence, a qualitative spectrum or scale becomes a scheme of numberable variations or a common unit.

(2) It is capable of mutual substitution with other objects.[52]

> The technique of equations and other functions characteristic of modern science is, taken generically, a method of thoroughgoing substitutions. It is a system of exchange and mutual conversion carried to its limit. The cognitive result is the homogeneous natural world of modern science, in its contrast with the qualitatively heterogeneous world of ancient science.

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[50] EAN, 139.

[51] Ibid, 142.

[52] Ibid, 142-3.

(3) It is a numerically discrete unit; the things of experience are treated as composed of these units.[53]

(4) It is generic in character. Objects of science "are not individualized .... but are instances, cases, specimens, of some generical relation or law."[54]

It is clear, upon the face of this analysis of the object of science, that Dewey is thinking of science in terms of the natural sciences, of which physics is a model.

When we turn to the Quest for Certainty we find Dewey again interpreting scientific method in terms of the experimental method of the physical sciences. The burden of the argument of the Quest for Certainty is to show the superiority of the procedure of modern science to the science and philosophy of the ancient world. As he compares the modern and the ancient and traces the transition from the latter to the former, it is the methods of the physical sciences that are taken as distinguishing modern science from that of the ancient and medieval world. The significant feature of the change he describes thus:[55]

> All that counted for science became mechanical properties formulated in mathematical terms: -- the significance of mathematical formulations marking the possibility of complete equivalence of homogeneity of translation of different phenomena into one another's terms.

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53. EAN, 143.

54. Ibid, 146.

55. QFC, 97.

The work of Galileo, who, Dewey tells us, initiated the revolution that brought modern science to birth is characterized thus:[56]

> It marked a change from the qualitative to the quantitative or metric; from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; from intrinsic forms to relations; from esthetic harmonies to mathematical formulae; from contemplative enjoyment to active manipulation and control; from rest to change; from eternal objects to temporal sequences.

After having described ancient science, Dewey turns to "elucidate the constructions of tradition which are involved in the actual procedure and results of knowing" in the modern sense and finds his example "*in physical inquiry*."[57] He adds that physical inquiry "is taken as the type and pattern of knowing since it is the most perfected of all branches of intellectual inquiry." [58] While Dewey admits that everyday conduct embodies experimental procedure, overt manipulation, the respect in which scientific procedure differs from it is evident:[59]

> The important thing in the history of modern knowing is the reinforcement of these active doings by means of instruments, appliances and apparatus devised for the purposes of disclosing relations not otherwise apparent, together with, as far as overt action is concerned, the development of elaborate techniques for the introduction of a much greater range of variations -- that is, a systematic variation of conditions so as to produce a corresponding series of changes in the thing under investigation. Among these operations should be included, of course, those which give a permanent register of what is observed and the instrumentalities of exact measurement by means of which changes are correlated with one another.

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[56] QFC, 94-95.

[57] Ibid, 72. The italics are ours.

[58] Loc. cit.

[59] Ibid, 87.

It is not necessary to multiply illustrations. While Dewey gives verbal allegiance to the principle that every subject-matter should be treated by the method best suited to it[60] (which would open the door to theology if seriously carried out!), it is the method of the physical sciences that Dewey is thinking of when he eulogizes "scientific method."

Summing up the results of our discussion, then, we may say that by "scientific method" Dewey means (1) experimental method and (2) especially that form of it exemplified by the physical sciences. It involves (a) formulation of a problem to be solved, (b) projection of hypotheses, (c) deduction of verifiable consequences, (d) overt experimentation, (e) precise (mathematical) verification by prediction. Is the method thus outlined the only valid method of discovering and testing truth? It will be the problem of the chapter to answer the question.

C. THE CLAIM OF EXPERIMENTAL METHOD TO EXCLUSIVE VALIDITY

There are three ways in which the claim to exclusive validity of experimental method might be established. First, it might be shown that experimental verification is involved in the very concept of knowledge or truth. Secondly, a critique of other criteria of truth might be made which showed, by a process of elimination, that all other methods and criteria are invalid. Thirdly, a consistent pragmatist might show that the assumption of the exclusive validity of scientific method has been successful. An analysis of Dewey's writings reveals that Dewey employs all three.

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[60] QFC, 220.

1. Dewey's theory of judgment as practical. In the first place, Dewey attempts to show that the very activity of judging involves experimental verification. Judgment bears an intrinsic reference to action; ideas have a practical character. Judgments of practice, which Dewey assimilates to judgments of fact, are judgments of the form: "M. N. should do thus and so.; it is better, wiser.....etc. to act thus and so." [61] They possess, according to Dewey, six traits: (1) "Their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation;" something must be done to complete the presented state of affairs.[62] (2) They choose the alternative to be acted upon and thus shape to that extent the course of affairs.[63] (3) "There is something objectively at stake in the forming of the proposition."[64] (4) Practical judgments are judgments "that the given is to be treated in a specified way; .....also......that the given admits of such treatment."[65] Thus, judgments of practice involve not only ends but judgments of fact with regard to means, which "exist only for the sake of an intelligent determination of what is to be done."[66] (5) These statements of fact are necessarily hypothetical, since their relevance to the problem at hand can always be questioned.[67] (6) The truth or falsity of practical judgments is constituted by their outcome: "the events or issue of such action *is* the truth or falsity of the judgment."[68] If Dewey's view

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[61] EEL, 335.

[62] Ibid, 337.
[63] Ibid, 338-39.

[64] Ibid, 339.

[65] Ibid, 340.

[66] Ibid, 341.

[67] Ibid, 345-46.
[68] Ibid, 346.

of judgment is sound, experimental verification would seem to be involved in the very notion of truth; if concepts have meaning only in so far as they can be formulated in terms of operations, Dewey has at least established experimental verification as the sine qua non of intelligible interpretation of the world. To that extent, at least, experimental method could claim exclusive validity.

Unquestionably there is a relationship between judgment and action, probably a more inclusive relationship than traditional logicians have been willing to admit. Possibly most judgments result ultimately in action. That does not signify, however, that all judgments are operative in character (which Dewey must establish if he would prove his point) nor that their meaning is exhausted by the performance of operations, if they were. It is patent that there are purely retrospective meanings which cannot be verified experimentally in the sense in which Dewey usually employs the term "verified." The scent of a rose, to use Lovejoy's illustration, may beget an anticipation of the experience of finding and seeing the rose. But it may, equally well, beget a reminiscence of an experience of childhood with which the same odor is connected.

> In the one case, as in the other, the olfactory sensation .....serves as the cue which evokes the representation of something else. In both cases alike, the something else is present-as-absent; but in the latter case it is no part of the meaning of the experience that the thing meant shall ever itself 'become present' in the fashion in which the other elements of the experience (whether the memory-evoking odour or the memory-image) are now present.[69]

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[69] Lovejoy, Art. 1, 53.

There are notions such as the center of the earth, the other side of the moon, the inhabitants of Mars, the life of a pre-historic man, -- to mention only a few, -- that have meaning for us. But it is playing with words to say that they mean for us only the consequences they may have upon us or the operations necessary to verify them. The doctrine of the operational meaning of judgments and concepts is false as a generalization.

There are passages in Dewey which suggest his recognition of this fact, despite his adherence to the operational theory. He says, in speaking of scientific meanings in one place,

> Scientific meanings were superadded to esthetic and affectional meanings when objects instead of being defined in terms of their consequences in social interactions and discussion were defined in terms of their consequences with respect to one another.[70]

Again, he denies in another place that scientific objects must be defined with reference to human use.

> Many critics take an 'instrumental' theory of knowledge to signify that the value of knowing is instrumental to the knower.....But 'instrumentalism' is a theory not about personal disposition and satisfaction in knowing, but about the proper objects of science, that is 'proper' being defined in terms of physics[71]

The doctrine of judgments as practical, because not exclusively valid in itself, cannot be said to establish the exclusive validity of experimental method.

2. The attack on the other criteria of truth. A second way in which Dewey seeks to establish the validity of his method is by impugning

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[70] EAN, 189.

[71] Ibid, 151.

the validity of other methods and criteria of truth. Most of them come under his fire:

(a) Sense-experience. It is not a valid criterion of knowledge: All knowledge is relational, connected;[72] sensations are not knowledge in themselves but incitements to knowledge.[73]

> Sensations are not parts of any knowledge, good or bad, superior or inferior, imperfect or complete. They are rather provocations, incitements, challenges to an act of inquiry, which is to terminate in knowledge....; as interruptions, they raise the questions: What does this shock mean? What is happening? What is the matter? .... What should be done about it?...... How shall I readjust my behavior in response? Sensation is thus, as the sensationalist claimed, the beginning of knowledge, but only in the sense that the experienced shock of change is the necessary stimulus to the investigating and comparing which eventually produce knowledge.

(b) Intuition. This is not a valid criterion of truth, either. (1) There is no such thing as pure knowledge by acquaintance; there is always an element of mediation in it.[74] (2) Further, both valid and invalid meanings are apprehended; action upon them is necessary to distinguish them.[75]

(c) Rationalistic criterion. This criterion makes knowledge consist in some form of identification with premises or objects securely known. It is defective at several points: (1) It appeals to some prior form of knowing; what guarantees the latter's validity?[76] (2) If taken

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[72] Ratner, Op. cit., 207.

[73] RPH, 89-90.

[74] Art. 35, 294.

[75] EAN, 320-321.

[76] QFC, 183-84.

consistently it would provide no place for real novelty, real knowledge.[77] (3) Syllogistic logic is practically barren; it provides no way by which we can get truth about matters of existence.[78]

(d) Correspondence. The correspondence criterion is not adequate: (1) It must assume the immediacy of knowledge: the idea must correspond with a reality which must be known in some way previously.[79] (2) It assumes an epistemological dualism, inheriting all the difficulties inherent in it.[80] (3) In the last anlysis, the "agreement" which the correspondence theory requires is but another way of expressing the notion of experimental verification. How is "agreement" brought about except through action?[81]

(e) Coherence. When we come to the coherence criterion of truth we discover a very significant fact: Dewey does not reject it. He is explicit in his attacks on other criteria. A sworn foe of Absolutism, -- we should expect him to condemn the criterion of truth to which it appeals. Yet he does not. Take, for example, his well-known essay on "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth", directed against Bradley.[82] One would expect that Dewey would assail the coherence criterion. Instead, he admits that consistency is a criterion of correct thought. What he objects to is making the criterion of thought the criterion of reality, as Bradley does.

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77. QFC, 184.
78. EAN, 380.
79. QFC, 181.
80. EEL, 231.
81. Ibid, 238-40.
82. IDP, 112-53.

> Thinking without doubt must be logical; but does it follow from this that the reality about which one thinks, and about which one must think consistently if one is to think to any purpose, must itself be already logical?[83]

Dewey's real quarrel with Bradley is over his transformation of logic into a metaphysical system, which is a different question from that of the validity of the coherence criterion as such.

Dewey's attack on Absolutism in general, as Feldman points out, is three-fold: (1) Practically, he opposes Absolutism because intelligence cannot function in a block universe.

> A theory which ends by declaring that everything is, really and eternally, thoroughly ideal and rational, cuts the nerve of the specific demand and work of intelligence.

(2) Logically, it assumes the reality of experience in order to get its dialectic started and then ends by pronouncing the very thing upon which it rests, experience, an unreality.[84]

(3) Ethically, Absolutism is not relevant to the actualization of values in human living.[85]

> Is any value more concretely and securely in life than it was before? Does this perfect intelligence enable us to correct one single misstep, one paltry error, here and now? Does this perfect all-inclusive goodness serve to heal one disease? Does it rectify one transgression? Does it even give the slightest inkling of how to go to work at any of these things? No; it just tells you: Never mind, for they are already eternally corrected, eternally healed in the eternal consciousness which alone is really Real.

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[83] IDP, 129.

[84] EAN, 61; cf. supra, 48.

[85] IDP, 24.

It is apparent that none of these arguments is directed against the coherence criterion.

The truth is that not only does Dewey not oppose the coherence criterion, but he employs it constantly. (1) His theory of knowledge is relational.

> To assume that anything can be known in isolation from its connections with other things is to identify knowing with merely having some object before perception or in feeling, and is thus to lose the key to the traits that distinguish an object as known..... The more connections and interactions we ascertain, the more we know the object in question. Thinking is search for these connections.[86]

(2) He represents the end of science as the putting of facts "into coherent form"[87] and its goal a "coherent and self-luminous system of meaning."[88]

(3) We have already seen that he employs coherence as an ethical criterion.[89]

(4) He represents the office of philosophy, which is the ultimate arbiter of the sciences, to subject "values, criticisms, and critical methods" to a criticism "as comprehensive and consistent as

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[86] QFC, 267.

[87] LCS, 115.

[88] EEL, 90.

[89] Cf. supra,86; "There is nothing intrinsically bad about raw impulse and desire. They become evil in contrast with another desire whose object includes more inclusive and enduring consequences. What is morally dangerous in the desire as it first shows itself is its tendency to confine attention to its own immediate object and to shut out the thought of a larger whole of conduct." ETH, 201.

possible." [90]

The significance for the problem of this chapter of Dewey's employment of coherence cannot be over-estimated. In order to establish the exclusive validity of experimental method as criterion of truth it is necessary toinvalidate the others. Inasmuch as Dewey not only does not eliminate coherence as a criterion but actually employs it, his claim to exclusive validity for experimentalism can scarcely stand.

3. The pragmatic sanction of the exclusiveness of experimental method. A consistent pragmatist would not, however, adopt either of the two approaches already considered, i. e. that experimental verification is involved in the act of judgment and that other criteria of truth are not valid, for such approaches in themselves imply the validity of coherence (that is, they seek to show that experimental method is internally consistent and externally coherent). A consistent pragmatist would act as though experimental method were the only one and would show that the results of such an assumption justify it. In many of Dewey's writings

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[90] EAN, 404. One of the assumptions of Dewey's philosophy is the principle of the whole. He says that "philosophical dualism is but a formulated recognition of an impasse in life." (EAN, 241) His writings are full of attacks made upon dualisms from the standpoint that they violate the integrity of the whole:
(1) Man-nature. Cf. supra, 73.
(2) Body-mind. Supra, 79.
(3) Self-its deed. ETH, 123.
(4) Theory-practice. QFC, 24.
(5) Truth-means of acquiring it. IDP, 139-40.
(6) Subject-object. EAN^2, 8-9.
(7) Reason-experience. RPH, 83ff.
(8) Cause-effect. Cf. Supra, 62-63.
(9) Means-ends. Cf. supra, 87.
(10) Ideal-real; value-existence. Cf. supra, 87-88.

that point of view is taken. In Reconstruction in Philosophy and the Quest for Certainty the burden of the argument is to show the results which have come from exclusive preoccupation with the experimental methods of science as distinguished from the unfruitful methods of ancient science.[91] It is not necessary to rehearse the facts; experimental science has unquestionably revolutionized and in most respects enhanced the common life. So successful have the results been that Dewey is willing to accord to science rational certainty, logical warranty.[92] "Theoretical certitude is assimilated to practical certainty; to security, trustworthiness of instrumental operations."[93]

But Dewey's task is to establish the exclusive validity of experimental method, and a rehearsal of its successes does not constitute certainty that it is the only method and criterion of truth. To make a successful journey to New York by train, -- yes, to make a thousand journeys to the metropolis by train, -- does establish beyond reasonable doubt that transportation by train is a satisfactory way to go. But a thousand successful journeys by train do not demonstrate that a railroad is the only means of transportation to New York. Put logically, it seems to us that the fallacy in the pragmatic argument for the exclusive validity of scientific method is one of faulty conversion. In effect Dewey converts

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[91] Cf. RPH, chapters I, II, III; QFC, chapters I, IV, XI.

[92] DEE, 224.

[93] QFC, 128.

"All results of scientific research are cases of knowledge" into

"All cases of knowledge are results of scientific research", which, when faced with the necessity of confuting his enemies, is contraposed into

"No results of non-scientific research are cases of knowledge." In the conversion of the first proposition into the second the distribution of the predicate of the first is illegally increased.

Dewey fails to establish his belief that experimental method is exclusively valid. His doctrine of meaning as practical does not tally with experience. His elimination of competing criteria fails to take in the coherence criterion, which he employs. His argument from the successes of experimental method is essentially irrelevant to establishing its claim to sole validity. The doctrine of exclusive validity of experimental method is a dogma, an assumption, which cannot be established on the basis of its own logic. It is no better grounded, logically, than are the assumptions upon which religious theory moves into the supernatural. The argument for the supremacy of scientific method stands on the same level, logically, with the argument of the eleventh chapter of Hebrews for the supremacy of faith.

D. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER SELVES

Is it possible by experimental method to gain a knowledge of other selves? We do not know that Dewey ever puts the question in just this way. In fact, he would object that the question as thus phrased is an artificial problem. He maintains that inner experience is an abstraction.

He opposes those who would make social interactions

> products of a ready-made specific physical or mental endowment of a self-sufficing individual, wherein language acts as a mechanical go-between to convey observations and ideas that have prior and independent existence.[94]

Social experience is not something that we acquire after we have attained self-consciousness. Rather, inner experience is the product of social relations.[95]

> When the introspectionist thinks he has withdrawn into a wholly private realm of events disparate in kind from other events, made out of mental stuff, he is only turning his attention to his own soliloquy. If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to and with ourselves. Because of converse, social give and take, various organic attitudes become an assemblage of persons engaged in converse, conferring with one another, exchanging distinctive experiences, listening to one another, over-hearing unwelcome remarks, accusing and excusing. Through speech a person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind emerges.

Communication arises from the successful results of acting in certain fashion. The assumption that other people share our meanings enables us to get on.[96]

Several observations suggest themselves at once. In the first place, Dewey's genetic argument that social experience is the condition of self-consciousness is beside the point. However consciousness may have arisen, we unquestionably distinguish between ourselves and others. Dewey does not assume any more than anyone else in his right mind that he alone exists. We have a right, then, to ask what our grounds are for assuming the existence of others and whether our conviction of others' existence can

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[94] EAN, 169.

[95] Ibid, 170.

[96] Cf. ibid, 176-81.

be established by the method and criterion of truth which we employ.

Having disposed of the denial of our right to put the question, analysis shows, in the second place, that the existence of other selves cannot be established by experimental method in the exact sense. My friend's idea of my self-consciousness cannot lead to the concrete fact which is my self-consciousness. To be sure, he may identify my self-consciousness with certain overt organic movements which he can submit to verification. But that is behaviorism, a theory which we have seen Dewey characterize as inadequate and grossly over-simplified.[97] There is no way by experimental method that he can enter into my mind and verify the object of his hypothesis (my self-consciousness). The fact is that Dewey admits it.

> Psychology of course does not aim at reinstating the immediate experience of the individual; nor does it aim at describing that experience in its immediate values, whether esthetic, social or ethical. It reduces the immediate experience to a series of dispositions, attitudes, or states which are taken as either conditions or signatures of life-experience. It is not the full experience-of-seeing-a-tree it is concerned with, but the experience reduced by abstraction to an attitude or state of perception; it is not the concrete getting angry, with all its personal and social implications, but anger as one species of a generic psychic disposition known as emotion.[98]

Dewey says, further, that consciousness is "gratuitous, superfluous, and inexplicable when reality is defined in terms of the relational objects of science."[99]

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[97] Supra, 77.

[98] LCS, 132-33.

[99] EAN, 104.

The only way the existence of other selves can be experimentally verified is in the sense of working successfully.[100] That is the method Dewey actually employs in his long analysis of communication in Experience and Nature.[101] But that is the rough-and-ready procedure of the everyday world; Aristotle and the ancients were as familiar with it as we. It cannot be identified with the highly-refined methods by which the natural sciences have transformed the modern world.

It is to be noted that Dewey assumes with regard to other selves what he wants. He does not, confesses he cannot, establish their existence by the method to which he has sworn first allegiance. And his assumption is metaphysical.[102] Other persons are metaphysical so far as my consciousness is concerned; no prediction verifiable in sense-experience can reveal to me the inside of another's mind. Logically, the existence of other selves can no more be established by strict science than the existence of God. Practically, the religious man has the same right of assuming the existence of a metaphysical Person or God, because the hypothesis "works" (in the most general sense), as Dewey has in assuming the existence of other human selves, because that hypothesis works successfully.

E. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST

Can knowledge of the past be established by the experimental method

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[100] Method A; see supra.

[101] Cf. especially, 176-81.

[102] Cf. Brightman, RV, 151.

of the physical sciences? Dewey seems to believe that it can. He deplores the divorce which is often attempted of the natural and historical sciences. They are not rivals, for all natural existences are histories.

> Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic; chemistry, geology, physiology, as well as anthropology and those human events to which, arrogantly, we usually restrict the title of history. Only as science is seen to be fulfilled and brought to itself in intelligent management of historical processes in their continuity can man be envisaged as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapolation. Just because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly known -- understood, intellectually realized -- than are mathematical and physical objects.[103]

Acknowledging that history is known by scientific methods, the question arises as to its extent. Dewey's answer is that knowledge of the past is possible only to the extent that past events have "effects still directly observable."[104] "Thoughts about the past hang upon present observable events and are verified by future predicted or anticipated events which are capable of entering into direct presentation."[105] "Knowledge where the past is implicated is logically knowledge of past-as-connected-with-present-or-future."[106] To illustrate:[107]

> I see a letter box; there is an observed thing. It is a commonplace that every recollection starts, directly or indirectly, with something perceived, immediately present. It suggest a letter. This may remain a mere suggestion. Thought of a letter written yesterday or last year may become simply something for fancy to sport with -- an esthetic affair, what I call a reminiscence. Truth or falsity does not enter into the case. But it may give rise to questions. Did I actually write the letter or only mean to? If I wrote it, did I mail it or leave it on my desk or in my pocket? Then I do something. I search my

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[103] EAN, 163-64.

[104] Art. 59, 311.

[105] Ibid, 310.

[106] Ibid, 309.

[107] Ibid, 310-11.

> pockets. I look on my desk. I may even write the person in question and inquire if he received a letter written on a certain date. By such means a tentative inference gets a categorical status. A logical right accrues, if the experiments are successful, to assert the letter was or was not written. Generalize the case and you get the logical theory concerning knowledge about the past.

If a past event has no consequences continuing in the present it is meaningless so far as knowledge is concerned. Such questions as "What did Brutus eat for his morning meal the day he assassinated Caesar?" cannot be answered, for his breakfast has left no consequences which are now observable. Such a matter is purely an "esthetic fancy."[108]

> So far as the meaning is wholly of and in the past, it cannot be recovered for knowledge. This negative consideration suggests that the true object of a judgment about a past event may be a past-event-having-a-connection-continuing-into-the-present-and-future.[109]

The issue is clear. Dewey affirms that the past can be known by experimental method in so far as it has consequences verifiable in the present or future. But this theory is open to objection. To begin with, in sponsoring such a theory of knowledge of the past Dewey has departed from the strict experimental method of the physical sciences. He forsakes it in two respects. First of all, he gives up overt manipulation of the object of investigation, which forms such an essential part of physical science.[110] For the past cannot be manipulated. The

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[108] Art. 59, 311.

[109] Ibid, 311.

[110] "Experimental science is a recognition that no idea is entitled to be termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers." Art. 37, 65.

past, as Lovejoy puts it, "is just blankly there, unmodifiable, irremediably external to the 'present concrete situation.'"[111] To be sure, Dewey suggests that we do not need to experiment with the past, for the progress of history itself does the experimenting for us.[112]

> History offers to us the only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative recombination of experiment. The early periods present us in their relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial operation of an experiment: following the phenomenon into the more complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for the synthesis of the experiment.

But that suggestion does not strike very deeply. There is an ongoing process, apart from man, taking place in the world today. No scientist would urge, however, that experiment is unnecessary because history (in this case, contemporaneous history) is performing experiments for us! In historical method the all-important element of overt manipulation of the object is absent.

Further, judgments about the past cannot be verified in the strict sense. Dewey has said that we have an experience of knowledge

> if, in its quale, there is an experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort: one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it sets up.[113]

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[111] Lovejoy, Art. 1, 65.

[112] Art. 24, 113.

[113] IDP, 90.

But the past cannot "become present" in the sense Dewey speaks of. The past ex hypothesi is inaccessible to us, and hence "we can never compare it with our idea of it, nor determine which of our ideas of it are true and which are false."[114] Dewey affirms, in discussing the verification of meanings, that an intended meaning must be fulfilled "in propria persona."[115] Since the past is irrevocably gone, its fulfillment in propria persona in present experience is impossible.[116]

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[114] Lovejoy, Art. 1, 66. Dewey seems almost to recognize this in one passage. "How can the present belief jump out of its present skin, dive into the past, and land upon just the one event (that as past is gone for ever) which, by definition, constitutes its truth? I do not wonder the intellectualist has much to say about 'transcendence' when he comes to dealing with the truth of judgments about the past; but why does he not tell us how we manage to know when one thought lands straight on the devoted head of something past and gone, while another thought comes down on the wrong thing in the past." IDP, 160.

[115] IDP, 103n.

[116] Dewey argues, however, that the "content" of a judgment must not be confused with "the reference of that judgment." "The content of any idea about yesterday's rain certainly involves past time, but the distinction or characteristic aim of judgment is none the less to give this content a future reference and function." (IDP, 161) We have already seen, however, that the doctrine that all meanings imply future operation is not tenable. (Cf. supra,146) Further, not only the content of the judgment supplied by Dewey but the reference of the content is to the past. "It is yesterday that I 'mean', and not tomorrow, and no logical hocus-pocus can transubstantiate the meaning 'yesterday' into the meaning 'to-morrow.'" Lovejoy, Art. 1, 67.

The only way history can be known experimentally is in the broad, pragmatic sense of the term. Our hypothesis regarding a past event works; it fits in coherently with our judgments about history as a whole. Dewey seems to acknowledge the fact when he says, [117]

> If we could free ourselves from a somewhat abject emotion, it would be clear enough that what makes any proposition scientific is its power to yield understanding, insight, intellectual at-homeness, in connection with coherent and tested meanings. The case of history is typical.

There is no one method applicable to all sorts of facts.[118] Experimental method in the abstract mathematical sense does not apply to the concrete facts of human history. Knowledge of the past cannot be gained by strict scientific method. The natural sciences have no place for history. As Cohen points out, the more developed a science is the less use it makes of history.[119] Is not Dewey's depreciation of history, which we have noted again and again, partially the result of his insistence upon the exclusive validity of a method that is not adapted to the

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117. EAN, 163.

118. Rickert's words are relevant. "Es giebt......keine wissenschaftliche Universalmethode......Wohl aber sind wir sogleich orientirt und auf dem Wege zu einem Verständniss der wissenschaftlichen Thätigkeit, wenn wir uns klar machen, dass in dem Material der Wissenschaft ein prinzipieller Unterschied besteht, insofern die Kulturvorgänge sich durch ihre Bedeutung für den Menschen aus der Gesamtwirklichkeit herausheben und um dieser Bedeutung willen auch eine wissenschaftliche Erforschung verlangen, die sie nicht unter ein System allgemeiner Begriffe bringt, sondern in ihrem einmaligen individuellen Werden verfolgt." GNB, 593.

119. "History has no applications in mathematical investigations, and next to none in physical researches. With the recent growth of experimental and scientific methods in biology and the realization of the inadequacy of the supposed law of parallelism between ontogeny and phylogeny, the historical point of view has been losing the importance it once had in the study of life phenomena." RAN, 370-71.

treatment of historical fact?[120]

Thus, we find Dewey's method inadequate to establish another one of the major principles of his philosophy.

F. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND VALUES

What is the relationship of experimental method to values? Can values be known? We have already expounded Dewey's theory of value.[121] The relationship between experimental method and values is instrumental. The knowing process is an instrument by which the things we desire, the possibilities of experience, may be securely experienced.[122] As we have seen, for Dewey judgments about values are "judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects."[123] The "ought" is merely "the 'is' of action."[124] There is no real difference between saying "this act is the one to be done, this act will meet the situation," and saying "The act ought to be done."[125] Knowledge begins with the ordinary things of experience, the things we prize and desire. They form the data of the knowing procedure. By abstraction the sciences ascertain certain basic relations obtaining between these prized things and other

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[120] The pragmatic attitude is not congenial to the treatment of history. Although James was certainly friendly to religion in the metaphysical sense, Cohen notes that in his Varieties of Religious Experience, "none of the great historic religions receives any attention." Op. cit., 454.

[121] Cf. supra, 85-91.

[122] QFC, 218-19.

[123] Ibid, 265.

[124] Ratner, POJD, 374.

[125] Ibid, 375.

existents. The sciences then return to experience from their abstractions with knowledge of the conditions to be observed if the valued objects will be had and thus provide the instruments by which desired objects may be made secure.[126]

> The world as we experience it is a real world. But it is not in its primary phases a world that is known, a world that is understood, and is intellectually coherent and secure. Knowing consists of operations that give experienced objects a form in which the relations, upon which the onward course of events depends, are securely experienced. It marks a transitional redirection and rearrangement of the real. It is intermediate and instrumental; it comes between a relatively casual and accidental experience of existence and one relatively settled and defined.[127]

What shall we say of this account of value? (I) In the first place, experimental method cannot tell us what we ought to do. It can supply us with facts about the conditions and results of certain types of experience. But natural science cannot give us a true science of value for several reasons. (A) For one thing, as we have already seen, its theory of value-judgments is not tenable.[128] Judgments of value cannot be reduced to judgments of practice. What we can do (Dewey's definition of value: the possible)[129] and what we ought to do are not the same. (B) Further, Dewey implicitly recognizes this fact when he assigns to philosophy the task of criticizing the results of the sciences with an eye to rendering them "more coherent, more secure, and more significant."[130] If the sciences can reveal in themselves what ought to be done, the critical function Dewey gives to philosophy would not

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126. QFC, 218-19.
127. Ibid, 295.
128. Cf. supra, 90-91.
129. QFC, 299-300.
130. EAN, 408.

have to be exercised. (C) Again, experimentation, in the sense Dewey conceives it, is impossible of execution for two reasons at least: (1) Values are not amenable to mathematical treatment, as are the facts of the natural sciences. Dewey admits that the hedonistic calculus of Bentham and his followers involved them in insuperable difficulties.[131] (2) The objectivity of the natural sciences is lacking in axiology by virtue of the fact, which Dewey admits, that the subject and his influence cannot be eliminated from the situation.[132]

(II) In the second place, it is a very significant fact that in the Quest for Certainty, one of Dewey's last major works, we find him admitting that knowledge is not the only approach to the real. The meaning of the Copernican revolution, he tells us, is "that we do not have to go to knowledge to obtain an exclusive hold on reality."[133] Knowledge transforms "disturbed and unsettled situations into those more controlled and more significant," but it does not encompass the world.[134] After all, he confesses, "hopes and fears, desires and aversions, are as truly responses to things as are knowing and thinking."[135] While knowledge is an "indispensable medium" for securing the objects which we prize,

> our affections, when they are enlightened by understanding, are organs by which we enter into the meaning of the natural world as genuinely as by knowing, and with greater fullness and intimacy.[136]

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131. ETH, 263.

132. LCS, 27-28.

133. QFC, 295.

134. Ibid, 295, 296.

135. Ibid, 297.

136. Loc. cit.

In effect, in setting forth these doctrines Dewey is renouncing his doctrine of the exclusive validity of scientific method. He is admitting that other interests than the cognitive have a hold on reality. To be sure, he says that science alone "knows" the real.[137] But there is no need of quarrelling over terms so long as it is granted that value-experience is a legitimate mode of apprehending the real.[138]

(III) Finally, Dewey recognizes that experimental method depends for its validity upon moral considerations.

> The system of science (employing the term 'science' to mean an organized intellectual content) is absolutely dependent for logical worth upon a moral interest: the sincere aim to judge truly. Remove such an interest, and the scientific system becomes a purely esthetic object, which may awaken emotional response in virtue of its internal harmony and symmetry, but which has no logical import.[139]

Thus, in his treatment of values we see Dewey virtually forsaking his experimental method and criterion of truth again. It is another illustration of the fact that for all his bludgeoning of his opponents with "scientific method", the keystones of his own philosophical structure are not established by appeal to that method.

G. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE WHOLE

Dewey tells us in the Common Faith that the self is dependent for its own unification upon "the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes

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[137] Cf. QFC, 296.

[138] "One mode of experience is as real as any other." QFC, 219.

[139] LCS, 125.

of the world into that imaginative totality we call the universe."[140] The final question of the chapter is whether this totality so essential to the religious life, as Dewey conceives it, can be known by scientific experimental method.

We need not delay long over the answer, which Dewey gives without equivocation.[141]

> The limited world of our observation and reflection becomes the Universe only through imaginative extension. It cannot be apprehended in knowledge nor realized in reflection.

In other words, the most real reality of all -- the universe -- cannot be known by scientific method but must be apprehended by non-cognitive experience.

We see, then, that the religious self for Dewey is dependent on a reality that cannot be known. The self must rely upon a reality which in its totality transcends cognitive experience. The self in Dewey's philosophy of religion thus possesses precisely the same epistemological status as the self in those (to Dewey) highly offensive supernatural religions which put their trust in powers unverifiable by scientific research!

H. CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters we have seen Dewey attack the non-scientific foundations of historical religion and attempt to build a new conception

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[140] CF, 19.

[141] Ibid, 18-19.

of faith in harmony with science, -- the premise of both Dewey's destructive and constructive efforts being the doctrine of the exclusive validity of scientific method. Discovering that by scientific method Dewey means the experimental method and predictive verification of the physical sciences we have investigated in this chapter whether Dewey's premise is sound by asking two questions: (1) Is Dewey's method and criterion of truth self-consistent: can the exclusive validity of scientific method be established scientifically? (2) Can the essential momenta in Dewey's own philosophy of religion -- (a) society, (b) the past, (c) values, (d) the whole -- be established by scientific method?

In answer to (1), we discovered that Dewey's key principle is an assumption: it does not follow from his theory of judgment; the attempt to establish it pragmatically is logically defective. In fact, we saw that while Dewey is an enthusiastic prophet of experimental method and an avowed antagonist of other methods and criteria, he makes extensive use of the coherence criterion, which in itself is sufficient indictment of his extreme claims for scientific method.

In answer to (2) we found that the central concepts of his own philosophy cannot be established by the method to which he ascribes exclusive validity. (a) He lays claim to being a social philosopher, and yet the existence of other selves cannot be experimentally verified by it. (b) He condemns supernatural religion for its unworthy past, when, in the strict sense, past events, whether good or bad, could never be known by his own predictive, future-directed experimental method. (c) He lifts values to the place occupied in historic religions by God, though his own

method can never establish what ought to be. (d) He claims that the supreme quality of the religious life, the vital unification of the self, rests upon devotion to an idea of the universe in its totality, and then confesses that the universe can never be known. The conclusion of the investigation is: the premise of Dewey's philosophy of religion is an assumption, nothing more; the epistemological attacks on the supernatural lose their cogency; the objects of humanistic faith have the same status so far as knowledge is concerned as the objects of supernaturalism.

Shall we, then, renounce Dewey's teachings? Rather, we ought to develop the valid insights of his thinking, as they have appeared in this chapter. (1) The recognition that the validity of science rests upon moral -- ideal -- considerations. (2) The admission that there are other approaches than science to the real. (3) His actual appeal to coherence as the ultimate criterion of truth. (4) His implied teaching that the existence of other selves is not a matter of immediate knowledge but a working hypothesis to account for certain levels of meaning. (5) His implicit recognition that men may gain help from relations to an object of faith transcending cognitive experience. Let these insights be followed out and Dewey's philosophy of religion will eventuate in a doctrine not easily distinguishable from theism.

CHAPTER V

THE DOGMA OF HUMAN PROGRESS

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAPTER

As was pointed out at the close of Chapter III, the underlying premise of Dewey's rejection of supernaturalism, as well as of his own theory of religion, is the adequacy of scientific method. This premise expresses itself in two ways: Epistemologically, it affirms that scientific method is the only sure method of arriving at truth. Practically, it asserts that scientific method is the one hope of human progress. We have considered the epistemological implications of scientific method in Chapter IV. In this chapter our purpose is to expound Dewey's doctrine of progress as grounded in science and to inquire into the validity of his teaching.

For the moment we shall define "progress" in the broadest fashion as meaning "advance," including within it all forms of physical, mental, and moral betterment. The idea of progress in its broad meaning involves three notions at least: (1) That the present is superior to or marks an advance over the past. (2) That the future will be still better. (3) That such advance as has been or will be made is a human,

as distinguished from a divine achievement.[1]

The conviction of human progress is the silent assumption of much that Dewey has written about religion. We have seen that he objected to historic religion from a genetic standpoint; he held it simply to be a primitive attempt to gain security or as an outgrowth of myths.[2] It is implied in the argument that we have progressed beyond the mythological stage, while science's development has outmoded need of appeal to supernatural powers.[3] He attacked historical religion, too, from a practical standpoint, and the assumption of progress is present there, too. Religion was said to be a subversive influence, retarding the onward march of science, the assumption of progress being plainly revealed.[4] It was said that supernatural religion cannot solve our specific problems; while science, the argument presupposes, has developed to the place where it can.[5] It was said that supernaturalism is inimical to human endeavor; and this objection takes its point from the supposition that men through their unaided effort are capable of genuine advance.[6]

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[1] Otherwise, the doctrine of progress would be scarcely distinguishable from the doctrine of Providence. As Bury points out, speaking from the historical point of view, "The undermining of the theory of Providence is very intimately connected with our subject; for it was just the theory of an active Providence that the theory of Progress was to replace; and it was not until men felt independent of Providence that they could organize a theory of Progress." IOP, 73.

[2] Supra, 37ff.

[3] Supra, 39. It will be remembered that Dewey admits the genetic argument is not a logical refutation of supernaturalism but a practical consideration designed to show its outmoded character. Supra, 42.

[4] Supra, 52.

[5] Supra, 53-54.

[6] Supra, 54-55.

Not only are the objections to supernaturalism grounded in the notion of progress, but his constructive view of religion is as well. He affirms that a theory of religion such as his own is called for because historical religions have been outmoded by science.[7] His conception of God is a projection of the possible.[8] Salvation is to come through the ever-advancing methods of science, while revelation,[9] appeal to historic events or creeds, has been supplanted by "the continual disclosure of truth through directed cooperative human endeavor."[10] In short, Dewey conceives of supernatural religion as belonging to a stage of human development that was left behind when science appeared on the scene, and his own theory of religion is designed to harmonize with the ever-advancing character of science.

It will be noted that Dewey's assumption here is not so much logical as practical. It is not so much the notion that traditional religion is untrue as that it is no longer needed. The problem of the chapter will be to expound this practical argument further and to ask whether it is valid.

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[7] CF, 29-33.

[8] "God" is "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions." CF, 42. The "ideal" is defined as "the possible." QFC, 299-300.

[9] Art. 66; CHE, II, 457; EAN, iii.

[10] CF, 26.

B. DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS

1. Progess as increase of meaning: value. Dewey defines progress several times in essentially the same way:

> Present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning....[11] ....
>
> ....Remedial action.....endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by man.[12]
>
> Progress means increase of present meaning which involves multiplication of sensed distinctions as well as harmony, unification.[13]
>
> If history shows progress it can hardly be found elsewhere than in... complication and extension of the significance found within experience.[14]

Progress, as these definitions would agree, is increase of meaning. "Meaning" is variously defined in Dewey's writings.[15] (1) Sometimes it is regarded as a relationship of purely physical events, as the relation of consequence to antecedent. The quenching of thirst is, thus, a meaning of water.[16] (2) In other places it is regarded as the apprehension of the relation of things to one another. Meaning is defined as a sign or clue of a reality to be realized through action,[17] "awareness" of the consequences of an event before it occurs,[18] or "the

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[11] HNC, 281.

[12] Ibid, 282.

[13] Ibid, 283.

[14] Ibid, 284.

[15] For a good discussion of the point, see Feldman, PJD, 77.

[16] Cf., EEL, 246.

[17] Cf. EEL, 248.

[18] EAN, 324.

potentiality" of an event, expressed "in expectation, beliefs, inferences."[19] (3) Finally, meanings are regarded as methods of action, ways of using things.[20]

> Meanings are rules for using and interpreting things; interpretation being always an imputation of potentiality for some consequences.

Since (3) is chiefly identified with Dewey's behavioristic moods, which we have seen are not most characteristic of him, (1) and (2) represent his meaning of "meaning." There is no contradiction between them; (1) is the relationship of purely physical things; (2) is the relationship as apprehended. In either case "meaning" is synonymous with "consequences" for Dewey.

> To judge that this object is sweet, that is, to refer the idea or meaning 'sweet' to it without actually experiencing sweetness, is to predict that when it is tasted -- that is, subjected to a specific operation -- a certain consequence will ensue.[21]

"Meanings" are synonymous with "values." We have already seen that "a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical judgment about the doing of something,"[22] while "in general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations."[23] Values are "ends or consequences not now existing but which the actual may through its use bring into existence."[24] Values are the possibilities of existence.[25]

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19. EAN, 324.
20. Ibid, 188.
21. QFC, 137.
22. EEL, 358.
23. QFC, 111.
24. Ibid, 299.
25. Loc. cit.

Hence, progress as the "increase of meaning" is "the increase of value", the increase of the possibilities of existence.

2. Progress as growth: the end as immanent. Progress is often conceived as the approach of society or civilization to a goal lying in the future. "Progress means," Lyman contends, "proceeding toward a goal, advance toward an end, approach to the realization of value."[26] Bernard defines progress as

> an approach to an end or result which is regarded as more nearly perfect or complete than the antecedent stage in the development process with which the end or result is compared.[27]

According to these definitions progress has an end external to the process, which is the goal of the advance.

Dewey, however, will have nothing to do with such a view. Indictments of the notion that there are certain definite ends toward which mankind is progressing are to be found in almost all of Dewey's writings. The following are some of the objections raised to such a notion of progress:

(1) The notion of a fixed end or goal is a vestige of supernaturalism.[28]

(2) The idea of a goal or perfect end breeds despair and discouragement in those who seek to realize them.[29]

(3) Concentration of attention upon a distant goal tends to distract thought and energy from making the most of the present.[30]

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[26] MTR, 7.

[27] Bernard, Art. 1, 21.

[28] RPH, 162-3; HNC, 236-237; 241-42. These arenot direct quotations.

[29] HNC, 232-33, 274-75, 288.

[30] Art. 86, 179; HNC, 261, 266.

(4) An infinite goal gives no insight into the immediate steps to be taken.[31]

(5) Only the present is in our control. Why yield to the distant, the uncontrollable?[32]

(6) "Means-consequences" is an undivided situation; there are no fixed ends as such.[33]

(7) Progress is a process in which aims or purposes are continually being realized and new ones are being projected. The notion of fixed ends does not do justice to the perpetually changing nature of the process.[34]

Progress is not, thus, for Dewey the pursuit of fixed goals, as it is often conceived.

Nor is progress for him a matter of mere change. Not only are they not the same, but progress does not depend on the existence of social change, "but on the direction which human beings deliberately give that change."[35]

Rather, progress is a matter of growth. The moral life is not striving for certain all-inclusive ends or goals, as we have said. There are many meanings and purposes in life; no one can be singled out as supreme.[36] Our task is to "wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning."[37] The goal of progress lies

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[31] HNC, 283-4; 288-89; ION, 164-5.

[32] HNC, 266-71.

[33] EAN, 397; RPH, 171-75; HNC, 226-27, 232.

[34] DEE, 361.

[35] Art. 53; CHE, II, 322.

[36] Art. 86, 179.

[37] Loc. cit.

within action, not without.[38] It is the process of growth itself.[39]

> The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better.[40]

The axiom of progress is: "So act as to increase the meaning of present experience."[41]

> The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing. Not health as an end fixed once and for all, but the needed improvement in health -- a continual process -- is the end and good. The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living.....Growth itself is the only moral "end."[42]

3. Progress as a human achievement. Needless to say, Dewey conceives of progress as a purely human achievement. The notion that progress is inevitable, that evolutionary process guarantees that we shall reach certain desirable ends willy-nilly, that advance is automatic, -- these ideas Dewey repudiates in the sharpest fashion. Progress rests upon human intelligence and activity alone. Writing during the Great War, Dewey said,[43]

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[38] HNC, 223.

[39] RPH, 177.

[40] Ibid, 176.

[41] HNC, 283.

[42] RPH, 176-77.

[43] Art. 53, 324.

> The doctrine of evolution has been popularly used to give a kind of cosmic sanction to the notion of an automatic and wholesale progress in human affairs. Our part, the human part, was simply to enjoy the usufruct. Evolution inherited all the goods of Divine Providence and had the advantage of being in fashion. Even a great and devastating war is not too great a price to pay for an awakening from such an infantile and selfish dream. Progress is not automatic; it depends upon human intent and aim and upon acceptance of responsibility for its production. It is not a wholesale matter, but a retail job, to be contracted for and executed in sections. I doubt if the whole history of mankind shows any more vicious and demoralizing ethic than the recent widespread belief that each of us, as individuals and as classes, might safely and complacently devote ourselves to increasing our own possessions, material, intellectual, and artistic, because progress is inevitable anyhow.

4. The doctrine of progress: convergence of philosophical principles. The meaning of "progress", then, for Dewey may be defined as follows: Progress is a process of perpetual growth which is directed, not toward fixed goals or ends, but toward the transforming of existing situations so that an increase of value (meaning, possibilities) results. It is a purely human process and is exemplified both in the lives of individuals and society at large.

This concept of progress represents a convergence of five significant principles of his philosophy:

(1) Temporalism: To exist is to be in process.[44]

(2) Darwinism: The notion of experience as interaction of the organism with the environment.[45]

(3) Emergent evolution: Its doctrine of increase of meaning.[46]

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[44] Supra, 72.

[45] Supra, 27. Dewey usually takes the biological point of view. "The brain, the last physical organ of thought, is a part of the same practical machinery for bringing about adaptation of the environment to the life requirements of the organism, to which belong legs and hand and eye." PAC, 44.

[46] Supra, 73-74.

(4) Instrumentalistic theory of knowledge: The test of meaning is to be found in the success with which difficulties are resolved; meaning lies in future consequences.[47]

(5) Theory of value: Values are possibilities of present existence.[48]

C. PROGRESS AND THE PAST

1. Scientific progress. Having considered Dewey's theory of progress we turn to the past for evidences of it. Has there been a process of increase of value in the past? We are directed at once to the wealth of possibilities that science has brought into being. The whole argument of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* and *The Quest for Certainty* pivots about the world-transforming progress the sciences have made in three centuries and the reconstruction in the higher life which this progress calls for. We are reminded again and again of what science has done for us.

> The combined effect of science and technology has released more productive energies in a bare hundred years than stand to the credit of prior human history in its entirety. Productively it has multiplied nine million times in the last generation alone. The prophetic vision of Francis Bacon of subjugation of the energies of nature through change in methods of inquiry has well-nigh been realized. The stationary engine, the locomotive, the dynamo, the motor car, turbine, telegraph, telephone, radio and moving picture are.....the fruit of methods that first penetrated to the working causalities of nature and then utilized the resulting knowledge in bold imaginative ventures of invention and construction.[49]

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[47] Supra, 138.

[48] Supra, 87.

[49] LSA, 73-74.

> With the introduction of steam-power, the fifty years from 1780 to 1830 were marked by more changes than are found in any previous thousand years. The advance of chemical techniques and in use of electricity and radio-energy in the last forty years makes even this last change seem awkward.[50]

> Because of science for the first time man is relieved from overhanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to possess and accumulate, and is freed to consider the more gracious question of securing to all an ample and liberal life.[51]

> The machine age has resulted in a transformation of the locus of the ideal of a larger and more evenly distributed happiness and leisure from heaven to earth.[52]

In general, Dewey outlines four stages of development which science has undergone: (1) A stage when there is no problem at all, when facts and relations are "taken for granted."[53] (2) The empiric stage: After the problem has dawned, -- "a period of occupation with relatively crude and unorganized facts."[54] (3) The speculative stage: "a period of guess, of making hypotheses, of framing ideas which later on are labelled and condemned as only ideas."[55] (4) "Finally, there comes a period of fruitful interaction between the mere ideas and the mere facts."[56] This is the stage of modern experimental science. The progress which science has made consists in the fact that science has changed from "an art of accepting things as they are........." and has become "an art

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[50] PAC, 318-19.

[51] IDP, 58.

[52] Art. 80, 323-4.

[53] EEL, 89. Dewey organizes the four stages a bit differently in another place: (1) Dogmatism, (2) Discussion (Sophists) (3) Proof (Aristotelian philosophy), (4) Empirical science. (EEL, 185-209)

[54] Ibid, 89.

[55] Loc. cit.

[56] Ibid, 89.

of control."[57] In modern experimental science men have at last come upon a method which gives "experience and its potentialities a radically new meaning," and a means of controlling their own destiny.[58]

2. The absence of progress in non-scientific fields. When we turn, however, from the world-transforming progress of science to other fields of human endeavor a drab picture is painted for us. Dewey tells us that the ideas dominant today in morals and political matters are those "which universally obtained in Europe till the seventeenth century;"[59] they are pre-scientific. Philosophy "has remained, as far as possible, true to conceptions formulated more than two thousand years ago in Greece, when the experimental method was not dreamed of."[60] The institutional and legal concepts which are in use were framed in the feudal period.[61] As for religion, its sorry plight has been already exposed. It is still a compensatory device, as it was in the days before we had science.[62] It is fighting a losing battle with science.[63] Its institution, the Church, has been demoted from the central, all-embracing institution of an essentially religious community to "a special institution in a secular community."[64] In short, "the outer arena of

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[57] QFC, 99-100.

[58] Art. 86, 177-78; QFC, 9.

[59] RPH, 75.

[60] Art. 80, 317.

[61] ION, 74.

[62] Supra, 38ff.

[63] QFC, 303.

[64] CF, 61.

life has been transformed by science. The effectively working mind and character of man have hardly been touched."[65] This fact constitutes the deepest contradiction of our culture.[66]

The impartial student cannot fail to be impressed with the narrow empirical basis of belief in progress, as Dewey conceives it. In time the period of progress extends over a mere three centuries. In range of operation we see it taking place in but one field of human endeavor, -- the scientific. Is this a sufficient basis for discounting man's traditional religious interest, which has manifested itself now for many centuries and over wide fields of human effort?

D. PROGRESS AND THE FUTURE

1. Dewey's meliorism: optimism. Dewey believes that the success of the sciences has been so great in the past three hundred years that we may look to the future with optimism. He acknowledges, of course, that the future cannot be predicted; any affirmations about the future are pure prophecy.[67] As we have seen, he rejects the notion that progress is certain or inevitable. He defines his position regarding the future as meliorsitic: "the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively

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[65] PAC, 326.

[66] Cf. ION, 35-37.

[67] "Where are we going? Toward what are we moving? The value of any changing thing lies in its consequences, and the consequences of the present conditions and forces are not here. To make an evaluation is to prophesy and where is there the astronomer who can predict the future of our social system?" Art. 79, 256.

good, in any event may be bettered."[68]

And because the future can be bettered, Dewey has faith that it will. His meliorism turns to optimism when he views prospectively what scientific method, when made universal in its application, will accomplish. Great though the achievements of the last century have been, Dewey tells us that "they are not to be compared with those which will emerge when our faith in scientific method is made manifest in social works." [69] Though revolutionary progress in science has been made, the great scientific revolution, -- when scientific methods are applied to the **securing of** social values, -- is still to come.[70] While the obstacles in the path of such a revolutionary application of science are enormous, "an idealism of action", armed with the methods of intelligence, is invincible and will finally triumph.[71] Other civilizations have decayed or stagnated, but "wholesale permanent decays of civilization are impossible" now, because we have a "sure method."[72]

> While the modern man was deceived about the amount of progress he had made, and especially deceived about the automatic certainty of progress, he was right in thinking that for the first time in history mankind is in command of the possibility of progress.[73]

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[68] RPH, 178.

[69] PAC, 330.

[70] Ibid, 329-30.

[71] Cf. QFC, 394.

[72] Art. 53; CHE, II, 823.

[73] Loc. cit.

The success of science ensures the ultimate triumph of democracy and liberty, which depend upon it for their strength. While they shall undergo periods of trial and eclipse they cannot be forever obscured, for "intelligence after millions of years of errancy has found itself a method, and it will not be lost forever in the blackness of night."[74]

The path by which Dewey's logic of faith moves is evident. Science has made progress in the past; this shows that progress is possible in the future. "In the end, men do what they can do;"[75] because the possibility of progress is open, they will avail themselves of it. Thus, Dewey argues from past progress to future progress.

2. The direction progress should take: democracy. We have seen that Dewey refuses to predict the exact course that future progress will take. But we may ask, what direction should it take? In a sense the asking of such a question is contradictory to Dewey's conception of progress. For, as we have noted, he conceives of progress as the resolving of specific, existential situations; an external goal toward which progress should move is obnoxious to him. Progress is simply "growth." But as Professor Lyman has pointed out, progress is something more than mere growth for Dewey. He would not regard "growth" in the direction of a Fascist regime as progress.[76] The fact is that Dewey is not consistent at this point in his concept of progress. He denounces, first of all, the notion of ends and then makes "growth" the

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[74] LSA, 93.

[75] IDP, 74.

[76] MTR, 187.

end of progress![77] Then he goes on to define "growth" in terms of a still further end! The "end" (Dewey uses the term) to which liberalism -- which is the philosophy of progress, -- is committed, he tells us, is "an end that is at once enduring and flexible: the liberation of individuals so that realization of their capacities may be the law of their life."[78] The goal of progress should be self-realization.

> Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and to develop capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status.[79]

This is what democracy means.[80]

3. Conditions of future progress: What are the conditions upon which progress such as Dewey hopes for is to be had? Four conditions appear in his writings:

a. Desire for progress. The first essential, if progress is to be a reality, is that men shall want it.[81]

> It seems to me that about all that I can say about the future of progress at the present time is that it depends upon man to say whether he wants it or not. If we want it, we can have it -- if we are willing to pay the price in effort, especially in effort of intelligence.

b. Intelligence: use of scientific method. As may be expected, a sine qua non of progress is the use of intelligence, which is another term for the experimental method of the sciences.[82]

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[77] RPH, 177.

[78] LSA, 56.

[79] RPH, 186.

[80] Loc. cit.

[81] Art. 53; CHE, II, 823.

[82] Cf. QFC, 200.

> In dwelling upon the need of conceiving progress as a responsibility and not as an endowment, I put primary emphasis upon responsibility for intelligence, for the power which foresees, plans and constructs in advance.[83]

> One of the only two articles that remain in my creed of life is that the future of our civilization depends upon the widening spread and deepening hold of the scientific habit of mind; and that the problem of problems in our education is therefore to discover how to mature and make effective this scientific habit.[84]

> Science is the sole instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from accidental progress.85

> Ultimately and philosophically science is the organ of general social progress.[86]

> Every step forward in the social sciences -- the studies termed history, economics, politics, sociology -- shows that social questions are capable of being intelligently coped with only in the degree in which we employ the method of collecting data, forming hypotheses, and testing them in action in which we utilize in behalf of the promotion of social welfare the technical knowledge ascertained by physics and chemistry.[87]

> The patient and experimental study of nature, bearing fruit in inventions which control nature and subdue her forces to social uses, is the method by which progress is made.[88]

c. Communication of knowledge. Quite as important as the results of scientific method is the dissemination of them so that they may be a force in forming public opinion.[89]

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83. Art. 53, CHE, II, 824.

84. Art. 42; CHE, II, 765.

85. DEE, 266.

86. Ibid, 270.

87. Ibid, 333.

88. RPH, 49.

89. Art. 86, 181.

> Controlled moral progress can begin only where there is sifting and communication of the results of all relevant experiences of human association, such as now exists as a matter of course in the experiences of science with the natural world.

d. An effective social organization. All of these things mentioned would come to little good if there is not an effective social organization to establish them. "The greatest educational power, the greatest force in shaping dispositions and attitudes of individuals, is the social medium in which they live."[90] Hence, one of the prerequisites of true progress is the formation of "a social organization that will make possible effective liberty and opportunity for growth in mind and spirit in all individuals."[91]

4. Progress and nature. As one studies Dewey's conditions of progress one is impressed with the minor role that physical nature plays in them. One would think that nature's evolution, its future course, would determine to a great extent what man's future course would be, whether he would progress or not. Dewey, naturally, admits that man is dependent upon nature, and that he cannot wholly control it.[92] But he chooses to leave such considerations out of account when he talks about progress. In general, theories of nature are inimical to human endeavor: optimism, the doctrine that this is the best possible of worlds, "becomes too readily the creed of those who live at ease;" pessimism, on the other hand, which declares the world evil, "makes

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[90] LSA, 91.

[91] Ibid, 57.

[92] CF, 24-25.

futile all efforts to discover the remediable causes of specific evils and thereby destroys at the root every attempt to make the world better and happier."[93] Nature for Dewey is essentially indifferent to man: in some respects it is his friend; in others his enemy.[94] Hence, it is simply a background before which man plays his part, or, better, the material which he fashions to suit his needs. Dewey chooses to leave it out of account.[95]

In summary, Dewey's theory of progress is this: Progress is a process of perpetual growth by which existent situations are so transformed that increase of value results. Past progress has been confined to science, technology, but the successes of science will be carried over into all realms of human endeavor in the future. The end toward which this future progress in the several fields should be coordinated is the development of the capacity of human individuals, which is democracy. While he is optimistic with regard to the future, Dewey acknowledges that future progress depends not upon God or physical nature, but upon human attitudes and achievement: the desire for progress, intelligent method, communication, an effective social organization.

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93. RPH, 178-9.

94. CF, 55-56.

95. Dean Knudson distinguishes two conceptions of progress: the naturalistic, which conceives of progress as belonging to the very structure of reality and having about it "all the certainty and inevitableness of a scientific law;" and the ethical, according to which "science does not reveal progress as a law of nature; it furnishes the means by which it may be achieved." PTR, 53, 54. In this sense Dewey's theory of progress is ethical rather than naturalistic.

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NOTION OF PROGRESS FOR RELIGION

What is the significance of scientific advance for religion? It goes almost without saying that the religio-philosophical problem of the past fifty years has been one of reconciling the claims of science and religion. The attempts at harmonization have met with no little success. The procedure employed by most religious and scientific thinkers has been one of partition of territory. It may be along the dividing line between phenomenon and noumenon, as with Bowne. Or it may be along the line which separates values from existence, as was the case with Ritschl. While Dewey is opposed to such divisions in the realm of nature,[96] the distinction between the province of science and that of religion has been widely accepted. There are thinkers who write as though the relationship between science and religion had been settled, and religion has nothing to fear from science.

It is important to note, however, that the reconciliation just referred to is what may be called conceptual. Modern theology has endeavored to show that there is no basic conflict between the concepts of science (law, electrons, evolution, and the like) and those of religion (God, freedom, immortality, etc.). Naturalism, however, such as Dewey's, does not strike solely at the intellectual framework of religion, as the older naturalism did. It strikes religion on its functional side, which requires a new adjustment of science and religion.

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[96] Cf. CF, 34-35.

Religion has been defined as "the feeling of dependence on a personal God and.....the will to cooperate with God in the conservation and increase of values."[97] Science does not deny the existence of a personal God; it threatens the feeling of dependence which lies so close to the heart of religion. It is making us less and less dependent on anything other than ourselves. This is an indirect effect of science on religion, and as Dewey rightly points out, it is of far greater moment than the influence of science upon the creeds.[98] Conceptually there may be no inherent contradiction between science and religion; but functionally science is usurping more and more of the historic functions of religion. The real issue is not "Can scientific doctrines and the tenets of religion be reconciled?" but "Is there anything that religion can do for us that science cannot do?" It is at this point that a theory of progress such as Dewey's, which affirms that man can realize his needs by scientific method, gives its greatest challenge to supernatural religion. For there is an "Occam's razor" at work in the practical realm as well as the theoretical. Occam argued that what can be explained well on one ground is not to be explained again on another. The practical principle of parsimony says that what can be done easily and effectively by one means (by science) will not be tried by another (by appeal to God and

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[97] Brightman, ITP, 321.

[98] Cf. CF, 62-65.

religion).[99]

Herein lies Dewey's contribution to the philosophy of religion. His attacks on the supernatural from the standpoint of epistemology can hardly claim validity, as we have indicated in the preceding chapter. But in his attack on religion from the functional side he has struck a more vital blow at the traditional faith. Suppose that there is good reason for believing in the existence of a God. If I can get everything I need by scientific means, -- strength, security, courage, understanding, -- what is the difference whether there is a God or not? Theologians of the years to come will not answer A Common Faith by the usual dogma that science and religion do not conflict, but by showing there are certain essential functions in life that religion alone can fulfill.

F. CRITICISM

What shall we say of Dewey's theory of progress? We shall be concerned in this section with three general considerations. First, we shall endeavor to indicate briefly the contradictions contained in the theory. Secondly, we shall inquire whether his doctrines in themselves

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[99] The writer recalls hearing Anna Louise Strong, the Russian correspondent, relate the explanation a Russian farmer gave for his apostasy from the Orthodox faith. "We used to have the priests come out and bless the fields in the springtime to ensure a crop. But we don't need them any more. We have tractors." This is an illustration, at a primitive level, of the principle under discussion. If men's actual needs can be supplied as well or better by science, religion of a supernatural sort becomes irrelevant. This is the real force of Dewey's thrust at theism. In our judgment it is the most difficult of all Dewey's attacks to meet.

As we shall see later (infra,196-201), Dewey effectually answers his own objection by his confession that there are a number of needs science cannot meet which (he reluctantly admits at times) traditional religion supplied.

do not admit that there are certain needs science cannot supply. Finally, we shall point out again that despite Dewey's alleged appeal to experience, in matters of religion he depreciates religious experience where it has appeared in the course of history.

(I) A close scrutiny of Dewey's philosophy of progress will reveal several difficulties inherent in it. (1) There is the contradiction, already noted, between Dewey's polemic against ends of progress and his elevation of growth itself, and finally, self-realization to the status of end.[100]

(2) Dewey's doctrine of progress violates his principle of continuity. As we have already seen, Dewey opposes a separation of man and nature as violating the principle of continuity.[101] But we have seen also in the present chapter that in so far as progress is concerned, Dewey sharply distinguished between man and nature. Man is progressing; nature as a whole is indifferent to progress. Unlike the historic doctrine of progress, which was grounded in a metaphysic of evolution which made human and natural progress co-ordinates, Dewey distinguishes in effect between that which progresses and that which does not.[102] Thus, the breach between man and nature which he attempted to close with his doctrine of continuity is opened by his doctrine of progress.

(3) It is to be noted, too, that Dewey's conviction of progress

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[100] Supra, 184-85.

[101] Cf. EAN, vii.

[102] Supra, 187-88.

is never proved by him; it is a matter of faith, not knowledge.

> In its strict sense, knowledge can refer only to what has happened and been done. What is still to be done involves a forecast of a future still contingent, and cannot escape the liability to error in judgment in all anticipation of probabilities.[103]

That knowledge will increase indefinitely, that man's nature is capable of indefinite improvement, that natural events will not forestall progress, that the population of the earth will not increase so as to threaten man's means of sustenance (Malthus), indeed, that there will be a future, -- all of these are assumptions.[104] From the standpoint of scientific knowledge Dewey's faith in progress has the same standing as faith in immortality. The progress which Dewey envisions will never be realized within his life-time; like immortality it lies beyond. That the one will take place cannot be established any more than the other.[105] Once again Dewey does what he forbids the supernaturalists to do, -- **he has** faith in an object which cannot be established by scientific method.

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[103] PUB, 178.

[104] For good statements of some of the assumptions underlying the notions of progress, see Inge, IOP, 11-16, Hertzler, SPR, 140-44, and Bury, 3-4. See Whitehead, SMW, 65 and Lovejoy, Art. 1, 70-71, for the argument that the existence of the future is an assumption.

[105] It may be objected that life after death is of a different order of experience from that in which future progress will take place. This, of course, is true. But we are thinking now solely about the possibility of scientific verification. Future progress can no more be scientifically verified than a future life, not because the future belongs to a different order of experience, but because, as Dewey suggests in the quotation above, knowledge in the strict sense can refer only to what has happened. No categorical judgments can be made about the future by its very nature: scientific predictions are hypothetical, "if-then." (Cf. Brightman, FOC, 19) To affirm on the basis of past experience that progress will take place in the future is faith; just as the affirmation of a future life on the basis of "intimations of immortality" is faith.

"Progress" must be added to the existence of other selves, the past, value, and the whole as entities having a central position in his thought but which cannot be established by his method of knowledge.

(4) Again, we have already seen how Dewey berates the supernaturalist for his projection of the object of worship into the unknown in order to fulfil a desire.[106] What he does not see is that progress is a projection, too. Its reality cannot be proved, and, as the work of imagination, is under the influence of desire.[107] If projections per se are to be thrown out as objectionable, as one gathers from Dewey's deliverances on supernaturalism, by the same logic his doctrines of progress must be denied.

(5) Finally, it is to be observed that there is an element of finality in Dewey's thought, despite his polemic against finalities. That "finality" is anathema to Dewey, whether it be in the form of an Absolute, an a priori, an antecedent reality, a fixed goal, an eternal principle, a static Good, or a finished world, is familiar to every student of his philosophy. Yet, in the notion of universal progress, as Dewey expounds it, there is one factor that we shall never progress beyond, -- scientific method. "Both logically and educationally,

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[106] Supra, 39.

[107] PAC, 120.

science is the perfecting of knowing, its last stage."[108] The procedure of science represents the limit of methodological advance. After tracing the stages of the development of science he concludes his discussion by saying,[109]

> Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to define the ideal of limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated, universalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it makes the terminus of our description.

(II) Not only does Dewey's doctrine have serious internal difficulties, but an inquiry into it will show its incompleteness. In order to have decisive weight against supernatural religion it must be shown that with the aid of science man can get for himself the things he most needs. An analysis of Dewey's thought, however, reveals that on Dewey's own principles there are at least four important factors in the higher life of man that scientific method cannot achieve.

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[108] DEE, 256.

[109] Art. 23, 486-7. Bury calls the difficulty we have cited above "the illusion of finality" (IOP, 351). He notes its presence in Hegel, who traces the progressive development of the World Spirit through the cultures of many peoples until he lets it culminate in the Germanic world and in the philosophy of the Absolute (Ibid, 255). Comte, too, brilliantly set forth the laws of human development until he came to positivism, -- there development stopped! (Ibid, 351)

It must be said in defense of Dewey, Hegel, and Comte, however, that the difficulty under consideration arises really out of the nature of truth. In every true judgment there is an element of permanence, finality. Even the judgment that everything changes has significance only as we assume that its meaning, at least, does not change. Likewise, any doctrine of progress must presuppose entities that do not progress.

1. Scientific method cannot create goodwill. We have noted that Dewey lists the will to progress as one of the conditions of progress.[110] It is a sine qua non of a better world. Yet, Dewey confesses that the achievements of science in creating morally better purposes have been disappointing.

> Only a blind man would deny that characteristic traits of present life are a mad scramble for material commodities, a devotion to attainment of external power, and an insensate love of foolish luxuries and idle display.[111]

> We seem to find everywhere a hardness, a tightness, a clamping down of the lid, a regimentation and standardization, a devotion to efficiency and prosperity of a mechanical and quantitative sort.[112]

> It must be admitted that to a considerable extent the progress thus procured by scientific methods has been only technical: it has provided more efficient means for satisfying preexistent desires, rather than modified the quality of human purposes.[113]

Dewey's answer, of course, to the failure of science to improve the quality of human purposes is that we have yet to apply science directly to human acts and attitudes.[114] Science can be the means by which human morality is bettered. But this answer is inadequate for a number of reasons: (1) It is only a conjecture; there is no evidence thus far that science can elevate the moral quality of human acts. In fact, the opposite would seem to be the case. As we saw in Chapter IV, Dewey's

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[110] Supra, 185.

[111] Art. 80, 324.

[112] Art. 79, 257.

[113] DEE, 262.

[114] PAC, 324.

ideal of science is the procedure of the physical sciences, which reduces the qualitative to the quantitative.[115] If science, so conceived, becomes more and more dominant, it is folly to think we shall have anything else but that "efficiency and prosperity of a mechanical and quantitative sort" which Dewey condemns. Dewey says that the chief indictment of our present civilization is "its devotion to quantity at the expense of quality." [116] It is a cause for wonder that a thinker ordinarily so sensitive to sociological interconnections as he should fail to see a relationship between this devotion to the quantitative at the expense of the qualitative and that scientific revolution, which, in Dewey's words, "marked a change from the qualitative to the quantitative......from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous."[117]

(2) Further, this notion that science can ennoble men's purposes is opposed by another consideration in Dewey's philosophy. He is strong in insisting that science in itself is ethically neutral, capable of being put to uses both good and bad.[118]

> Science is strictly impersonal; a method and a body of knowledge. It owes its operation and its consequences to the human beings who use it. It adapts itself passively to the purposes and desires which animate these human beings. It lends itself with equal impartiality to the kindly offices of medicine and hygiene and the destructive deeds of war. It elevates some through opening new horizons; it depresses others by making them slaves of machines operated for the pecuniary gain of owners.

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115. Supra, 141-43.

116. Art. 79, 272.

117. QFC, 94.

118. PAC, 319.

How can that which is in itself ethically neutral, which "adapts itself passively to the purposes and desires which animate" human beings, be the agent of moral elevation?

(3) Finally, it is to be remembered that control of nature and control of human nature are quite different in character. Dewey admits that he cannot predict even the general course of human events;[119] yet, an astronomer can predict the course of bodies light-years away. Predictability, and hence control, is much less possible in dealing with human nature.

While goodwill is necessary for the building of a better world, it would seem from Dewey's own thought that we shall have to look to some agency beyond science for it.

2. Scientific method cannot give meaning to life as a whole. Dewey practically admits the failure of science to bestow meaning upon life as a whole. As we have already seen in his discussion of the office of philosophy,[120] it is necessary for philosophy to exercise a critical eye upon the sciences, because their interpretations of life are partial and spotwise. In Dewey's address before the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy he deplores the "worship" of science, the "immense amount of dead, specialized work in the region of 'facts,'"

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[119] Supra, 122.

[120] Supra, 97.

which forgets that facts are only data, -- "fragmentary, uncompleted meanings."[121] We hear him summoning philosophers to more "speculative audacity" and the "sloughing off" of "a cowardly reliance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts."[122] If we interpret him correctly he is pleading for ideas that will unify life and give it meaning as a whole.

While deploring our loss of perspective upon life as a whole, Dewey admits that historic religion did give a meaning to life that we do not have.[123]

> Whether even in the ages of the past that are called religious, religion was itself the actively central force that it is sometimes said to have been may be doubted. But it cannot be doubted that it was the symbol of the existence of conditions and forces that gave unity and a center to men's views of life.

3. Scientific method, further, cannot integrate the self. This fact is admitted. It is a function which Dewey confessedly turns over to religion.[124]

> It is pertinent to note that the unification of the self throughout the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers, and achieves, cannot be attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe.

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[121] P6IC, 542.

[122] Loc. cit.

[123] ION, 62.

[124] CF, 19. It is interesting to note that in Dewey's latest work on religion, in which he appeals to the imagination to bring unity into life, he comes around to the point of view of Irving Babbitt, his antagonist for so many years. Cf. Babbitt, RAR, xiii-xv.

Here again we see Dewey creating a breach between man and physical nature, despite himself. He gives us a picture of man cherishing his ideals and seeking to realize them while nature, in the silent background, keeps an indifferent peace. How long, one wonders, can man hold out against the universe? In fair weather men can go their own passably well. But what about when they become tired of their ideals? What about discouragement? What about the many vicissitudes that often take toll of the stoutest souls? Can the self hold out in defiant loneliness against the universe, then? Or, losing its hold upon its ideals, will it not disintegrate? It is a question not amenable to decisive proof. But one surmises that there is more than a little truth in an opinion Dewey uttered in those early days before his antipathy to metaphysical religion became so pronounced:[125]

> I question whether the spiritual life does not get its surest and most ample guarantee when it is learned that the laws and conditions of righteousness are implicated in the working processes of the universe; when it is found that man in his conscious struggles, in his doubts, temptations, and defeats, in his aspirations and successes is moved on and buoyed up by the forces which have developed nature; and that in this moral struggle he acts not as a mere individual but as an organ in maintaining and carrying forward the universal process.

4. Finally, scientific method cannot effect social unity. Dewey confesses that the great failure of liberalism, -- and liberalism is the movement most intimately connected with the use of scientific method,[126] -- has been its failure "when faced with the problems of social

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[125] Art. 20, 341.

[126] Cf., IDP, 61.

organization and integration."[127] But he has hopes that in the future liberalism will be able to remedy the defect through scientific intelligence.[128]

It is to be noted, again, that this is a faith, a dogma, and little more. Further, it is hard to see just how a unity can be achieved without a will to unity, and we have already explored a few of the difficulties in the way of science's effectually elevating human purposes. Dewey thinks that it can be done by a true religious attitude, -- devotion to ideal ends, -- which would enlist all genuinely religious men.[129] (The fact that the task should be turned over to religion is suggestive of the failure of science at this point.) But sooner or later "the ideal ends" of "the religious attitude" will have to be defined. When that time arrives it is difficult to see how we shall escape the present disunity that prevails with the various conceptions of God. To think that men can be united about a "religious attitude" is as naive as to think, to use Professor VanDusen's illustration, that a lasting union of all those who are characterized by a "political interest" can be effected.[130]

(III) Finally, let us consider briefly again Dewey's treatment of historical religion.

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127. LSA, 28.

128. Ibid, 73.

129. Cf. CF, 80-87.

130. VanDusen, Art. 1, 131.

Dewey prides himself on being an empiricist; he calls his thought "empirical naturalism."[131] He considers the method of experience as the philosophic method.[132] He insists that knowledge must be experienced to be known.[133] He tells us that we must go to experience if we would know what things are.[134] "Man discovers" for instance, "how it is possible to walk or talk or fly by examining how these things are actually done."[135] He tells us that "the failures of philosophy have come from lack of confidence in the directive powers that inhere in experience."[136] From first to last, Dewey emphasizes the "necessity of reference to experience."[137]

Further, Dewey contends that there must be continuity between present and past experience.

> We cannot lay hold of the new, we cannot even keep it before our minds, much less understand it, save by the use of ideas and knowledge we already possess. But just because the new is new it is not a mere repetition of something already had and mastered. The old takes on new color and meaning in being employed to grasp and interpret the new.[138]

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[131] EAN², ii.

[132] Cf. EAN, 2.

[133] Ibid, 31.

[134] IDP, 239.

[135] Art. 80, 321.

[136] EAN², iii.

[137] EEL, 64.

[138] EAN², i-ii.

> It is antecedently certain that continuities there must be; the new idea must be generated out of the old; it has its basis in them; and in the end its justification is found in the completion and organization which it contributes to them.[139]

> If a philosopher ignores traditions his thoughts become thin and empty.[140]

The notion of continuity and experience are fundamental to Dewey's philosophy. Yet, the surprising thing is that when he comes to consider the historical experience of religion he violates both of them. So far as the principle of continuity is concerned, he says frankly that in projecting his own view of religion he hopes to "wipe the slate clean and start afresh," -- the opposition, he says, "between religious values as I conceive them and historical religions cannot be bridged." [141]

So far as experience is concerned, the only experience of religion that there is is historical experience. The only data from which we may proceed in formulating a philosophy of religion are historical data, facts about religion as it is historically experienced. Yet, as we have indicated more than once, Dewey depreciates the historical experience of religion. He associates it with the primitive.[142] He identifies it with the more unworthy psychical phenomena of projection and compensation.[143] He insists that it has no meaningful essence of content.[144] He accuses it of cowardice, represents it as futile in dealing with

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139. Art. 75, 1.

140. Art. 80, 330.

141. CF, 6, 28.

142. Supra, 39-40.

143. Supra, 40.

144. Supra, 92-93.

human problems, a barrier in the way of scientific development, and a counterpart of human slothfulness.[145] He denies that it has progressed, but maintains that it has declined and is on the way to oblivion.[146]

Such a depreciation of an aspect of experience is not in harmony with Dewey's own principles nor does it commend itself as true to the spirit of philosophy.[147]

Why, then, is there this failure to appreciate the past? Several considerations offer themselves. In the first place, we have already seen that Dewey's method is forward-pointing and ill-adapted to the acquisition of knowledge of past events.[148] Secondly, the remarkable progress of science has tended to accentuate whatever superiority the present may possess and to associate ancient institutions, philosophies, and religions with ancient techniques and world-views that have been outmoded. Further, it must not be forgotten that Dewey before everything else is a reformer and has the reformer's sensitiveness to the contrast between what might be and what is and has been. This tends to depreciate the past. Finally, it must be confessed that

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145. Supra, 52-56.

146. Supra, 47, 96, 103, 121. CF, 29-34.

147. Tennant: "Contempt for the 'merely historical', entertained by those who would ground their beliefs on present experience alone, to the exclusion of all connexion with the implications of past Objective fact, is no philosophic habit of mind: it evinces the mistaken view that..... 'reality in the making' is more 'real' than 'reality' which has been made." (PT, II, 238) Berdyaev: "The doctrine of progress is first and foremost an entirely illegitimate deification of the future at the expense of past and present, in a way that has not the slightest scientific, philosophical or moral justification." (MOH, 187.)

148. Supra, 160-61.

Dewey's neglect of historical religion is due, to some extent at least, to an unaffected blindness for the values of historical faith. Religious values in the usual sense do not fit into his scheme of things; he simply can find no place for them. "Every age produces people," Whitehead tells us,[149]

> with clear logical intellects, and with the most praiseworthy grasp of the importance of some sphere of human experience, who have elaborated, or inherited, a scheme of thought which exactly fits those experiences which claim their interest. Such people are apt resolutely to ignore, or to explain away, all evidence which confuses their scheme with contradictory instances. What they cannot fit in is for them nonsense.

Dewey appears to be one of those people!

G. SUMMARY

The task of Chapter V. was to expound and to evaluate Dewey's doctrine of progress, which, we have seen, is one of the premises of his philosophy of religion as well as his rejection of supernaturalism. We found that he conceives of progress as a process of perpetual "growth" by which an increase of value is realized. We saw that three centuries of science provide the basis for his belief, and that while other achievements of man have scarcely kept up with his scientific development, Dewey was optimistic about the results when science is given universal application. Analysis of Dewey's hopes for the future revealed that he conceived of genuine progress as more than mere "growth", but, rather, growth in the direction of a social order designed to liberate

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[149] SMW, 268.

and encourage the development of human capacities. Needless to say, this progress is a human achievement, dependent on human desires, intelligence, and powers of organization.

It was argued that the doctrine of progress such as Dewey outlined offers the most serious threat to metaphysical religion and that Dewey's most fruitful contribution to religious philosophy is his practical insistence on a functional interpretation of religion.

When Dewey's theory of progress was subjected to criticism, however, it appeared that his doctrine was neither self-consistent nor in harmony with some of the basic principles of his naturalism. Further, it was seen that his own teachings force the admission that scientific method cannot supply some of the elements necessary for that better order which Dewey **sees.** Again, it was pointed out that his depreciation of the historical experience of religion is not in harmony with his own empiricism.

In concluding the two chapters of criticism it is to be noted that Dewey's positive theory of religion is open to the same general objections as he raised against the supernatural. (1) He contends that religion took its origin in desire. Yet, we have seen that his own religion arises from desire, -- the desire of the self for integration and for progress. (2) He argued that supernaturalism was epistemologically defective: its claims cannot be validated by scientific method. But it was pointed out that the central objects of Dewey's own religious teaching -- society, the past, values, the whole (in Chapter IV), and progress

(in Chapter V) -- are incapable of strict scientific verification. (3) Dewey maintained that logically supernaturalism is guilty of what he calls "the fallacy of selective emphasis." Certain aspects or factors of experience, rather than experience as a whole, are elevated to the status of religious objects. In Chapter III, however, we cited Dewey's own words to the effect that the object of faith for him is certain selected factors of existence. In Chapter V we saw Dewey concentrating upon the possibilities of human achievement, leaving the destinies of physical nature out of account. (4) Dewey raised practical objections to the historical faith, but in this chapter it became clear that science, too, has decided limitations to its practical effectiveness as a meliorative agent.

Thus, we find an inner contradiction in Dewey's position with regard to religion between its positive and negative sides. If Dewey's grounds for negating supernaturalism are valid, then his humanism has to be denied along with the theism he opposes, for the objections to the one are applicable in principle to the other. If, on the other hand, Dewey's humanism is valid, with its faith in that which confessedly rests on desire (the desire for progress), is scientifically indemonstrable (society, values, the whole, progress), plainly selective in character (man as distinguished from physical nature), and subject to practical limitations, then the strictures raised against supernaturalism do not hold. Dewey is caught in hopeless contradiction as his philosophy of religion stands.

There is a possible synthesis for the contradictions of Dewey's philosophy, however, at a higher stage of the "dialectic." The essential truth of Dewey's attack on supernaturalism is: The object of religion should be real, and the real is that which functions in human experience for the increase of value. The burden of his attack on historical religion, as we have seen repeatedly, is that the traditional faith has not dealt with realities nor been fruitful in the enhancement of human experience. The essential truth of his own conception of religion is: The increase of value in human experience depends on factors that are (1) personal and (2) wholes. We have seen that Dewey's major concern is with the personal; for all his talk about "means" and "instruments" it is to be remembered that they are instrumental to personal life. Whatever goods there be, they are personal and achieved through personal functioning. Human beings cannot be developed in isolation but require the cooperation of all other relevant persons. Further, the underlying principle of his metaphysics is continuity, which implies that anything less than a whole is unreal. We have noted that the mark of "the religious" in Dewey's eyes is integration of the self (wholeness) and that that unification is effected through allegiance to a whole, whether it be conceived as an imaginative synthesis of ideal ends or an objective reality.

A synthesis of the essential truths of the two sides of Dewey's philosophy may be phrased thus: The object of religion is the universe, conceived as a personal whole (the universe is the ultimate whole), and functioning in human experience for the increase of value.

We repeat, Dewey's philosophy of religion as it stands is involved in contradiction. But if the legitimate implications of his view be developed the result is not inconsistent with theism.

SUMMARY.

The preliminary chapter of this dissertation was concerned with certain introductory matters. It contained first of all, a section devoted to Dewey's life and achievements, followed by a statement of the problem and a word about the term "naturalistic", which figures so largely in the discussion. Then a sketch of the organization of the dissertation was given. There came next a survey of the meager literature on Dewey's interpretation of religion and a chronological classification of the sources on which this study is based. The remainder of the first chapter was a brief exposition of Dewey's views on religion in the early period of his development (roughly, before 1890), when his position was quite different from that which later characterizes him.

In Chapter II the argument proper began. As every student of Dewey's philosophy is aware, for a period of thirty-odd years Dewey maintains a relentless attack upon what he calls "the supernatural", which occupies a central place in the religious tradition of the Western world. We sought to analyze "the supernatural" and came to the conclusion that his polemic is directed against the ascription of normative worth and superior reality to entities lying beyond the bounds of scientific verification. We organized his objections to the supernatural under four heads: (1) Genetic, -- the supernatural arises out of desire, or myth, a fact which discredits its claims to objective validity. (2) Epistemological, -- the supernatural rests on premises belonging to the prescientific era. (3) Logical, -- it is self-refuting and

guilty of hypostatizing eventual functions of experience into antecedent realities. (4) Practical, -- belief in the supernatural is inimical to the development of science, human amelioration, the exercise of human endeavor, and the practice of true religion. We saw that Dewey's attitude toward the traditional arguments for God is essentially that of post-Kantian religious philosophy.

Upon examination of the objections to the supernatural we observed that the genetic argument is irrelevant, even on a pragmatic basis, for antecedents are not the criteria of truth. The epistemological objection presupposes the exclusive validity of scientific method. The third objection, -- the logical, -- is decisive against an impersonal idealism. The practical objection we noted to be weakened by unguarded generalizations and to rest on the pragmatic criterion of truth.

From Dewey's critique of historical religion we turned, in Chapter III, to an exposition of his positive doctrine on religion. Every religious philosophy must take a position with respect to (1) nature, (2) man, and (3) value. We saw concerning (1) that Dewey holds nature to be a totality, inclusive of physical things, mind, universals, and values. Man (2) is, thus, an integral part of nature and the values which he cherishes (3) are continuous with nature, being the possibilities of existence. Rejecting the notion of a universal content in historical religions, we noted that Dewey establishes his own conception of "the religious" as an apprehension of and devotion to such inclusive ends as result in the unification of the self, a view of "the religious"

that is in harmony with science, dependent on philosophy for its values, closely related to the moral and esthetic, and eventuating in social idealism. The object of faith, or God, Dewey defines as "the active relation of the ideal and the actual." When we inquired into the nature of the relationship we found that two interpretations emerge in Dewey's writings, -- God as an imaginative synthesis of the ideal ends, or possibilities, of existence, and a realistic view, nature as a whole or those selected aspects of nature which support ideals. While the first interpretation probably represents Dewey's main intent, the second is present and illustrates the difficulty Dewey experiences in his whole philosophy of resolving the ideal-real relationship. We commented not only on the fact that the basic concept of his philosophy of religion is ambiguous but that it is open to the same fundamental objections which he had laid himself at the door of the supernatural. When we investigated Dewey's position with reference to the perennial problems of religion we found that he is suspicious of personal piety, feels that the problem of evil is practical rather than speculative, questions immortality, and summons men to a consecration of the Church to social ends. We compared Dewey's philosophy of religion with personalism and found that, apart from the fact that the one gives a conceptual interpretation of religion as distinguished from a functional (Dewey), the basic difference between them arises out of their divergent appraisals of the scope and validity of scientific method. While personalism recognizes the importance of science in the discovery of truth, its method is synoptic: it takes into account non-scientific

data as well. On the other hand, Dewey's whole polemic against traditional religion, and his own positive doctrine rests on the assumption of the exclusive validity of scientific method.

This assumption expresses itself in two ways: (1) in the epistemological doctrine that scientific method is the only certain method and test of truth, and (2) in the practical teaching that science offers the one hope of human progress. In Chapter IV we took (1) under consideration. We found that by scientific method Dewey means the experimental method and precise, predictive verification of the physical sciences. In order to test the validity of the assumption referred to above we asked whether this method and criterion of truth is self-consistent: Can the exclusive validity of scientific method itself be established scientifically? Three ways were indicated by which this question might be affirmatively answered, -- (a) by showing that experimental verification is involved in the very notion of truth, (b) by demonstrating that all other criteria are invalid, (c) by contending pragmatically that the assumption of the exclusive validity of science works. We discovered that Dewey employs all three. But none of them is adequate to establish the premise under consideration. So far as (1) is concerned, we saw that Dewey's theory of judgment as practical is untenable. With regard to (2) we found that Dewey rejects all significant criteria, -- except coherence! Not only does he refrain from criticism of it, but he uses it extensively, a sufficient commentary in itself on his extreme claims for scientific method. It was pointed out that (3), the pragmatic argument, is logically defective

and does not establish the exclusive validity of science, which is the point at issue.

We tested Dewey's claims for scientific method, further, by asking, not only whether they are self-consistent, but whether the essential momenta in Dewey's own philosophy of religion can be established by scientific method. We discovered (a) that though Dewey is a philosopher of society, the existence of other selves cannot be verified by the precise methods of the sciences; (b) that while Dewey condemns supernatural religion for its unworthy past, in the strict sense past events, whether good or bad, could never be known by methods of the precise physical sciences; (c) that though he elevates values to the place occupied by God in historical religions, he could never establish what ought to be by scientific method; (d) that the concept of the Universe in its totality, devotion to which the vital integration of the self -- the supreme mark of "the religious" -- depends, is by his own confession incapable of being known. The conclusion which follows naturally is that the premise of both the negative and positive elements of Dewey's philosophy of religion, -- the notion of the exclusive validity of scientific method, -- is an assumption and nothing more. Thus, the attack on the supernatural loses its cogency, and the objects of Dewey's humanistic faith enjoy no preferential status over the objects of supernaturalism.

The last chapter was concerned with the practical assumption (2 above) that science is not only exclusively valid, so far as knowledge

is concerned, but that it offers the one sure hope of human progress. We found that Dewey conceives of progress as a process of perpetual "growth" by which an increase of value is realized. When we investigated the grounds for progress in the past we discovered that science is the only field of human endeavor in which perceptible progress has been made; men's other achievements have scarcely kept up with scientific development. Nevertheless, Dewey is optimistic with regard to the future. He believes that future progress should be in the direction of a social order designed to liberate and encourage the development of human capacities and will take place when allegiance to the supernatural is given up and science is universally applied.

When this theory of progress was subjected to criticism, however, several internal difficulties came to light: the conflict between the teaching that progress has no ends and the doctrine of self-realization as an end, the lack of harmony between the thorough-going application of the principle of continuity in his metaphysics and his singling out man alone, apart from that which supports him, as the agent of progress, the fact that future progress is incapable of scientific verification, and the inconsistency in attacking supernatural religion as projection when the idea of progress is itself a projection. Further, it was seen that his own teachings force the admission that scientific method cannot supply some of the elements essential for the better order which Dewey **sees**, -- goodwill, meaning for life as a whole, integration of the self, and social unity.

Despite these limitations, however, it was pointed out that a doctrine of progress such as Dewey's constitutes a serious threat to metaphysical religion and that his most fruitful contribution to religious philosophy is his practical insistence on a *functional* interpretation of science and religion.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. Dewey's interpretation of religion is fundamentally naturalistic in that (a) it rejects the supernatural, (b) considers man, the bearer of religion, as a part of nature, (c) the ends of faith as the possibilities of nature, (d) the means, the method of the natural sciences, (e) the fruition, a re-making of the natural.

2. Despite his avowed naturalism, there are pronounced idealistic elements in his thought (especially his doctrines of mind, continuity, the efficacy of intelligence, and the primacy of the ethical), which are only verbally reconciled with his realism.

3. The supreme instance of his difficulty in resolving the ideal and the real is his conception of God as "the active relation between ideal and actual," which is capable of either idealistic (God as the imaginative synthesis of the ideal possibilities of existence) or realistic (nature, in whole or part, as the support of ideals) interpretation.

4. While Dewey claims to be an empiricist in his general philosophy, his philosophy of religion is non-empirical, since he depreciates historical religion, which provides the data of religion.

5. Both the negative and positive elements of Dewey's religious philosophy rest on the assumption of the exclusive (epistemological) validity and (practical) efficacy of scientific method.

6. Yet, this assumption of exclusive validity itself can not be established scientifically, the essential momenta of Dewey's own philosophy of religion (society, the past, values, the whole, progress) are incapable of scientific verification, and not all elements essential to human progress can be supplied by science.

7. The most fruitful contribution of Dewey's religious philosophy is his insistence on a functional interpretation of science and religion.

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[1] This bibliography does not purport to be exhaustive. For such a bibliography the reader is referred to the excellent study by Thomas and Schneider, BJD. The bibliography of this dissertation is selective, containing only those works of Dewey's many-sided authorship and written about his philosophy which have particular bearing on the problem under discussion. It is to be noted, further, that where magazine articles have been collected by Dewey into book form, as is the case with IDP, EEL, CHE, and PJD, especially, the book citation alone (with a very few exceptions) has been given. The works written by Dewey are arranged chronologically, the others alphabetically so far as authors are concerned and chronologically with respect to the works of each individual writer.

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The author of this dissertation was born in Chesterville, Ohio, August 12, 1907, the son of Louis Alfred and Nellie McConnell Ensley. His early education was gained in the public schools of his native state, and he received the A.B. degree from Ohio Wesleyan University in 1927. After a year of public-school teaching in Lorain, Ohio, he matriculated at Boston University School of Theology. He received his S. T. B. degree in 1931 and was elected by the Faculty to the Jacob Sleeper Fellowship for foreign study. During 1931-2 he studied at the University of Berlin, Germany. Upon his return to America he registered in the Graduate School of Boston University for the Ph.D. degree, completing his residence requirements in 1934. He was associate pastor of the Islington (Mass.) Community Church in 1932-33. From there he was called to the pastorate of the First Congregational Church of North Hampton, New Hampshire. In 1935 he became minister of the United Church of Norwood, Massachusetts, which is his position at the present time. He was married to Eunice Irene LeBourveau in 1935 and has one son.

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